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1 
Preface 
As risk is undeniably a part of human life, a considerable share of economic 
decisions is made under some form of risk. Taking decision makers’ risk preferences 
into account can substantially change the validity of theoretical economic 
predictions. The revenue equivalence theorem, for instance, one of the major 
findings in auction theory stating that bids and revenues are equivalent in all 
common auction forms1, loses its validity when bidders are assumed to exhibit 
preferences towards risk other than risk neutrality. Understanding how choice 
behavior is affected by risk is thus crucial to predict market behavior and to make 
correct policy decisions. Economic research contributed a lot to develop models 
capturing basic human tendencies under risk in order to better understand market 
behavior. These models are, for instance, necessary to explain the existence of 
insurance markets. More elaborate models are also capable of capturing more 
puzzling findings such as the demand for insurances and lottery tickets at the same 
time, or the return-premium of stocks over bonds usually observed in financial 
markets. 
Laboratory experiments play an important part in testing and refining these models 
as well as their implications. An analysis of behavior under risk with real world data 
is aggravated by the decision makers’ unknown level of information, a self-selection 
of decision makers into risky situations, and the impracticality to control for motives 
other than risk preferences. In contrast, the laboratory environment allows 
controlling for various factors such as available information, it averts self-selection 
by assigning participants exogenously, and enables the elicitation of context-free 
preferences over probabilities and outcomes.  
All studies presented in this dissertation report results of laboratory experiments. The 
first two chapters explore how human behavior under risk may change under certain 
circumstances. While the first chapter investigates how choices concerning risk 
change when a decision maker decides not only for herself but is responsible for 
another person, the second chapter examines how choices made under risk change 
when the decision maker faces severe time pressure. Chapter three and four 
                                                            
1 All auction forms where the bidder with the highest signal wins the auction and the bidder with the 
lowest signal has an expected surplus of zero. 
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investigate how the introduction of risk changes behavior in two well-studied 
economic settings allowing for a more realistic approach: Chapter three investigates 
how bidding behavior changes in a first-price sealed bid auction when the auctioned 
good exhibits an ex-post risk, meaning that the true value of the good is revealed 
only some time after the auction. Chapter four analyzes how individuals’ willingness 
to cooperate in the framework of a linear public goods game is affected if the goal of 
cooperation is not to create a gain but to prevent a loss and if a cooperative 
contribution has no deterministic impact on final outcomes but exhibits an outcome 
risk itself, i.e. a contribution only influences the probability of the desired outcome to 
occur. 
 
In Chapter 1, which is joint work with Sebastian Strasser and Ferdinand Vieider, we 
explore how a decision maker’s risk preferences change when she decides not only 
for herself but for another person as well. So far, economic research has focused 
mainly on exploring and describing risk preferences when decisions are made 
individually. However, in reality a large part of decisions individuals face either 
personally or professionally are made under responsibility for other persons, e.g. as 
managers for a company, as parents for children, or as politicians for the society. To 
the extent that decisions under responsibility differ from decisions commonly found 
in the individual decision making literature, findings from the latter will only 
constitute an imperfect predictor of attitudes under responsibility. Given that 
decisions under responsibility constitute an important class of decision situations - 
and indeed one that in its economic importance may even surpass individual 
decisions - additional evidence on any differences can provide important insights for 
descriptive as well as prescriptive policy purposes.  
In a between subjects design we compare lottery decisions observed in an individual 
treatment, i.e. a decision maker’s choice only affects her own income, with those 
made in a responsibility treatment, i.e. a decision maker’s choice affects her own 
income as well as the income of an anonymous other (the recipient) in exactly the 
same way. The perfect income matching for the decision maker and her recipient 
allows us to study possible behavioral changes in a clean way, excluding issues 
deriving e.g. from preferences over outcome distributions that may cause inequality 
concerns. As the decision maker’s choice does not only affect the recipient´s 
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outcome but also her own, she will not be able to exactly follow her own preferences 
and thus will bear an actual cost when accommodating any presumed preferences of 
the recipient or when following some social norm. Therefore, our findings constitute 
only the lower bound on the effects we aim to investigate.  
As individual risk attitude has been found to differ systematically across probability 
and outcome spaces we confront individuals with risky choices in the gain domain, 
the loss domain, and the mixed domain including both gains and losses. In a second 
experiment we also systematically vary probabilities in the gain domain.  
For medium probabilities we can confirm the intuition that being responsible for 
somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion for gains, while in the loss domain 
we find increased risk seeking. In our second experiment we replicate the finding of 
increased risk aversion for large probabilities of a gain, while for small probabilities 
we find an increase of risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. This discredits 
hypotheses of a cautious shift, and indicates an accentuation of the fourfold pattern 
of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory.  
Our results indicate that typical risk attitudes found for individual decision makers 
can not only be generalized to decision makers bearing responsibility for others, such 
as professional agents, but are even reinforced to some extent. These findings may 
have important consequences for economic prediction and policy design. As such 
patterns are usually seen as suboptimal from a (risk neutral) principal’s point of 
view, special care should be taken when designing contracts, and training programs 
for managers may seem desirable in order for them not to follow these unwanted 
decision making patterns. 
 
In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Martin Kocher and Stefan Trautmann, we 
explore how the presence of severe time pressure affects individual decision making 
under risk. Time pressure is common to many crucial economic decisions. Whether 
in financial markets, in auctions, or in negotiations – individuals often have to make 
their decisions immediately after new information becomes available. In most 
experimental studies on individual decision making under risk, however, subjects 
have plenty of time to make their decisions and face no severe time restrictions. 
Instead, experimental subjects are usually even urged to consider their choices 
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carefully. If there is a change in behavior under time pressure, existing behavioral 
predictions and empirical evidence based on data without time pressure may not be 
valid in fast-paced markets. The effects of time pressure on decision making under 
risk are also important from a methodological perspective, as it is inevitable in some 
disciplines such as the quickly emerging field of neuro-economics to restrict decision 
times for individuals to only a few seconds in order to measure neural activity during 
the decision process. If decisions under risk are affected by time pressure, the 
observed patterns of neural activity may also be specific to this condition. If, in 
contrast, they are not or only partially affected, the results can claim wider 
applicability. 
In a between subjects design we confront individuals with risky decisions in the gain 
domain, the loss domain, and the mixed domain varying the time available for 
making the decision and the degree of decision aid in terms of expected value 
information. We find that risk aversion in the gain domain is robust under time 
pressure whereas risk seeking in the loss domain turns into risk aversion under time 
pressure. For mixed prospects, subjects become more loss averse and more gain 
seeking under time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. The 
availability of expected value information affects choices concerning mixed 
prospects, reducing both loss averse and gain seeking behavior irrespectively of the 
presence of time pressure. In contrast, we find decisions for pure gain or pure loss 
gambles not to be affected by expected value information.  
Our findings provide reasserting evidence for the generalizability of elicited risk 
attitudes from the laboratory to real world environments exhibiting time pressure as 
long as the gain domain is concerned. If losses and mixed outcomes are involved, 
results with existing elicitation methods seem to be only partially valid.  Our results 
show that typical non-expected utility patterns as modeled by prospect theory may 
not provide an appropriate description of choice behavior when time pressure 
becomes important. Instead, recently developed models of expected utility with an 
aspiration level (Diecidue and van de Ven 2008) may be more suitable to capture 
behavioral patterns in such situations. Our finding of expected value information to 
reduce both loss averse and gain seeking behavior indicates that subjects benefit 
from such decision aids. Our results suggest that subjects are aware of their 
sensitivity to framing and aspiration levels, and try to avoid such effects by falling 
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back on presumably objective measures. Given that in many decision situations 
outside the lab a wide range of decision aid, e.g. summary statistics, is available to 
decision makers, actual behavior may thus be closer to the risk neutral benchmark 
than laboratory studies sometimes suggest. 
 
In Chapter 3, which is also joint work with Martin Kocher and Stefan Trautmann, we 
study how bidding behavior in an affiliated private value first-price auction is 
affected when adding an ex-post risk to the value of the auctioned good. The 
expression ex-post risk reflects the fact that the stochastic event which determines the 
good’s value either takes place or is at least revealed only some time after the good is 
auctioned off. Real life auctions often involve goods exhibiting such a common 
knowledge ex-post risk that is independent of buyers’ private values or their signals 
regarding common value components. For instance, the final value of construction 
procurements might depend on future weather conditions, the value of mining- or 
drilling-rights on the outcome of a future political election in the target country, and 
the value of antiques and paintings on a future verification of authenticity. However, 
theoretical as well as empirical economic studies mostly ignore the presence of ex-
post risk and focus on auctions for deterministic objects, i.e. objects exhibiting no 
such risk. 
From a theoretical perspective the introduction of an ex-post risk should have three 
effects concerning the bidding decision of a risk averse agent: First, the bidder´s 
valuation for the auctioned good should be reduced by her risk premium. Second, as 
the riskiness of the object introduces a background risk, the bidder should become 
more risk averse regarding other risks and should consequently reduce her bid 
shading in order to lower the risk of losing the good. Third, due to prudence, the 
bidder should value each extra unit of wealth more in case she wins the auction and 
has to face the ex-post risk and should consequently lower her bid. Esö and White 
(2004) theoretically show for bidders exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA) that the last effect which they call the precautionary effect overweighs the 
second effect, thus, predicting bidders to reduce their bids by more than their 
appropriate risk premium when ex-post risk is involved. We are the first to provide 
an empirical study exploring the effect of ex-post risk on bidding behavior. Although 
deriving our hypotheses from Esö and White’s theoretical result which is based on 
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the assumption of expected utility theory, we provide a model-free test and a 
behavioral definition of precautionary bidding. 
In a within subjects design we conduct experimental first-price auctions that allow us 
to compare subjects’ bids for risky objects, i.e. lotteries, with bids for their respective 
certainty equivalents which we have elicited beforehand. We find subjects to place 
significantly lower bids on risky objects than on equally valued sure objects. Our 
results are robust when controlling for potentially confounding decision biases such 
as loss aversion. As we find precautionary bidding to occur already for the small 
stakes employed in our experimental setting, it is natural to expect such behavior to 
be an important factor in real world auctions where stakes are usually much higher. 
Thus, our results have implications for auction design in general, and more 
specifically, for information revelation by sellers and information acquisition by 
buyers.  
 
In chapter 4, I investigate whether cooperation in social dilemmas is more likely if 
cooperation is either framed as an opportunity to create a value (creation frame) or to 
prevent the loss of a value (prevention frame) and if cooperative behavior increases 
the group’s outcome either in a deterministic way (no outcome risk condition) or in a 
non-deterministic way affecting only outcome-probabilities (outcome risk condition). 
Distinguishing within these two dimensions allows capturing crucial characteristics 
of various real world social dilemmas. While the provision problem of public 
parkways, for instance, can most likely be classified as a creation frame social 
dilemma, the provision of public safety is rather an example for a prevention frame 
social dilemma. However, both examples share the existence of an almost infinite 
number of provision levels allowing each invested monetary unit to deterministically 
increase the quality of provision. In contrast, the funding of research and 
development projects or the construction of a dyke are examples for social dilemmas 
exhibiting only two possible provision levels: A scientific breakthrough is either 
achieved or it is not, a dike either bursts with the next flood or it does not. 
Contributions only increase the probability of the desired event. However, the former 
of these two examples has a creative character while the latter exhibits a preventive 
nature. Although ubiquitous in real world social dilemmas, the impact of such 
variations has never been analyzed in depth. 
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In a between subjects design I systematically vary a linear public goods game in the 
two dimensions introduced above. Keeping marginal incentives equivalent in 
expectations, I find both a preventive character and the presence of outcome risk to 
increase contributions. Consequently, the highest degree of cooperation can be found 
when combining both characteristics. My findings contribute to a better 
understanding of why some real world social dilemmas are more easily overcome 
than others. The results furthermore suggest interest groups concerned with the 
provision of a specific public good containing a preventive character and/or outcome 
risk to emphasize these characteristics as much as possible.  
All four chapters contain their own introductions and appendices so they can be read 
independently. 
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1 Chapter 1 
Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Economic situations in which an agent takes decisions that affect others' outcomes as 
well as her own constitute a common class of phenomena. For instance, they 
represent situations in which a decision maker’s choices affect not only her own 
outcomes, but those of her family as well. Another common instance of such 
decision problems is the one of financial agency contracts in which the incentive 
structure of the agent coincides with the one of the principal. An example may be the 
one of executives that are compensated through company shares, or the one of a 
stock broker whose payoffs are determined by the outcomes of the investments she 
undertakes. 
There is an extensive literature on individual decision making under risk and 
uncertainty (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Post et al., 2008), as well as a substantial 
literature on risk attitude in agency problems and how to influence it through 
performance-contingent pay (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). What is missing, 
however, is a direct comparison of risk attitudes when decisions are individual to 
situations of responsibility. Indeed, to the extent that decisions under responsibility 
differ from decisions commonly found in the individual decision making literature, 
findings from the latter will only constitute an imperfect predictor of attitudes under 
responsibility. Given that the latter constitute an economically important class of 
decision situations - and indeed one that in its economic importance may even 
surpass individual decisions - additional evidence on any differences can provide 
important insights for descriptive, prescriptive, and policy purposes. 
We thus explore the difference in risk attitudes between situations of decision-
making for oneself and situations of responsibility, i.e. situations in which the 
decision maker decides for others as well as for herself. We explore such decisions 
for situations in which an anonymous other (the recipient) is affected by any 
outcomes in exactly the same way as the decision maker herself. This allows us to 
study possible changes in behavior in a clean way, excluding issues deriving e.g. 
from preferences over outcome distributions that may cause inequality concerns. 
Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk 
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Also, by making both the decision maker’s outcome and the recipient’s outcome 
dependent on the decision makers’ choice, the latter will bear an actual cost in terms 
of her own preferences by accommodating any presumed preferences of the recipient 
or by following some social norm. Any findings should thus constitute a lower bound 
on the effects we want to investigate. 
To our best knowledge, the only paper that reports results about this issue under 
equal payoff assumptions in a non-strategic setting is Bolton and Ockenfels (2010), 
although the authors report these results as an afterthought to their main results about 
inequality concerns and do not find statistically significant results due to their small 
sample size. They also discuss only the case of decisions in the gain domain. We 
explore the issue systematically for risky choices in the gain domain, the loss 
domain, and the mixed domain. Individual risk attitudes have been found to differ 
systematically in the different domains (Abdellaoui, 2000; Booij et al., 2010; 
Schoemaker, 1990). To the extent that individual risk attitudes have been found to 
differ systematically across the probability and outcome spaces, responsibility may 
well have different effects across these dimensions. While we adopt a theory-neutral 
approach in our exploratory efforts, the inclusion of different decision domains will 
allow us to capture any richness in behavior as predicted by descriptively more 
complex theories such as prospect theory. 
We find that in the gain domain, being responsible for others as well as oneself does 
indeed increase risk aversion for medium to large probabilities, thus, showing that 
Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2010) intuition was correct. In addition, we show that for 
pure loss prospects, subjects become more risk seeking when responsible for others. 
Loss aversion on the other hand, being already very strong in individual decisions, 
does not seem to increase when subjects are responsible for others. In a second 
experiment aimed at exploring social norms on risk taking in the gain domain in 
more detail, we replicate the finding that risk aversion increases under responsibility 
for large probabilities. When choices regard small probability prospects, however, 
we find increased risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. Overall, our results 
thus point to an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes typically found 
in individual decision making when subjects are responsible. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses risk attitudes and how they 
may be influenced by social contexts. Section 1.3 describes the first experiment, with 
Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk 
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section 1.3.1 describing the methodology and section 1.3.2 presenting the results; 
section 1.3.3 discusses the result of experiment 1 and derives hypotheses for 
experiment 2. Section 1.4 introduces experiment 2, with section 1.4.1 describing the 
methodology and section 1.4.2 presenting the results. Section 1.4.3 discusses the 
results of experiment 2 as well as the overall results. Section 1.5 concludes this 
chapter. 
 
1.2 Risk Attitudes in Social Contexts 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest by economists in how social factors 
may influence decision making under risk (Bohnet et al., 2008; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2010; Goeree and Yariv, 2008). Such social factors could take various 
forms, ranging from whether a decision is observed by somebody else or whether the 
decision maker observes somebody else’s decision, to whether one’s outcome 
depends on somebody else or whether one’s decision influences the outcome of 
somebody else (Trautmann and Vieider, 2010). We are interested in the latter 
category: do preferences over risky choices change when the decision influences 
somebody else’s outcomes as well as the ones of the decision maker? And if so, 
how? 
To date there is very little evidence on this issue, with the existing evidence 
appearing inconclusive. Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) hypothesize that risk aversion 
will increase under responsibility. However, their result fails to reach statistical 
significance. Indeed, their main results concern the effect of social comparison, so 
that they mainly examine choice behavior when outcomes may differ between the 
decision maker and the recipient. They find an increase in risk taking under 
conditions of responsibility when the safe option yields unequal payoffs, and 
particularly when such payoff asymmetry is unfavorable to the decision maker. In 
contrast, they find that under responsibility risk taking does not depend on whether 
the risky option yields unequal payoffs. 
In a somewhat related study from the game-theoretic literature, Charness and 
Jackson (2009) have subjects play Rousseau’s stag hunting game against each other. 
They compare conditions in which one subject simply plays against another, to one 
in which a second, passive, subject depends on each player. They find that under 
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responsibility for someone else the efficient equilibrium obtains less frequently. 
While this may again be an indication for increased risk aversion under 
responsibility, it is not clear where such a risk may actually come from since it is not 
in the interest of any of the players to deviate from the efficient equilibrium unless 
they think the other player may deviate. Furthermore, the setup of the study again 
creates issues of inequality aversion. Even if the passive recipient obtains the same 
payoffs as the decision maker, the strategic nature of the game implies that the 
decision maker can influence the payoffs of her opponent and the latter's passive 
recipient –which may affect her choices ex-ante. 
We aim to specifically exclude inequality concerns to filter out the pure effect of 
being responsible for somebody else's payoffs. In order to achieve this, the exact 
choice that determines the decision maker's payoff also determines the recipient's 
payoff, resulting in exactly the same outcome for the decision maker and the 
recipient. This design thus allows us to isolate the effect of being responsible for 
somebody else as well as for oneself from any distributional issues (Rohde and 
Rohde, 2010). Furthermore, there are costs for the decision maker in adapting her 
preferences under conditions of responsibility in terms of sacrificing her own 
preferences. In this sense, we believe that our design constitutes a lower bound on 
any effects of responsibility that could be found employing alternative designs, such 
as salaried agents. 
Given the lack of conclusive evidence to date, we propose to systematically explore 
the effect of responsibility on risk preferences throughout the outcome and 
probability domains. In order to facilitate that task, in what follows in this chapter we 
will adopt a behavioral, and hence theory-neutral, definition of risk aversion. A 
decision maker will be defined as risk averse whenever she prefers the expected 
value of a prospect to the prospect itself; conversely, she will be defined as risk 
seeking whenever she prefers the prospect to a sure amount equivalent to the 
prospect in terms of expected value (Wakker, 2010, p.52). Risk aversion and risk 
seeking are thus relative terms, such that a decrease in risk aversion can be seen as 
equivalent to an increase in risk seeking, regardless of absolute levels of risk taking2. 
                                                            
2This means that saying that choices under condition A are more risk averse than under condition B is 
taken as equivalent to saying that they are less risk seeking under A than under B, regardless of the 
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In our presentation of the results we recur to prospect theory - the prevalent 
descriptive theory of choice under risk and uncertainty today (Starmer, 2000; 
Wakker, 2010). Under prospect theory, risk attitudes are described by utility 
curvature, loss aversion, and probability weighting (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005). 
Since prospect theory is more general than other theories of decisions under risk such 
as expected utility theory, we can thus capture richer risk attitudes if present, without 
however imposing a theory on our data a priori. 
In individual decision making under risk, the typical finding is a fourfold pattern of 
risk attitudes: risk aversion for medium to large probabilities of gains; risk seeking 
for small probability gains; risk aversion for small probability losses; and risk 
seeking for medium to large probability losses (Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 
2010; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In addition to this 
fourfold pattern, for mixed prospects involving both gains and losses, risk attitudes 
are significantly influenced by loss aversion - the phenomenon according to which 
monetary losses are usually attributed greater weights than equivalent monetary 
gains (Abdellaoui et al., 2007; Schmidt and Zank, 2005; Tversky and Kahnemann, 
1992). 
The question of whether and how being responsible for others changes choice 
behavior also raises interesting questions about rationality concepts, social norms on 
risk taking, and the perceived acceptability of attitudes towards risks. This in turn has 
implications for debiasing, or simply changing risk attitudes in ways that may seem 
socially desirable. By comparing situations of individual decision making to 
situations of responsibility for different probabilities and in different domains, we are 
able to examine the perceived acceptability of common individual decision making 
patterns under risk. To the extent that being responsible for others may act as a 
cognitive motivator for more careful consideration of the decision alternatives, we 
can draw conclusions about the perceived acceptability of a type of behavior by 
observing if and in what direction people move from the individual baseline when 
responsible for others. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
absolute level of risky or safe choices (i.e, regardless of whether safe choices are more or less than 
50% in both cases, or whether they cross the 50% mark). 
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1.3 Experiment 1: Responsibility for Gains, Losses, and Mixed 
Prospects 
1.3.1 Experimental Design 
We designed a laboratory experiment in which we asked subjects to take binary 
decisions between two alternatives that are presented to them on a computer screen. 
Payoffs always affect the decision maker and the recipient in a perfectly parallel 
manner in the responsibility treatment, so as to avoid issues of payoff inequality 
(Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010; Rohde and Rohde, 2010). 
 
Subjects: Overall, 144 subjects were recruited from a subject pool of the 
experimental laboratory MELESSA of the University of Munich, Germany, via 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment took roughly 1.5 hours, and average 
earnings were €22.49. The experiments were run on computers using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 46% of subjects were female, and the average age was 24.07 
years. 
 
Task: Subjects were asked to choose between a safe prospect and a risky prospect. 
The safe prospect usually consisted in a sure amount of money, and sometimes in a 
prospect with lower volatility compared to the risky prospect. The risky prospect 
always gave a 50–50 chance to obtain one of two outcomes. The prospects could 
comprise only positive amounts, only negative amounts, or both positive and 
negative amounts (see below). Overall, subjects had to make 40 choices, with the 
order of presentation as well as the position of the two prospects randomized for each 
subject. Subjects took decisions sequentially and had no opportunity to return to an 
earlier decision to revise it. All of the above was explained in the instructions (see 
appendix A1). 
 
Prospects: The 40 choices to be made by all subjects in the experiment were 
constructed systematically in the following way: We chose five different stake levels 
that we denote henceforth by b where b = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}. For every stake level, we 
had subjects chose between the following eight different prospect pairs: 
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Base Case: These prospect pairs offered a choice between the safe payment b and a 
prospect providing a 50% chance to win twice the safe amount b or zero otherwise. 
Sensitivity up: Compared to the base case, the safe payment is increased by 25% to 
assess the degree of risk aversion of subjects. The risky option remained unchanged. 
Sensitivity down: Similar to Sensitivity up, but the safe payment is reduced by 25%, 
again in order to measure the degree of risk aversion. The risky option remained 
unchanged. 
Positive shift: Every amount is increased by 50% of the safe payment in the base 
case. These choices were included to see how choices changed when shifting away 
from the €0 outcome. 
Lottery choice: The risky prospect now remains identical to the base case, but the 
safe payment is replaced by a prospect with a lower variance (0.5 b and 1.5 b) than 
the risky prospect (0 and 2 b)  
Mixed prospects: To obtain these prospects, the safe amount in the base case was 
subtracted from all outcomes, thus obtaining a prospect with an expected value of €0. 
The safe amount was therefore always €0, the prospect always a lottery between -b 
and b. 
Mean-preserving spread (MPS): To obtain this prospect, the two risky outcomes of 
the base case were respectively increased and decreased by 50% of the sure amount. 
The expected value of the prospect thus remains the same; however, the variance of 
the prospect increases, and a loss equal to 50% of the sure amount is introduced into 
the prospect.  
Loss Shift: The mirror image of the base case where every amount was negative 
instead of positive. These prospects were inserted to directly compare risk taking 
behavior for gains and losses.3 
Table 1-1 gives an overview of the eight different prospect pairs as a function of the 
stake level b. 
 
                                                            
3Additional prospect in the gain domain were not mirrored for ethical reasons - indeed, replicating all 
gain prospects for losses would have resulted in a high chance of overall losses during the experiment. 
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Choice Type Option A (“safe”) Option B (“risky”) 
50% 50% 50% 50% 
Base Case b 0 2b
Sensitivity Up 1.25b 0 2b 
Sensitivity Down 0.75b 0 2b 
Positive Shift 1.5b 0.5b 2.5b 
Lottery Choice 0.5b 1.5b 0 2b 
Mixed Prospect 0 -b B 
MPS b -0.5b 2.5b 
Loss Shift -b -2b 0 
Table 1-1: Prospects as functions of stake level b 
 
For a complete overview of all prospect pairs, see Table 1-6 in appendix A2. 
 
Treatments: Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the 
individual treatment, subjects took their decisions only for themselves. In the 
responsibility treatment, half of the subjects were randomly assigned the role of 
decision maker and the other half to the role of passive recipient. The decision maker 
was told that she had to take the decision on behalf of herself and another subject 
sitting in the laboratory, whose identity was not disclosed. All other subjects were 
told that they were in a passive role and that somebody else in the laboratory would 
take the decisions on their behalf. With a lag of one period, recipients were shown 
the decision problem and the choice of their corresponding decision maker. They 
could then indicate whether they were “satisfied” or “not satisfied” with the decision, 
but this did not affect payoffs nor was it shown to the decision maker.  
 
Incentives: 3 out of the 40 decisions were randomly drawn for every subject to be 
payoff relevant once the experiment was over. Subjects did not learn about any 
payoffs or extractions before the very end of the experiment. The random incentive 
system was chosen in order to avoid possible income effects, and because it is the 
standard procedure used in this kind of tasks. We extracted 3 out of the 40 choices in 
order to reduce the probability that subjects would actually lose money in the 
experiment. To make the random mechanism behind lotteries as transparent as 
possible, we had one participant throw a dice for every lottery that determined what 
outcome of the lottery is obtained. In the responsibility treatment, we implemented 
the payout procedure such that always three identical decisions were randomly 
chosen for the two paired subjects. A decision maker and her passive recipient would 
thus always obtain the same payoff from a choice. Subjects were told that it was 
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possible - though unlikely - that they would lose money in the experiment. They 
could either pay such losses directly or work them off in the lab for a wage of €5 per 
half hour. 
 
1.3.2 Results: Choices under Responsibility 
Prospect Choices: overview 
Before discussing treatment effects, it seems desirable to discuss general risk 
attitudes and how they change for the different types of prospects employed when we 
look at the individual treatment only. In the base case we find a considerable degree 
of risk aversion across all stake levels, with about 73% of subjects choosing the sure 
amount over the prospect with equal expected value (p<0.0014). As one would 
expect, choices of the sure amount further increase when the sure amount is higher 
than the expected value of the prospect (Sensitivity Up), and decrease when the sure 
amount is lower (Sensitivity Down) in which case we observe a majority of choices 
for the prospect (p<0.01). When, compared to the base case, all outcomes are moved 
upward by 50% of the sure amount (Positive Shift), we observe increased choices of 
the prospect, although choices still display significant risk aversion (p<0.01). This 
can be explained by aspiration level theory, whereby subjects aspire to win at least 
some money, thus making a prospect with a non-zero minimal outcome more 
attractive (Payne et al., 1980; 1981). 
When the choice is between two non-degenerate prospects (Lottery Choice), choice 
frequencies of the safe prospect are further increased relative to the base case, 
indicating a similar heuristic, since the safe choice now provides a combination 
between a safe minimum amount and a potentially higher outcome. For mixed 
prospects, the choice frequency of safe choices is only slightly increased compared to 
the base case (this, however, underestimates the effect given the lowering of the 
stake levels: see below as well as appendix A3 for a more nuanced discussion). For 
the mean-preserving spread, choices of the risky prospect increase, but risk aversion 
remains the dominant pattern (p<0.001). This may indicate that the increase in the 
good outcome more than makes up for the slight loss that has been introduced in the 
                                                            
4P-values reported are two-sided and refer to binomial tests for intermediate stakes, with a safe 
amount of b=6, unless specified otherwise. 
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bad outcome. Finally, for pure loss choices, subjects are considerably more risk 
seeking than for gains, and in absolute terms risk neutrality cannot be  rejected 
(p=0.19). 
It is also commonly found in the literature that risk attitudes are influenced by stake 
levels (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Binswanger, 1980; Holt and Laury, 2002; 
Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992). We thus take a look at the influence of the different 
stake levels on decisions. Figure 1-1 shows choices for the safe alternative separately 
for the basic case and the pure loss pairs.  
 
Figure 1-1: Choice frequency of the safe prospect - Stake effects for gains and losses 
 
The stake effect is clearly visible for the gain prospects, with increasing expected 
values resulting in increased levels of risk aversion. Indeed, we cannot reject risk 
neutrality for the lowest stakes (p=0.47), with risk aversion increasing with stake 
levels and being highly significant for the highest stake level (p<0.001). For losses, 
on the other hand, there is no clear trend and risk aversion has only a very slight (and 
non-significant: p=0.31 for the highest stake level) tendency to increase with 
absolute stake values5. A parametric analysis of these descriptive results can be found 
in appendix A3. We next turn to the differences between the individual and the 
responsibility treatment. 
                                                            
5The Spearman correlation coefficient between the stake size b and choice for the safe option in the 
individual treatment is indeed significantly positive for the base case (p<0.001), but not different from 
zero for the loss shift (p=0.57). 
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Individual decisions versus Responsibility 
Figure 1-2 shows choice frequencies for the safe prospect by treatment, for males 
and females respectively6.  
 
Figure 1-2: Choice frequency of the safe prospect for different prospect pairs, by treatment 
 
One can clearly see how for the base case subjects are more risk averse under 
responsibility than in the individual decisions - this holds both for males and females. 
The same tendency is visible in almost all other positive prospect pairs, except for 
the upward sensitivity prospect pair, in which there is no difference. There is only a 
very slight indication of responsibility inducing more risk aversion in the mixed 
prospect pair, while this tendency is again more pronounced for the mean-preserving 
spread (MPS) pair. For pure loss choices, however, the tendency is inverted, with 
responsibility decreasing risk aversion. 
                                                            
6We display the effects by gender because of the large gender effects in risk taking typically found in 
the literature (Donkers et al., 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2008), which are also present in our data.  
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Table 1-2 presents a random effects probit model regressing choices for the safe 
prospect on a variety of explanatory variables. Regression I regresses choices on the 
treatment dummy, a dummy variable indicating the pure loss prospects, a dummy 
indicating mixed prospects, and two interaction terms between the latter two and the 
treatment dummy.  
Dep. Var.: choice of safe prospect I II III 
responsibility 0.070* 
(0.036) 
0.080* 
(0.037) 
0.099* 
(0.049) 
pure loss –0.043* 
(0.033) 
–0.067* 
(0.033) 
–0.067* 
(0.033) 
responsibility  pure loss –0.098* 
(0.049) 
–0.106* 
(0.049) 
–0.106* 
(0.049) 
mixed prospect 0.131*** 
(0.027) 
0.112*** 
(0.027) 
0.112*** 
(0.027) 
responsibility  mixed prospect –0.024 
(0.051) 
–0.032 
(0.051) 
–0.032 
(0.051) 
EV difference  0.196*** 
(0.012) 
0.197*** 
(0.012) 
SD difference  0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.022*** 
(0.002) 
female 0.083* 
(0.033) 
0.086* 
(0.036) 
0.107* 
(0.049) 
responsibility  female   –0.046 
(0.076) 
constant   
# observations 
(# subjects) 
3840 
(96) 
3840 
(96) 
3840 
(96) 
Wald Chi2 64.43 417.03 417.27 
Random effects probit regressions: coefficients show marginal effects relative to choices 
in the individual treatment; standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction; *** represents 
significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Table 1-2: Experiment 1 – Choice of safe prospect 
 
Being responsible for somebody else's payoffs as well as one's own increases risk 
aversion relative to affecting only one's own payoffs; the latter is a simple main 
effect, indicating the effect of responsibility for all prospects except the pure loss 
prospects (i.e., with the pure loss dummy held constant at zero) and the mixed 
prospect (i.e., with the mixed dummy held constant at zero). The effect of the pure 
loss dummy indicates that for pure loss prospects subjects are more risk seeking 
compared to all other gain prospects. The interaction between the treatment dummy 
and the one identifying pure loss prospects indicates that for pure loss prospects the 
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effect of responsibility goes in the opposite direction compared to pure gain 
prospects, and thus shows that subjects in the responsibility treatment are more risk 
seeking (or less risk averse) for losses compared to subjects in the individual 
treatment. The significant effect of the mixed-prospect dummy shows that subjects 
choose the safe option significantly more often for the mixed prospect than for pure 
gain prospects. The insignificant interaction between the treatment dummy and the 
mixed dummy on the other hand indicates that there is no significant treatment effect 
for mixed prospects, with the effect thus going in the same direction as for gains. 
Finally, we also find that females are significantly more risk averse than males. Such 
an effect is commonly found for decision making under risk (Donkers et al., 2001; 
Eckel and Grossman, 2008). 
Regression II keeps the same independent variables as regression I, and adds the 
difference in expected value (defined as the expected value of the safe prospect 
minus the expected value of the risky prospect) and the difference in standard 
deviations (defined as the standard deviation of the risky prospect minus the standard 
deviation of the safe prospect, which is thus always positive). The higher the 
difference between the safe prospect and the risky prospect in terms of expected 
value, the more likely subjects will choose the safe prospect. Also, the larger the 
difference in terms of standard deviation, the more likely subjects are to choose the 
safer alternative. The main treatment effects discussed above are stable, indicating 
increased risk aversion under responsibility in the gain domain, increased risk 
seeking in the loss domain, and no treatment effect in the mixed domain. 
Regression III further adds an interaction term between the gender dummy and the 
treatment dummy. The effect is not significant, which goes to show that being 
responsible for somebody else does affect males and females in the same way. Once 
again, all the effects previously discussed remain stable. We next turn to the analysis 
of the satisfaction ratings of recipients in the responsibility treatment. 
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Choice satisfaction of recipients 
In the responsibility treatment, recipients saw the decision maker's choice with one 
period lag and indicated whether they were satisfied with the decision or not. 
Although this rating was not incentivized, it may nevertheless give an indication of 
the extent to which decision makers adapted their decision to the commonly 
acceptable one, or correctly intuited which decision would be deemed more 
acceptable while doing so. Since satisfaction ratings were not communicated to the 
decision maker and had no influence on payoffs whatsoever, recipients had indeed no 
reasons to systematically misrepresent their preferences. Also, the fact that providing 
such ratings was the only occupation of recipients during the experiments leads us to 
suspect that they took this task seriously. 
Table 1-3 shows a random effects probit model regressing the recipients' satisfaction 
with each choice on a number of independent variables. The highly significant effect 
of the safe prospect being chosen by the decision maker shows that safe choices are 
deemed more satisfactory in the gain domain (this being a simple main effect 
measuring the effect of safe choices with the pure loss dummy held constant at zero). 
While the fact that a prospect offers only negative outcomes per se does not affect 
satisfaction ratings, choosing the safe amount in pure loss prospects is generally not 
perceived as satisfactory by recipients, as shown by the highly significant interaction 
effects of the pure loss and safe choice dummies. This finding confirms that risk 
seeking is deemed more acceptable than safe choices in the loss domain. There is no 
main gender effect for satisfaction ratings. 
Regression II confirms the stability of the findings we have just discussed, and adds 
some more variables. The significantly negative main effect of the mixed prospect 
dummy indicates that choices of the prospect are considered even less satisfactory in 
the mixed domain as compared to the gain domain. In a parallel fashion, satisfaction 
increases relative to the pure gain domain when a safe amount is chosen, giving 
again an indication of loss aversion on the side of recipients. Choices are deemed 
more satisfactory the higher the difference in expected value, providing an indication 
that higher differences in expected value increase the agreement between decision 
makers and recipients on which choice is the best one. Finally, in keeping with 
previous findings on gender effects, women generally deem choices of the safe 
prospect as more satisfactory than choices of the risky prospect. 
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Dep. Var.: satisfied with decision I II 
safe prospect chosen 0.346*** 
(0.028) 
0.208*** 
(0.038) 
pure loss 0.046 
(0.036) 
–0.002 
(0.040) 
pure loss  safe prospect chosen –0.268*** 
(0.075) 
–0.174* 
(0.072) 
mixed prospect  –0.227** 
(0.080) 
mixed prospect  safe prospect chosen  0.187*** 
(0.286) 
EV difference  0.068*** 
(0.012) 
female 0.034 
(0.032) 
–0.016 
(0.039) 
female  safe choice  0.078* 
(0.037) 
constant  
# observations 
(# subjects) 
1920 
(48) 
1920 
(48) 
Wald Chi2 196.08 230.93 
Random effects probit regressions:  coefficients indicate marginal changes in 
satisfaction levels relative to a choice of the risky prospect; standard errors in 
parenthesis; : interaction;  ***represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at 
p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Table 1-3: Experiment 1 – Satisfaction rating 
  
At the end of the experiment we asked subjects to rate their degree of risk aversion 
on a scale from being very risk seeking (1) to being very risk averse (6). This self-
declared risk aversion correlates strongly with the number of safe choices taken in 
non-negative prospect pairs during the experiment itself on the basis of the Spearman 
correlation coefficient (p=0.01) across both treatments. Self-declared risk attitudes 
are not significantly different between the two treatments (p=0.26; Mann-Whitney 
test, two-sided), nor is there a significant difference between decision makers and 
recipients in the responsibility treatment (p=0.72; Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). 
Finally, we also asked subjects to rate themselves according to their risk aversion 
relative to other participants in the experiment. The rating went from 1 (indicating 
that a subject considered herself to be amongst the four most risk-loving participants 
in the session of 24) to 6 (indicating that a subject considered herself to be amongst 
the four most risk averse participants in the session). On average, decision makers in 
the responsibility treatment had a rating of 4.17, indicating that they considered 
themselves more risk averse than the median participant in the experiment, and thus 
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ruling out that they may have considered recipients on average to be more risk averse 
than they are themselves. This finding corresponds to existing evidence according to 
which subjects generally consider others as more risk loving than themselves (Hsee 
and Weber, 1997). 
 
1.3.3 Discussion 
For gain prospects, we find that responsibility increases risk aversion. An account 
based on the assumption that decision makers consider others to be more risk averse 
than they are themselves seems to be ruled out by the answers to the relative risk 
attitude ranking questions discussed above. Also, Hsee and Weber (1997) found that 
in a series of different experimental designs subjects systematically predicted others 
to be less risk averse than themselves. We can thus conclude that subjects do not 
simply try to adapt their decisions to what they think may be others' risk attitudes. 
A different possibility is that subjects comply with an implicit social rule dictating 
increased caution when responsible for somebody else as well as oneself, thus 
increasing their risk aversion when responsible for somebody else. This explanation 
is distinct from the argument discussed in the last paragraph, inasmuch as such a 
social norm may push subjects to be more risk averse when deciding for others even 
in cases they expect others to be more risk loving than themselves if left to decide for 
themselves. Such a cautious shift explanation, however, cannot explain our increased 
risk seeking for loss prospects. Arguably, different social rules dictating a cautious 
shift for gains and a risky shift for losses could well exist, but such a hypothesis does 
have a distinctly ad hoc flavor. Given that individual risk attitudes have been 
established to be much richer than the simple risk-aversion/risk-seeking dichotomy 
implicit in such explanations (Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui et al. 2010; Bleichrodt 
and Pinto, 2000), we rather hypothesize that risk attitudes typically found in 
individual decision making are accentuated under conditions of responsibility. 
 Prospect theory would predict risk aversion to prevail both for medium and large 
probabilities. Thus, a theory based on the amplification of the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes predicted by prospect theory cannot be separated from an account based on 
a social rule favoring increased risk aversion under responsibility when considering 
the evidence collected in the gain domain only. Risk seeking, however, seems to 
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appear more acceptable than risk aversion in the loss domain for the medium 
probabilities used in our experiment. Evidence in this direction comes both from the 
behavior of decision makers, who under conditions of responsibility in the loss 
domain are induced to become more risk seeking rather than more risk averse; and 
from recipients, who are much more likely to be dissatisfied with a decision in the 
loss domain when the decision maker chose the sure loss rather than the prospect. 
This, in turn, cannot be explained by a uniform social norm dictating increased 
caution under conditions of responsibility. 
We thus propose as an alternative hypothesis that the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes 
predicted by prospect theory - risk aversion for medium to large probability gains 
and small probability losses, risk seeking for medium to large probability losses and 
small probability gains - is amplified by responsibility. At this point, the hypothesis 
that responsibility accentuates the fourfold pattern may be no more plausible than the 
already discussed hypothesis of different social norms for decisions under gains and 
under losses. Luckily however, there is a possibility to disentangle such different 
explanations. The hypothesis of an accentuated fourfold pattern of risk attitudes as 
found in prospect theory and the social norm argument make very different 
predictions for different probability levels in the gain domain, making it easy to test 
them against each other. For large probabilities, both prospect theory and the social 
norm argument predict an increase in risk aversion under conditions of 
responsibility. For small probabilities, on the other hand, the social norm hypothesis 
still predicts an increase in risk aversion; quite to the contrary, however, prospect 
theory and the argument of an amplification of the fourfold pattern laid out above 
now predict an increase in risk seeking under conditions of responsibility.  
The same test can also be adopted to rule out yet another alternative explanation that 
we cannot rule out on the basis of the results from above. When deciding for others 
as well as themselves - so the objection goes - decision makers effectively decide 
over twice the amount of money. Given the common finding that risk aversion 
increases in stake levels, the increased amounts over which decisions are taken may 
thus well be the factor underlying the finding of increased risk aversion in the 
responsibility treatment, rather than the responsibility effect itself. This explanation 
is indeed plausible for the medium probability gains used in experiment 1 (although 
it cannot account for the findings for loss prospects). Notice, however, how this 
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explanation would again predict increased risk aversion for small probability gains 
under higher stakes, which has been found repeatedly (Kachelmaier and Shehata, 
1992; Lefebvre et al., 2010). We thus now proceed to testing the effect of 
responsibility on decisions for different probability levels in the gain domain. 
 
1.4 Experiment 2: Disentangling Social Norm and Amplification 
Accounts 
 
1.4.1 Experimental Design 
 
Subjects: 180 subjects were recruited from a subject pool of the experimental 
laboratory MELESSA at Ludwig-Maximilian’s University in Munich, Germany, 
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was run together with another, 
unrelated, experiment. 59% of subjects were female, and the average age was 23.88 
years. 
 
Task: This task was run after another, unrelated experiment7. Subjects were asked to 
choose between a safe option and a risky option in a fashion similar to experiment 1. 
However, we now only looked at choices in the gain domain. The safe option always 
consisted in a sure amount of money, while the prospect provides a chance of either 
10% or 90% to win €10. Overall, subjects had to make 10 choices where the order of 
presentation was randomized for every subject. Subjects took decisions sequentially 
and had no opportunity to return to an earlier decision to revise it. 
 
Prospect: The choice was always between a sure amount of money and a prospect. 
There were two prospects, one providing a 10% chance to win €10 and €0 otherwise; 
and one providing a 90% chance to win €10 and €0 otherwise. The sure amount 
could take one of five different amounts for each prospect: €0.8, €1, €1.2, €1.5 and 
€2 for the 10% prospect, and €7, €8, €8.5 €9, and €9.5 for the 90% prospect. 
                                                            
7 Although the preceding experiment was unrelated, care was taken to distribute the treatments of 
this experiment orthogonally to the treatments in the other experiment. 
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Treatments: Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments that exactly 
replicated those of experiment 1: an individual treatment in which subjects took their 
decisions only for themselves; or a responsibility treatment, in which half of the 
subjects were randomly assigned the role of decision maker and half the subjects 
were assigned the role of passive recipient. 
 
Incentives: One decision was randomly extracted to be played for real pay. Since in 
the unrelated experiment subjects could obtain at least an approximate knowledge 
about their payoffs, we decided to fully reveal earnings from  this experiment in 
order to be able to control for the exact income effect in a regression (rather than 
having unknown perceptions of earnings).  
 
1.4.2 Results 
 
Individual decisions versus decisions under responsibility 
Figure 1-3 displays the choice frequencies by treatment separately for small and 
large probabilities. On average we find the typical pattern of risk seeking for small 
probabilities and risk aversion for large probabilities. Indeed, when the subjects face 
a choice between a prospect and a sure amount of equal expected value, only about 
27% of subjects choose the sure amount for the 10% probability (p<0.001, binomial 
test), while 99% of subjects do so for the 90% probability (p<0.001, binomial test). 
For the 10% probability, subjects who are responsible for somebody else choose the 
sure amount less often for all but the smallest two certain amounts, where choices of 
the safe amount are generally low. For the 90% probability, responsible subjects 
always choose the sure amount at least as often as subjects who only decide for 
themselves. 
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Figure 1-3: Choices of safe amount by treatment for p=0.1 (left) and for p=0.9 (right) 
 
Table 1-4 presents a random effects probit model regressing choices of the safe 
alternative on a variety of explanatory variables. The effect of the responsibility 
treatment dummy now indicates the simple main effect of being responsible when 
probabilities are large (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). Subjects are thus more likely to 
choose the sure amount for a 90% probability of winning when responsible 
compared to the individual treatment. Under small probabilities, subjects are 
significantly more risk seeking than under large probabilities, as indicated by the 
highly significant effect of the small probability dummy. More importantly, the 
interaction of the small-probability dummy with the treatment dummy indicates that 
this risk-seeking tendency is further enhanced relative to the individual treatment 
when subjects are responsible for somebody else. As presumably expected, the 
difference in expected value between the sure amount and the prospect (defined as in 
experiment 1) is also highly significant. Finally, we find a significant, if small, 
income effect, which goes as expected in the direction of increased risk seeking by 
subjects who have realized higher earnings from the previous experiment. 
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Dep. Var.: choice of safe prospect I II 
responsibility .107†
(0.058) 
0.148† 
(0.086) 
small probability –0.666*** 
(0.036) 
–0.589*** 
(0.047) 
small probability  responsibility –0.135* 
(0.068) 
–0.133* 
(0.068) 
EV difference 0.295*** 
(0.025) 
0.295*** 
(0.025) 
female 0.071 
(0.044) 
0.197*** 
(0.061) 
past profit –0.008*** 
(0.002) 
–0.007* 
(0.003) 
female  small probability  –0.209** 
(0.068) 
past profit  responsibility  –0.003 
(0.005) 
constant  
# observations 
(# subjects) 
1200 
(120) 
1200 
(120) 
Wald Chi2 264.55 263.57 
Random effects probit regressions: coefficients show marginal effects relative to choices in 
the individual treatment; standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction; *** represents 
significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Table 1-4: Experiment 2 – Choice of safe prospect 
 
Regression II adds two further interaction terms. Almost all effects can be seen to be 
stable. The gender effect, which had not been significant in regression I, is now also 
significant: since this is a simple effect, the positive effect of the female dummy now 
indicates increased risk aversion by females relative to males for large probability 
prospects. This effect is qualified by the interaction of the female dummy with the 
small-probability dummy. The negative effect of that interaction shows that females 
are significantly more risk seeking relative to males for small probabilities. Past 
profits remain significant, though less so than in regression I. Most importantly, 
however, there is no significant interaction effect between past profits from the 
preceding experiment and our treatment manipulation, showing that this is not 
interfering with our results. 
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Satisfaction ratings 
Exactly as in experiment 1, recipients in experiment 2 saw the decisions of their 
assigned decision maker with a lag of one period, and had to indicate whether they 
were satisfied with the decision or not. Table 1-5 reports the results of a random 
effects probit model, regressing the satisfaction dummy on a number of explanatory 
variables.  
Dep. Var.: satisfied with choice I II 
safe choice 0.530*** 
(0.119) 
0.458*** 
(0.129) 
small probability (10%) 0.226* 
(0.113) 
0.238* 
(0.113) 
safe choice  small probability –0.658*** 
(0.130) 
–0.680*** 
(0.126) 
EV difference –0.228*** 
(0.064) 
–0.233*** 
(0.064) 
EV difference  safe choice 0.341*** 
(0.072) 
0.345*** 
(0.071) 
female 0.124** 
(0.044) 
0.023 
(0.060) 
female  safe choice  0.146* 
(0.064) 
past profit  –0.002 
(0.003) 
constant  
# Observation 
(# subjects) 
600 
(60) 
600 
(60) 
Wald Chi2 61.70 64.59 
Random effects probit regressions:  coefficients indicate marginal changes in 
satisfaction levels relative to a choice of the risky prospect; standard errors in 
parenthesis; : interaction; *** represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at 
p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Table 1-5: Experiment 2 – Satisfaction ratings 
 
The first dummy shows the simple main effect of choosing the safe amount over the 
large probability prospect: choosing the safe amount for large probability prospects is 
deemed much more satisfactory in general than choosing the prospect. The dummy 
indicating the simple main effect of a small probability choice is also positive, 
indicating considerable agreement with choices of the prospect in this          
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instance.8 However, choosing the safe amount for small probability prospects is 
considered to be very dissatisfying, as shown by the large negative coefficient of the 
interaction effect. Recipients are in general less satisfied with choices of the prospect 
the closer the safe amount is to the expected value of the prospect, which is indicated 
by the simple effect of the relative dummy. For large probabilities they are, however, 
more satisfied with a choice of the safe alternative for relatively small deviations in 
expected value than for small probabilities. Females tend to be much more satisfied 
when the safe amount is chosen for the large probability prospects, while past profits 
of the recipients have no influence on satisfaction ratings. 
 
1.4.3 Discussion 
The social norm hypothesis and the amplification of fourfold pattern hypothesis 
make very different predictions on behavior for small probabilities in the gain 
domain. While for large probabilities both theories predict an increase in risk 
aversion under responsibility, for small probabilities the social norm argument 
predicts a cautious shift towards increased risk aversion (or reduced risk seeking), 
whereas the amplification argument predicts increased risk seeking. Having directly 
tested these contradictory predictions in experiment 2, we conclude that the social 
norm dictating a cautious shift under conditions of responsibility has been discredited 
as an explanation of the results. In contrast, an increased fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes explains our results well. At the same time, this finding also excludes 
explanations based on which our initial effects could have been due to stake effects 
rather than responsibility. 
While an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is a good fit for our 
results, we have not fully proven that such an accentuation takes place. Indeed, we 
miss results for small probability losses. While such an additional result may seem 
desirable, our experiment was designed with the explicit purpose of testing two 
different predictions in the gain domain against each other. While the fourfold-
                                                            
8Indeed, the dummy indicates the satisfaction levels for small probabilities with all interactions which 
include this dummy held constant at zero (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). This in turn means that the safe 
choice dummy must be zero, thus resulting in the interpretation that the effect indicates satisfaction 
with choices of the prospect; this satisfaction in turn is measured relative to the (much fewer) choices 
of the prospect for the large probability prospect. 
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pattern hypothesis finds strong evidence in our data, it is not impossible that a 
different explanation could exist for our results. Indeed, even if the interpretation of 
an increase in the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes prevails - or at least an increase in 
typical risk attitudes found at the individual level - such an interpretation is merely 
descriptive in nature. The more fundamental question remains why we observe such a 
shift in risk attitudes under responsibility. 
We can only speculate about the answer at this point. One possibility is to examine 
the finding in the light of Wegener and Petty's (1995) flexible self-correction model. 
The model postulates that people may shift away from their natural or spontaneous 
behavior when motivated to do so. The extent to which they correct their behavior, 
however, as well as the direction in which they correct it, will fundamentally depend 
on their naïve theory of the bias. This explanation appears however highly 
unsatisfying, given that there is no way of determining what such unconsciously 
determined naïve theories of bias may be - with the consequence that such an 
account could be used to ex-post justify any kind of behavior that one may find. 
The fact that typical individual risk attitudes are accentuated under conditions of 
responsibility provides an indication that increased responsibility does by no means 
push decisions closer to expected utility maximization - generally held to be 
normative - but rather farther away from it. There seems, however, to be general 
agreement on this tendency, as indicated by our satisfaction rating patterns. Indeed, 
in experiment 1 we found recipients to be generally satisfied with safe choices in the 
gain domain, but dissatisfied with such choices in the loss domain. Given that safe 
choices have already been found to decrease under conditions of responsibility in the 
loss domain, this is indeed a strong indication for the perceived social acceptance (or 
at least desirability) of such choices. A similar pattern can be seen in experiment 2, 
where safe choices were deemed satisfactory for the large probability prospect, but 
very unsatisfactory for the small probability prospect. 
Whatever the psychological reasons behind our findings may be, the mere economic 
fact of more extreme patterns under responsibility remains. Such factors may have 
important consequences for economic predictions and for policy design. Probability 
weighting - from which the fourfold pattern is thought to derive to a large extent - 
has been used to explain the simultaneous take-up of insurance and lottery play 
(Wakker, 2010). The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes has also been used to explain 
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reference point effects that have been observed in financial markets (Baucells et al., 
2011; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and for investment behavior by firms 
(Fiegenbaum, 1990; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988). Our results provide a further 
indication that typical risk attitudes found for individuals may not only generalize to 
professional agents or firms, but even be reinforced to some extent. Given that these 
patterns seem very resilient to debiasing, explicit rules may be needed to rein in 
excessive risk taking in certain conditions, or special training programs for managers 
may seem desirable in order for them not to fall prey to automatic decision making 
patterns that may be suboptimal from the point of view of the company that they 
manage. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we systematically explored decision situations in which a decision 
maker bears responsibility for somebody else's outcomes as well as for her own. In 
the gain domain, and for medium to large probabilities, we confirmed the intuition 
that being responsible for somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion. Looking 
at risk attitudes in the loss domain, however, we found an increase in risk seeking 
under conditions of responsibility.  
This raises issues about the extent to which changed behavior under responsibility 
may depend on a social norm of caution in situations of responsibility, or to what 
extent pre-existing risk attitudes found at the individual level may simply be 
enhanced under responsibility. To further explore this issue, we designed a second 
experiment to explore risk-taking behavior for gain prospects offering very small or 
very large probabilities of winning. For large probabilities, we found increased risk 
aversion, thus confirming our earlier finding. For small probabilities, on the other 
hand, we found an increase of risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. The 
latter finding thus discredits hypotheses of a social rule dictating caution under 
responsibility, and points towards an amplification in the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes found for individual decisions. 
At the present point we can only speculate on what may underlie such an 
amplification of individual risk attitudes. Additional evidence - possibly from 
neighboring disciplines such as neuroscience - will probably be needed to fully 
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understand the underlying dynamics. Nevertheless, our findings point out how 
important and resilient to debiasing these risk attitudes are, and hence the importance 
of considering them in policy design or for the training and supervising of decision 
makers. 
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1.6 Appendix 
 
A1. Instructions (translated from German) 
Welcome to the experiment and many thanks for your participation! 
Please stop talking to other participants of the experiment from now on 
 
General rules concerning the procedure 
 
This experiment serves the investigation of economic decision making. You can earn money which 
will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. 
During the experiment you and all other participants will be asked to make decisions. 
In total, the experiment lasts for approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes. Please raise your hand in case 
you have any questions during the experiment. One of the experimenters will then come to you and 
answer your questions in private. In the interest of clarity, we use male terms only in the instructions. 
 
Payment 
You receive €4 for arriving in time in addition to your earnings from the experiment. There is a 
possibility that you suffer losses from specific decisions. Possible losses must be offset with your 
earnings from other decision situations and/or with your €4 starting balance. 
In (the very unlikely) case of an overall loss from the experiment, you may choose between paying it 
back in cash or by working as an assistant in the laboratory (€5 per half an hour). 
 
Support 
You are provided with a pen on your desk. 
Please type your decisions into the computer. While making your decisions, there is a clock counting 
down in the right upper corner of your computer screen. This clock serves as a guide for how much 
time it should take for you to make your decisions. Of course, you are allowed to exceed the time; 
particularly in the beginning, this may be happening quite frequently.  
 
 
Lottery decision making 
 
[IND: You do not interact with other participants of the experiment at any point during the 
experiment. Your final payment is determined exclusively by your own decisions and according to the 
rules explained in the following. Other participants do not find out about your decisions and about 
how much you have earned at any point during or after the experiment. In the same manner, you do 
not learn about other participants’ decisions and their earnings at any point during or after the 
experiment.] 
[RESP: You will be matched with another participant of the experiment. Your decisions or the 
decisions of the other participant determine your payment according to the rules explained in the 
following. At no point during or after the experiment other participants in the experiment learn your 
identity. In the same manner, you do not find out the identity of other participants at any point during 
or after the experiment.] 
 
 
Task 
[RESP: There are two types of participants, type A and type B. The matching is such that a type A 
person is always matched with a type B person. At the beginning your computer screen will tell you 
which type you are. The decision on which type you are is made randomly by the computer. You 
will remain the same type throughout the experiment. 
 
Decisions are made by type A only. Participants of type A make their decision for themselves and 
at the same time for their matching partner of type B. This means that every decision that applies 
for type A applies to his matching partner of type B in exactly the same way.] 
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In total, there are 40 periods. [IND: You] [RESP: Type A persons] have to make one decision per 
period for which [IND: you] [RESP: they] always have to choose between two alternatives.  
 
A representative decision scenario may look like the following: 
 
Figure 1-4: Screenshot – Gain domain 
 
In the above example, [IND: you have] [RESP: type A player has] the choice between alternative X, 
that yields €4 with a probability of 50% and €0 with the complementary probability of 50% [IND: to 
you] [RESP: to him and to his matching partner of type B], and alternative Y, that yields €2 with a 
probability of 100% [IND: to you] [RESP: to him and to his matching partner of type B]. [IND: You 
decide] [RESP: Type A player decides] on one of the two alternatives by clicking on either the button 
“Alternative X” or the button “Alternative Y” below the pie charts. 
An alternative such as alternative Y from the above example is called a “certain payment” since it is 
paid out with a probability of 100%. An alternative such as alternative X is called “lottery” since one 
amount is paid out with a probability of 50 % and another amount is paid out with a probability of 
50%. 
The alternatives between which [IND: you have] [RESP: type A has] to choose in each period either 
represent a choice between a certain payment and a lottery, or a choice between two different 
lotteries. In both alternatives there may be positive as well as negative amounts involved.   
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A decision scenario involving negative amounts may look like the following: 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Screenshot – Loss domain 
 
In this example, [IND: you have] [RESP: type A player has] a choice between alternative X, that 
yields €-2 (a loss of €2) with a probability of 100% [IND: to you] [RESP: to him and to his matching 
partner of type B], and alternative Y, that yields €0 with a probability of 50% and €-4 (a loss of €4) 
with a complementary probability of 50% [IND: to you] [RESP: to him and his matching partner of 
type B]. 
 
[RESP: Type B players are provided with the information on the decisions of their type A 
partner with a lag of one period. This means that type B players see the decision scenario on their 
screens with which their type A partner was confronted in the previous period and are told the 
alternative which their type A partner chose. Finally, type B players can indicate whether they were 
“content” with the decision or “not content”. The statements of contentment do not influence type B’s 
earnings or the earnings of his type A partner. The statements of contentment do not get passed on 
to type A.] 
 
Please note: Carefully check the alternatives that you can choose from. Pay attention to the 
corresponding signs of the amounts since they can be negative or positive. 
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Payment 
[IND: It is in your interest to think thoroughly about each decision because each single decision 
may determine your payment at the end of the experiment.]  
[RESP: If you are a type A player, it is in your interest to think thoroughly about each decision 
because each single decision may determine your payment as well as the payment of your type B 
partner at the end of the experiment.]  
This happens as follows: 
 
To determine final payments the computer randomly selects three different periods that are 
relevant for the payment at the end of the experiment. Each period is equally likely to be selected 
by the computer. The sum of the earnings from the three selected periods determines [IND: your final 
payment] [RESP: the final payment for type A as well as for this type B partner]. 
[IND: On your screen you get told which periods got selected at random and how you chose in these 
periods.] 
[RESP: All participants are told on their screens which periods got selected at random and how type A 
chose in these periods.] 
 
In case [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose a certain payment in a selected decision period, [IND: you] 
[RESP: type A and his type B partner] receive the amount of the certain payment as [IND: your] 
[RESP: their] earning from this selected period. 
 
In case [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose a lottery, the outcome of the lottery has to be determined 
first. To this end, lottery numbers from 1 to 6 get assigned to the possible earning amounts. As there 
are only lotteries involving probabilities of 50%, lottery numbers 1, 2 and 3 get assigned to one 
amount and lottery numbers 4, 5 and 6 get assigned to the other amount. The computer randomly 
determines which amount gets assigned to the low numbers and which amount gets assigned to the 
high numbers. Finally, a randomly chosen participant is asked to roll a 6-sided die in public. The 
amount corresponding to the lottery number that was rolled is then paid out for the selected period. 
 
Example 1: The computer selects a period in which [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose alternative X 
which yields €4 with a probability of 50% and €0 with a probability of 50%. Lottery numbers 1, 2 and 
3 were assigned to the amount of €4 and numbers 4, 5 and 6 were assigned to the amount of €0 by 
the computer. [IND: You] [RESP: Type A and his type B partner] thus have a 50% chance to receive 
€4 and a 50% chance to receive €0. If, for example, the lottery number 1 is rolled, the earnings from 
this period amount to €4 [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A and for his type B partner]. If, for 
example, the lottery number 5 is rolled, the earnings from this period amount to €0 [IND: for you] 
[RESP: for type A and for his type B partner]. 
 
Example 2: The computer selects a period in which [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose alternative Y 
which yields €-4 (a loss of €4) with a probability of 50% and €0 with a probability of 50%. Lottery 
numbers 1, 2 and 3 were assigned to the amount of €-4 and numbers 4, 5 and 6 were assigned to the 
amount of €0 by the computer. [IND: You] [RESP: Type A and his type B partner] thus have a 50% 
chance to receive €0 and a 50% chance to receive €-4 (a loss of €4). If, for example, the lottery 
number 4 is rolled, the earnings from this period amount to €0 [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A and 
for his type B partner]. If, for example, the lottery number 3 is rolled, the earnings from this period 
amount to €-4 [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A and for his type B partner]. This loss must be offset 
with earnings from other decisions and/or with your starting balance of €4. 
 
Your payment is formed by the sum of your earnings in the three selected periods.  
[RESP: Two participants that are matched with each other (type A and his type B partner) always 
have identical earnings and thus final payments.] 
Please note that it is optimal [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A] to choose the alternative that [IND: 
you prefer for yourself] [RESP: he prefers for himself and for his type B partner].  
There is no possibility to increase the final payment by adopting a different behavior. 
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A2. Tables 
  Option A ("Safe")  Option B ("Risky")     
Lottery  
Number   
Prob. 
Left 
Amount  
Left 
Prob. 
Right 
Amount 
Right  
Prob. 
Left 
Amount 
Left 
Prob. 
Right 
Amount  
Right   Category 
1   1 2 0 0  0.5 4 0.5 0   Base 
2   1 2.5 0 0  0.5 4 0.5 0   Sensitivity Up 
3   1 1.5 0 0  0.5 4 0.5 0   Sensitivity Down 
4   1 3 0 0  0.5 5 0.5 1   Positive Shift 
5   0.5 3 0.5 1  0.5 4 0.5 0   Lottery Choice 
6   1 0 0 0  0.5 2 0.5 -2   Mixed Prospect 
7   1 2 0 0  0.5 5 0.5 -1   MPS 
8   0 0 1 -2  0.5 0 0.5 -4   Loss shift 
9   1 4 0 0  0.5 8 0.5 0   Base 
10   1 5 0 0  0.5 8 0.5 0   Sensitivity Up 
11   1 3 0 0  0.5 8 0.5 0   Sensitivity Down 
12   1 6 0 0  0.5 10 0.5 2   Positive Shift 
13   0.5 6 0.5 2  0.5 8 0.5 0   Lottery Choice 
14   1 0 0 0  0.5 4 0.5 -4   Mixed Prospect 
15   1 4 0 0  0.5 10 0.5 -2   MPS 
16   0 0 1 -4  0.5 0 0.5 -8   Loss shift 
17   1 6 0 0  0.5 12 0.5 0   Base 
18   1 7.5 0 0  0.5 12 0.5 0   Sensitivity Up 
19   1 4.5 0 0  0.5 12 0.5 0   Sensitivity Down 
20   1 9 0 0  0.5 15 0.5 3   Positive Shift 
21   0.5 9 0.5 3  0.5 12 0.5 0   Lottery Choice 
22   1 0 0 0  0.5 6 0.5 -6   Mixed Prospect 
23   1 6 0 0  0.5 15 0.5 -3   MPS 
24   0 0 1 -6  0.5 0 0.5 -12   Loss shift 
25   1 8 0 0  0.5 16 0.5 0   Base 
26   1 10 0 0  0.5 16 0.5 0   Sensitivity Up 
27   1 6 0 0  0.5 16 0.5 0   Sensitivity Down 
28   1 12 0 0  0.5 20 0.5 4   Positive Shift 
29   0.5 12 0.5 4  0.5 16 0.5 0   Lottery Choice 
30   1 0 0 0  0.5 8 0.5 -8   Mixed Prospect 
31   1 8 0 0  0.5 20 0.5 -4   MPS 
32   0 0 1 -8  0.5 0 0.5 -16   Loss shift 
33   1 10 0 0  0.5 20 0.5 0   Base 
34   1 12.5 0 0  0.5 20 0.5 0   Sensitivity Up 
35   1 7.5 0 0  0.5 20 0.5 0   Sensitivity Down 
36   1 15 0 0  0.5 25 0.5 5   Positive Shift 
37   0.5 15 0.5 5  0.5 20 0.5 0   Lottery Choice 
38   1 0 0 0  0.5 10 0.5 -10   Mixed Prospect 
39   1 10 0 0  0.5 25 0.5 -5   MPS 
40   0 0 1 -10  0.5 0 0.5 -20   Loss shift 
 
Table 1-6: Overview of lotteries 
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A3. Prospect type regression 
Dep. Var.: choice of safe prospect I II III 
Sensitivity up 0.185*** 
(0.023) 
0.185*** 
(0.023) 
0.185*** 
(0.023) 
Sensitivity down –0.465*** 
(0.032) 
–0.465*** 
(0.032) 
–0.485*** 
(0.033) 
Positive shift –0.161*** 
(0.034) 
–0.161*** 
(0.034) 
–0.170*** 
(0.035) 
Lottery choice 0.101*** 
(0.026) 
0.101*** 
(0.026) 
0.098*** 
(0.026) 
Mixed Lottery 0.059* 
(0.028) 
0.059* 
(0.028) 
0.060* 
(0.028) 
Mean-preserving spread –0.065* 
(0.032) 
–0.65* 
(0.032) 
–0.069* 
(0.033) 
Loss shift –0.171*** 
(0.034) 
–0.172*** 
(0.032) 
–0.183*** 
(0.035) 
female  0.080* 
(0.036) 
0.080* 
(0.036) 
age  0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
stake size 
 
  0.064*** 
(0.006) 
# observations 
(# subjects) 
3840 
(96) 
3840 
(96) 
3840 
(96) 
Wald Chi2 510.80 515.91 608.33 
Random effects probit regressions: coefficients show marginal effects relative to 
choices in the basic prospect pair; standard errors in parenthesis; *** represents 
significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Table 1-7: Choices by prospect type 
 
Table 1-7 shows a random effects probit model with coefficients indicating the 
deviation of choices with respect to the basic prospect pair. In addition to the effects 
already discussed in the main text, it shows that females are on average significantly 
more risk averse than males. Also, risk aversion increases with age. Both findings are 
commonly found in decision making under risk (Donkers et al., 2001; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008). More interestingly, we find an effect of stake size, represented by 
the expected value of the prospect (taken in absolute terms for the pure loss 
prospect). The higher the stakes of the decision, the more risk averse subjects 
become on average. This is in agreement with general findings in the literature 
(Binswanger, 1980; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Lefebvre et al., 2010). 
Controlling for stake effects also makes the effect of the mixed prospects much more 
significant. This increased effect derives from the fact that the mixed prospects are 
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obtained by adjusting the expected value of the prospect downward from the basic 
prospect pair. Since subjects tend to be less risk averse for lower stakes, the 
increased risk aversion found for mixed prospects appears more relevant once one 
controls for the decreased stakes in those choice pairs. 
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2 Chapter 2 
Tempus Fugit: Time Pressure in Risky Decisions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Time pressure is common to many economic decisions. Traders make orders in 
financial markets within seconds after new information becomes available (Busse 
and Green, 2002). Last-minute bidders in auctions learn about common value 
components and adjust their valuation in an instant (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002). 
Negotiators must often reach agreements before a deadline (Roth et al., 1988; Sutter 
et al., 2003). This chapter studies the effect of time pressure on decision making 
under risk. Risk attitudes are important for economic policy decisions (Barsky et al., 
1997; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Guiso and Paiella, 2008), and the 
effects of time pressure on behavior in risky decisions should be considered by 
regulators of fast-paced markets. If there is a change in behavior under time pressure, 
existing behavioral predictions and empirical evidence based on data without time 
pressure may not be valid in these environments. Self-selection of individuals into 
occupations and a lack of comparable decision making situations with different 
degrees of time pressure complicate the study of time pressure in the real world. We 
therefore use a laboratory experiment to identify the effect of time pressure on 
decision making under risk. 
The effects of time pressure on decision making under risk are also important from a 
methodological perspective when eliciting risk attitudes. Whereas standard 
incentivized and non-incentivized methods for eliciting risk attitudes do usually not 
put the decision makers under time pressure, it is sometimes necessary to do so like 
in the quickly emerging field of neuro-economics (e.g., Glimcher, 2004; Camerer et 
al., 2005). Because of the technical need to record neural activity in short time 
windows, subjects are presented stimuli and have to make decisions in only a few 
seconds (e.g. in Tom et al. (2007) the whole process of presentation and decision 
took a maximum of 3 seconds; Engelmann et al. (2009) allow 3.5 seconds decision 
time). If risky decisions are affected by time pressure, the observed patterns of neural 
activity may also be specific to this condition. If they are not affected or only 
partially affected, the results can claim wider applicability. More generally, there is 
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no systematic study so far in economics that compares decision making under risk 
with time pressure and without time pressure. 
In this chapter, we analyze decisions in the gain domain, decisions in the loss 
domain, and decisions with both gains and losses involved. For gains we observe 
strong risk aversion; a finding that is very robust under time pressure. For losses we 
find that subjects become more risk averse under time pressure, turning mild risk 
seeking into risk aversion. For mixed prospects, the tendency to weigh gains and 
losses differently can become important. We call such weighting differences gain-
loss attitude, with loss aversion denoting an overweighting of losses and gain seeking 
an overweighting of gains. Gain-loss attitude is less robust under time pressure. Both 
loss aversion and gain seeking can be increased under time pressure depending on 
simple framing manipulations. In general, we find time pressure to alter choices once 
we move outside the domain of pure gain prospects. 
We also provide half of our subjects with information about the expected value of 
prospects. For instance, information on average returns is readily available on 
financial markets, and the impact of this availability on decision making under time 
pressure seems particularly relevant. We observe that the elicited risk attitudes are 
not systematically affected by expected value information in pure gain or pure loss 
decisions, but they are strongly affected for mixed prospects where choices are closer 
to risk-neutral expected value maximization when the information is available. This 
holds for decisions with and without time pressure. Interestingly, there are no 
interaction effects of time pressure and the availability of information. Our result 
suggests that subjects use information helping them to eliminate the influence of 
economically irrelevant gain-loss framing on their decisions (Slovic, 1972; Hilton, 
2003). 
Despite its relevance, time pressure in risky decision has received very little attention 
in the economics literature.9 Bollard et al. (2007) study the effect of time pressure in 
an experiment where subjects can buy prospects with different variance and expected 
payoff in the gain domain. They find more variance aversion for time pressure. 
                                                            
9 Its impact has been studied in a few other economic contexts such as search behavior (Ibanez et al., 
2009), bargaining (Sutter et al., 2003), and in the beauty-contest game (Kocher and Sutter, 2006). 
Reutskaja et al. (2011) investigate search dynamics from choice sets of different size under time 
pressure using an eye-tracking device. 
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Given that subjects had to pay for the prospects, however, all their decisions involve 
gains and losses, and the increased variance aversion could also be explained by the 
finding of stronger loss aversion under time pressure. There is a psychological 
literature on time pressure in risky decision (Ben-Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Payne et 
al., 1993; Payne et al., 1996; Maule et al., 2000). These studies focus on information 
processing and identify two strategies to cope with time pressure. First, behavior 
becomes more heuristic. Second, subjects exert more cognitive effort. These findings 
are consistent with evidence on decision-making costs in economics (Wilcox, 1993; 
Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Moffatt, 2005). Ben-Zur and Breznitz (1981) consider 
risk attitudes for mixed prospects involving both gains and losses. They find more 
risk aversion under time pressure, and our results suggest that this is due to increased 
loss aversion. 
Our study is the first to consider risk attitude separately for gains, for losses and for 
mixed gambles and the first to vary the availability of information both without time 
pressure and under time pressure. We provide evidence suggesting that risk attitude 
for losses and gain-loss attitude may be less robust with regard to external 
circumstances than risk attitude for gains. The generality of risk seeking for losses 
has been questioned by studies using repetition and financial incentives (Myagkov 
and Plott, 1997), and our results show that time pressure creates yet another 
environment in which risk aversion for losses may prevail. Under time pressure, 
gain-loss attitude is strongly affected by economically irrelevant framing effects and 
loss aversion is not necessarily a valid assumption if gains become more attractive 
because they give the impression to agents that they can break even. 
Different theories of decision making under risk predict different effects of time 
pressure. Under expected utility, time pressure should have no effects, with the 
potential exception of increased noise because of errors (Schmidt and Neugebauer, 
2007). Prospect theory assumes psychophysical effects in the weighting of 
probabilities and the weighting of gains versus losses. Such weighting effects would 
reasonably be expected to change under time pressure, but no clear direction is 
implied by the original theory. An expected utility model with an aspiration level has 
recently been formalized (Payne, 2005; Diecidue and van de Ven, 2008). This model 
can explain similar deviations from expected utility as prospect theory does by 
allowing utility to increase discontinuously at the aspiration level. The model 
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explicitly assumes that the aspiration level effect derives from a heuristic focus on 
the likelihood of breaking even (or the total probability to surpass the aspiration 
level). It therefore predicts that deviations from expected utility become stronger if 
decisions are made under time pressure. Our results suggest that aspiration-based 
models may be a useful alternative to prospect theory to model non-expected utility 
in situations with time pressure. Behavior becomes more heuristic and the probability 
of breaking even can lead to reversals of typical loss aversion patterns. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces 
the experimental design and the time pressure conditions. In section 2.3 we discuss 
our measures of risk attitude. Section 2.4 presents the experimental results, and 
section 2.5 discusses the results and concludes this chapter. 
 
2.2 Experimental Design 
2.2.1 Treatments and Procedures 
Our experiment employs a 22 between-subject factorial design. The two factors we 
vary are the degree of time pressure and the availability of information about the 
expected values of the risky prospects. The four treatments are summarized in Table 
2-1. 
 No time pressure Time pressure 
No EV information NTP-NEV 
N = 42 
TP-NEV 
N= 41 
EV information NTP-EV 
N = 45 
TP-EV 
N = 48 
EV = expected value; N = number of observations (experimental participants). 
Table 2-1: Treatments 
 
In all four treatments, subjects made choices between risky prospects in three 
separate experimental parts. Part I consisted of binary choices between pure gain 
prospects that were individually time constrained. Part II consisted of a choice list of 
seven choices adapted from Holt and Laury (2002). The whole list had to be 
completed within a time limit. The third part consisted of two subparts: in Part IIIA 
choices involving both gains and losses were made, and the choices were 
individually time constrained. In Part IIIB, subjects made individually time-
constrained choices between pure gain prospects with a smallest payoff of €20 to 
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cover possible losses from Part IIIA. When making their choices in Part IIIA subjects 
did not know how much money they could win in Part IIIB. The order of the three 
parts was fixed. 
At the end of the experiment one part was randomly selected to determine a 
participant’s income with equal probability. If either Part I or Part II was selected, 
one decision within this part was selected with equal probability to be paid out for 
real.10 If Part III was selected, then one randomly selected decision from Part IIIA 
with possible losses and one randomly selected decision from Part IIIB were played 
for real. The decision in Part IIIB was selected independently of the Part IIIA 
decision. The random selection of the payoff-relevant task was done independently 
for each subject. The structure of payments in Part III was chosen to avoid giving 
experimental participants a clear reference point when making decisions in the loss 
domain in Part IIIA. Hence, losses were more likely to be experienced as real losses 
at the time of decision making. The sequence of events in the experiment is 
summarized in Figure 2-1. 
 
                                                            
10 In individual decision experiments, this random lottery system is almost exclusively used for 
financial incentives (Myagkov and Plott, 1997; Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al., 2002). Its 
equivalence to a single and payoff relevant decision task has been empirically tested and confirmed 
(Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Hey and Lee, 2005). 
Part I: Pure gain prospects; separate choices.
Part II: Pure gain prospects; Holt and Laury choice list; seven choices on one screen. 
Part IIIA: Pure loss, pure gain and mixed prospects; separate choices; no information about 
the endowment at this point available. 
Part IIIB: Pure gain prospects paying at least €20; separate choices.
Determination of payoffs: one part randomly selected; one decision randomly selected 
within this part and played for real according to the subject’s choice (if Part III was selected, 
one decision from sub‐part A and one decision from sub‐part B was played according to the 
subject’s choice). 
Figure 2-1: Structure of the experiment 
Tempus Fugit: Time Pressure in Risky Decisions 
 
46 
All parts of the experiment were computerized using the experimental software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All randomizations were conducted by throwing a die 
individually at the subjects’ desks. 
Figure 2-2 shows how the prospects were presented to the subjects on the screen. 
Subjects always chose between two prospects A and B represented by the second and 
third row in Figure 2-2. All prospects had a maximum of two possible outcomes. The 
first row of the figure shows the faces of a twenty-sided die. The payoffs of the 
prospects depended on the outcome of a throw of the die. Each face of the die 
corresponds to a 5% probability. In the example, prospect A therefore pays €20 with 
probability 50% and zero with probability 50%. Prospect B pays €10 for sure. The 
procedure was explained in detail to all subjects (the original instructions are 
provided in appendix A1), and all rules of the experiment were common knowledge 
among participants. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
A €20 €0 
B €10 
Figure 2-2: Presentation of prospect choices 
 
2.2.2 Time Pressure and Expected Value Manipulation  
We manipulated decision time and availability of expected value information. In the 
treatments without time pressure, we constrained the decisions by introducing a 
maximum decision time that was very large and then measured actual decision times. 
Decisions in these treatments were practically unconstrained but we could use 
identical wording in all instructions by providing some threshold in the treatments 
without time pressure. Decisions in Part I and Part III were presented and constrained 
individually. Decisions in Part II had to be made on one screen and were constrained 
simultaneously, that is, all seven decisions of the choice list had to be made within 
the time limit. In the time pressure treatments, we restricted the decision times such 
that there was significant time pressure but subjects would still have sufficient time 
to make meaningful decisions at the computers.11 All subjects within a treatment 
faced identical time constraints because we used a between-subject design. Table 2-2 
                                                            
11 We conducted a pilot session with different time limits to test the severity of different limits. 
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summarizes the maximum and the actual decision times for each part of the 
experiment. 
 No time pressure 
 
Time pressure 
max 
No EV info EV info 
max 
No EV info EV info 
actual actual actual actual 
Part I 60 5.64 5.95 4 2.38 2.05 
Part IIa 150 59.5 71 30 29 26 
Part IIIAb 60 5.87 5.95 4 2.42 2.47 
Numbers are average medians in Part I and Part III and medians in Part II; EV info = expected 
value information. 
a Part II decision time refers to the total time for seven choices of the Holt and Laury (2002) choice 
list. 
b Data for Part IIIB were not used to determine decision times under time pressure. The time limit 
in this part was identical to the time limit in Part I and Part IIIA. 
Table 2-2: Maximum and actual median decision times per decision in seconds 
 
For each decision problem subjects had to click a button to make their choice 
between options A and B, and then, had to click an ‘OK’-button to confirm their 
choice within the time limit. The clock was clearly visible at the top of the screen. 
An example screenshot is given in appendix A2. If a subject failed to submit and 
confirm a choice before time runs out, this decision would pay the minimum payoff 
possible in either of the two prospects, should it be selected randomly for real pay. In 
decisions involving losses this would be the maximum loss. If a subject failed to 
submit all seven decision in Part II within the time limit, she would earn zero for 
each possibly selected decisions in this part of the experiment. Between two decision 
screens, a waiting screen occurred for 2 seconds in all treatments. This ensured that 
subjects could properly prepare for the next decision problem, especially under time 
pressure. Before each part of the experiment, specific instructions were distributed 
and read aloud. This gave subjects time to rest between parts.12 
In the treatments with expected value information, the information was provided for 
each prospect next to the button that had to be clicked for the decision. This location 
allowed subjects to access the information efficiently (see the screenshot in appendix 
A2). The meaning of an expected value was explained to the subjects in written 
                                                            
12 The working of the computer mouse was essential for subjects to enter decisions rapidly into the 
computer. Before the experiment, we checked the computer mice with each subject for proper 
working. 
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instructions before the experiment. We did not refer to the information as “useful” or 
“helpful” and did not make any suggestions regarding whether subjects should 
actually use the information in their decisions. 
 
2.2.3 Subjects and Payoffs 
176 undergraduate students from the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands 
participated in eight laboratory sessions and were randomly assigned to treatments. 
Students were recruited electronically from a pool of approximately 1,200 potential 
participants and came from different disciplines. Each subject participated only once. 
Subjects received a show-up payment of €5 and could earn between €0 and €200 
based on their choices and, when applicable, on the random draws. Average earnings 
were €17.15, and the experiment took between 30 and 50 minutes depending on the 
treatment. 
 
2.3 Prospects and Dependent Variables 
We analyze the effects of time pressure and expected value information on 
dependent variables that measure attitudes towards risk under gains and losses, and 
gain-loss attitude. The prospects used to construct these variables are discussed in the 
following and summarized in Table 2-3. 
 
RAG (from Part I) measures risk aversion for gains by the percentage of safe choices 
a subject makes in six decisions between pure gain prospects each involving one sure 
gain. Three decisions involve choices between a prospect and its expected value. The 
other three decision problems are adapted from prospect choices for which a 
preference of roughly 50% for each option has been found in the literature (Wakker 
et al., 2007b). These choices are therefore likely to distinguish well between 
subjects.  
RAG=EV (from Part I) uses only the three choices between prospects and their 
expected value from RAG. This variable is used to calibrate the average risk attitude 
for our sample of subjects. 
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RAGHL (from Part II) measures risk aversion for gains using a Holt and Laury 
(2002) choice list with pure gain prospects. We scaled up their low payoff treatment 
(2002, p. 1645) by a factor of six and used only choices with probabilities between 
20% and 80% including. The variable indicates the percentage of safer choices a 
subject makes if there was a unique point where the subject switched from the safer 
to the riskier option as the probability of the larger payoff increased. Subjects who 
switched twice or switched from risky to safe as the probability of the higher payoff 
increased were excluded from the analysis. 
RAL (from Part IIIA) measures risk aversion for losses by the percentage of safe 
choices a subject makes in six decisions between pure loss prospects each involving 
one sure loss. Three decisions involve choices between a prospect and its expected 
value. The other three decisions have a lower expected value for the risky option to 
detect possible risk seeking for losses. 
RAL=EV (from Part IIIA) uses only the three choices between prospects and their 
expected value from RAL to calibrate the average risk attitude for losses for our 
sample of subjects. 
RALMPS (from Part IIIA) measures risk aversion for losses considering two choices 
between prospects and mean preserving spreads of these prospects. The variable 
indicates the percentage of a subject’s choices of the prospect with lower variance. 
All prospects involved non-zero losses and had positive variance. 
PLA (from Part IIIA) measures avoidance of prospects with a prominent loss by the 
percentage of a subject’s choices of a pure gain prospect over a mixed prospect with 
higher expected value (and variance) in three decision problems. We call the loss in 
these decision problems prominent because gain-loss differences are more prominent 
here compared to pure loss decisions in RAL, and there is only one loss outcome but 
three gain outcomes in each decision problem. 
PGS (from Part IIIA) measures seeking of prospects with a prominent gain by the 
percentage of a subject’s choices of a mixed prospect over a pure loss prospect with 
higher expected value (and lower variance) in three decision problems. There is only 
one gain outcome but three loss outcomes in each decision problem. 
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ENDOW (from Part IIIB) measures the percentage of a subject’s safe choices in six 
decisions between prospects and their expected values used to endow subjects with at 
least €20 for the part involving losses. 
Variable Short 
Description 
Choices   Expected values 
RAG Percentage of 
safe choices 
(€20, .5) vs. €10   
(€52, .25) vs. €13                RAG=EV 
(€15, .8) vs. €12 
(€18, .95) vs. €14 
(€32, .5) vs. €13 
(€200, .05) vs. €11 
€10 vs. €10 
€13 vs. €13 
€12 vs. €12 
€17.10 vs. €14 
€18 vs. €13 
€10 vs. €11 
RAGHL Percentage of 
safe choices if 
there was a 
unique 
switching 
point toward 
the riskier 
prospect 
(€12, .2; €9.60, .8) vs. (€23.10, .2; €0.60, .8)       
(€12, .3; €9.60, .7) vs. (€23.10, .3; €0.60, .7)  
(€12, .4; €9.60, .6) vs. (€23.10, .4; €0.60, .6)  
(€12, .5; €9.60, .5) vs. (€23.10, .5; €0.60, .5)  
(€12, .6; €9.60, .4) vs. (€23.10, .6; €0.60, .4)  
(€12, .7; €9.60, .3) vs. (€23.10, .7; €0.60, .3)  
(€12, .8; €9.60, .2) vs. (€23.10, .8; €0.60, .2) 
€10.08 vs. €5.01 
€10.32 vs. €7.35 
€10.56 vs. €9.60 
€10.80 vs. €11.85 
€11.04 vs. €14.10 
€11.28 vs. €16.35 
€11.52 vs. €18.60 
RAL Percentage of 
safe choices 
( €20, .5) vs.  €10 
( €15, .8) vs.  €12              RAL=EV 
( €20, .1) vs.  €2 
( €20, .8) vs.  €15 
( €10, .95) vs.  €9 
( €19, .85) vs.  €13 
 €10 vs.  €10 
 €12 vs.  €12 
 €2 vs.  €2 
 €16 vs.  €15 
 €9.5 vs.  €9 
 €16.15 vs.  €13 
RALMPS Percentage of 
choices with 
lower 
variance 
( €18, .5;  €10, .5) vs. ( €15, .5;  €13, .5)  
( €9, .5;  €1, .5) vs. ( €6, .5;  €4, .5)  
 €14 vs.  €14 
 €5 vs.  €5 
PLA Percentage of 
pure gain 
prospects 
chosen 
(€4, .35; €2, .65) vs. ( €6, .25; €8, .75)  
(€7, .25; €2, .75) vs. ( €4, .2; €7, .8)  
(€11, .85; €15, .15) vs. ( €1, .1; €15, .9) 
€2.70 vs. €4.50 
€3.25 vs. €4.80 
€11.60 vs. €13.40 
PGS Percentage of 
mixed 
prospects 
chosen  
( €14, .15;  €11, .85) vs. ( €17, .85; €8, .15)  
( €14, .4;  €5, .6) vs. ( €14, .8; €4, .2)  
( €6, .45;  €3, .55) vs. ( €19, .35; €2, .65) 
 €11.45 vs.  
€13.25 
 €8.60 vs.  
€10.40 
 €4.35 vs.  €5.35 
ENDOW Percentage of 
safe choices 
(€20, .5; €24, .5) vs. €22 
(€20, .6; €25, .4) vs. €22 
(€20, .75; €28, .25) vs. €22 
(€20, .8; €30, .2) vs. €22 
(€20, .9; €40, .1) vs. €22 
(€20, .95; €60, .05) vs. €22 
€22 vs. €22 
€22 vs. €22 
€22 vs. €22 
€22 vs. €22 
€22 vs. €22 
€22 vs. €22 
Table 2-3: Dependent variables and prospects 
 
For each variable we have slightly different sample sizes because different numbers 
of subjects violated the time constraint in different parts of the experiment. More 
precisely, subjects who violated the time constraint in at least one of the decision 
problems used to construct a variable were excluded from the analysis of this 
variable. 
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2.4 Experimental Results 
2.4.1 Time Pressure Manipulation  
Table 2-2 in section 2.2.2 shows that median decision times under time pressure were 
approximately half the size of median decision times under no time pressure. We 
tested for each decision problem and under both expected value information 
conditions the null hypothesis that decision times are equal under both decision time 
conditions, using Mann-Whitney tests. Equality of decision times was rejected for all 
choice problems. The smallest z-value was z=3.171 (p=0.002),13 indicating that 
decision times have been much shorter under time pressure. We lose between four 
and eight observations per variable in Part I and Part III because of violations of time 
limits in the separate binary choices. Hence, the time constraints in these decisions 
have been substantial but not prohibitive. We lose twenty observations in the choice 
list in Part II; a fact suggesting that decision makers appeared to be seriously 
constrained with the 30 seconds time limit in Part II.14 
In a post-experimental questionnaire subjects indicated their stress level and the 
perceived difficulty of the experiment on a five-point Likert scale. Subjects in the 
time pressure treatments felt more stressed during the experiment (Mann-Whitney 
test, z=5.520, p<0.001) and considered it a more difficult experiment than subjects in 
the unconstrained treatments (Mann-Whitney test, z=2.230, p=0.026). 
The correlation between our risk measures and decision times was practically zero 
for all variables in the treatments without time pressure. That is, there were not 
certain types of subjects in terms of their risk attitudes that were more constrained 
than others; for instance, more risk averse subjects did not deliberate longer before 
making a decision. Our choice for a between-subject design is, hence, corroborated 
by the data. 
Note also that in the treatments without time pressure, decisions times for gains in 
Part I and for losses and mixed prospects in Part IIIA do not differ (Mann Whitney 
                                                            
13 All tests in this chapter are two-sided tests, and the abbreviation ns denotes non-significance. 
14 Another ten subjects were eliminated because they switched more than once in the choice list, nine 
of them under time pressure. Yet, in comparison to other experiments using the same elicitation 
method the percentage of consistent choice lists submitted by the subjects is high, despite the time 
pressure. 
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tests, z<1.093, ns). This suggests that pure gain, pure loss, and mixed decisions 
created a similar level of difficulty for the decision makers. 
 
2.4.2 Time Pressure and Risk Attitude 
An overview of the means and standard deviations of all variables in our four 
treatments is given in appendix A3. Here, we first consider results for pure gain and 
pure loss decisions, and then consider results for decisions involving mixed 
prospects. For each variable in Table 2-3 we run linear regressions of the general 
form 
mrai =  + 1 TPi + 2 EVi + 3 (TPi  EVi)+ 4 FEMALEi + i  [1] 
where mrai is the measure of risk attitude for subject i that is considered in the 
regression (always in percentages), TPi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if subject i 
was in the time pressure condition, EVi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
subject was given expected value information, and the interaction term TPi  EVi 
which equals 1 if the subject experiences time pressure and received expected value 
information. FEMALE controls for the subjects’ gender and i  is the error term.15 
 
2.4.2.1 Pure	Gain	and	Pure	Loss	Decisions	
The linear regressions in Table 2-4 show that risk attitude for pure gains is not 
affected by time pressure. The variables RAG, RAGHL, and ENDOW involve 
different payoff ranges and time constraints, and they are measured in different parts 
of the experiment. There is no direct effect of time pressure on either of these 
variables. Expected value information does not affect these variables, nor does its 
interaction with time pressure. 
RESULT 1: Risk attitude for gains is robust under time pressure, and it does not 
respond to the availability of expected value information. 
                                                            
15 We report linear regression results here in order to simplify the interpretation and the comparison 
between variables in terms of percentage of safe choices. Ordered probit regressions on the number of 
safe choices for each variable give qualitatively the same results for all reported regressions. 
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For losses, however, subjects become comparably more risk averse under time 
pressure (Table 2-5). For both variables RAL and RALMPS, the percentage of safe 
choices under time pressure increases. No significant effect is found for expected 
value information or for its interaction with time pressure. 
Dep. Var.:  RAG RAG RAGHL RAGHL ENDOW ENDOW 
time pressure 0.011 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.051) 
0.010 
(0.038) 
0.054 
(0.055) 
0.026 
(0.039) 
0.032 
(0.057) 
EV information  0.069 
(0.035) 
0.079 
(0.05) 
0.025 
(0.037) 
0.024 
(0.048) 
0.011 
(0.039) 
0.006 
(0.055) 
time pressure  
EV information  
 0.019 
(0.071) 
 0.121 
(0.075) 
 0.011 
(0.079) 
female 0.121** 
(0.037) 
0.120** 
(0.038) 
0.059 
(0.039) 
0.062 
(0.039) 
0.122** 
(0.042) 
0.122** 
(0.042) 
# observations 172 172 146 146 170 170 
OLS regressions: Standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction;  ** represents significance at 
p=0.01 and * at p=0.05. 
Table 2-4: Linear regression results for pure gains 
 
Dep. Var.: RAL RAL RALMPS RALMPS 
time pressure 0.078* 
(0.039) 
0.110* 
(0.056) 
0.143* 
(0.057) 
0.203* 
(0.082) 
EV information  0.000 
(0.039) 
0.031 
(0.054) 
0.046 
(0.057) 
0.103 
(0.08) 
time pressure     
EV information  
 0.061 
(0.077) 
 0.114 
(0.113) 
female 0.084* 
(0.041) 
0.083* 
(0.041) 
0.109 
(0.06) 
0.106 
(0.06) 
# observations 171 171 173 173 
OLS regressions: Standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction;  ** represents 
significance at p=0.01 and * at p=0.05. 
Table 2-5: Linear regression results for pure losses 
 
The effect of time pressure for loss prospects is larger for the mean preserving 
spreads (RALMPS) than for RAL. This is consistent with the fact that RAL 
contained three decisions that were designed to detect risk seeking for losses. As will 
be discussed next, there was on average only mild risk seeking for losses in the 
baseline treatment; that is, without time pressure many subjects chose the safer 
options already. 
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RESULT 2: With losses, time pressure leads to more risk averse choices. The 
availability of expected value information does not affect behavior in either of the 
treatment conditions. 
To show the effect of time pressure on average risk attitudes for both gains and 
losses under time pressure conditions we consider the variables RAG=EV and 
RAL=EV, pooling the data from both expected value information treatments. These 
variables involve only choices between prospects and their expected values and the 
average risk attitude can be determined by testing whether subjects chose on average 
more than half of the safe options (Table 2-6). 
 No time pressure Time pressure Mann-Whitney test 
RAG=EV 73.9% 
(z=6.669, p<0.001)a 
71.7% 
(z=6.173, p<0.001)a 
z=0.391, ns 
RAL=EV 46.7% 
(z=0.696, ns)a 
60.1% 
(z=4.130, p<0.001)a 
z= 2.677, p=0.007 
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the average percentage of safe choices being equal to 50%. 
Table 2-6: Average percentage of safe choices 
 
In the baseline condition with no time pressure, our data show the common pattern of 
partial reflection (see Wakker et al. (2007a) for an extensive review of empirical 
findings). There is strong risk aversion for gains, but mild and insignificant risk 
seeking for losses. Under time pressure, we obtain risk aversion for both gains and 
losses, i.e. risk seeking for losses without time pressure turns into risk aversion for 
losses under time pressure. We observe that under time pressure, subjects have 
strong preferences for safer options for both gains and losses, clearly rejecting the 
conjecture that choices were more random under time pressure.16 
                                                            
16 Risk aversion for gains is quite strong for our variable RAG=EV, and it is conceivable that no 
treatment effect for risk attitude is observed because risk aversion was high without time pressure 
already. However, the above regressions also employ the variables RAG and RAGHL to detect 
changes in risk attitude. These variables include decisions between prospects of unequal expected 
value, and the mean percentage of safe choices without time pressure was 60% for RAG and 64% for 
RAGHL (pooling the data from both expected value information conditions). These preferences are 
not extreme, and they are comparable to the mean percentage of safe choices of 58% without time 
pressure for the variable RAL for which we detected increased risk aversion for losses under time 
pressure. 
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RESULT 3: With time pressure, choices are risk averse, on average, in the gain 
domain and in the loss domain. 
 
2.4.2.2 Decisions	Involving	Gains	and	Losses	
The variables PLA and PGS study gain-loss attitude. PLA measures the percentage 
of choices of a pure gain prospect over a mixed prospect with higher expected value. 
These decisions always involve one prominent loss, and apart from risk aversion also 
loss aversion can lead subjects to choose the pure gain prospect. PGS measures the 
percentage of choices of a mixed prospect over a pure loss prospect with higher 
expected value. These decisions always involve one prominent gain. Loss aversion 
would lead to fewer choices of the mixed prospect while gain seeking, which is 
overweighting of gains relative to losses, may lead subjects to choose the mixed 
prospect.  
 Dep. Var.: PLA PLA PGS PGS 
time pressure 0.170**
(0.055) 
0.115 
(0.08) 
0.253** 
(0.043) 
0.186** 
(0.062) 
EV information  0.12* 
(0.056) 
0.173* 
(0.078) 
0.125** 
(0.043) 
0.188** 
(0.06) 
time pressure     
EV information  
 0.106 
(0.11) 
 0.129 
(0.086) 
female 0.130* 
(0.059) 
0.133* 
(0.059) 
0.006 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.046) 
# observations 172 172 168 168 
OLS regressions: Standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction;  ** represents 
significance at p=0.01 and * at p=0.05. 
Table 2-7: Linear regression results for mixed prospects 
 
The linear regressions in Table 2-7 show that subjects avoid more mixed gambles in 
PLA and take more mixed gambles in PGS under time pressure. 
RESULT 4: In mixed gambles, decision makers are more likely to avoid the 
prominent loss and seek the prominent gain under time pressure. 
We also observe an effect of expected value information on both PLA and PGS. If 
expected values are provided, subjects choose the higher expected value prospect 
more often, leading to less aversion to the prominent loss and less seeking of the 
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prominent gain. We did not observe an effect of expected value information for the 
pure gain or pure loss decisions, suggesting that gain-loss attitude is affected by 
expected value information and plays an important role in PLA and PGS choices. 
The effect of expected value information occurs under both time pressure conditions 
and there are no significant interactions between time pressure and expected value 
information. 
RESULT 5: In mixed gambles, the availability of expected value information leads 
to decisions that are closer to risk neutrality than without expected value 
information. This effect occurs with and without time pressure. 
A simultaneous increase in loss aversion and gain seeking under time pressure 
cannot be explained by a change in gain-loss attitude as typically modeled under 
prospect theory. An increase in loss aversion implies that losses receive more weight 
relative to gains under time pressure than without time pressure. An increase in gain 
seeking implies the opposite effect. However, aspiration level-based expected utility 
theory (Diecidue and van de Ven, 2008) is consistent with such an effect. The theory 
predicts people to consider the total probability of surpassing the aspiration level, 
leading to deviations from expected utility. In the current setting, the aspiration level 
would naturally be a zero outcome. Consequently, in the PLA decisions, the overall 
probability of a gain is lower for the mixed gamble, leading to loss aversion; and in 
the PGS decisions, the overall probability of a gain is higher for the mixed gamble, 
leading to gain seeking. We find that PLA and PGS are strongly positively correlated 
on the individual level (Spearman’s =0.32, p<0.001). That is, subjects who avoid 
the prominent-loss mixed prospect in PLA are also more likely to seek the 
prominent-gain mixed prospect in PGS. This observation corroborates the view that 
gain-loss attitude is driven by the interaction of framing and a subject’s susceptibility 
to aspiration levels.17 
 
                                                            
17 A similar effect has been found in Isaac and James (2000) and James (2007) in comparisons 
between risk attitude elicitation procedures. In the two studies the subjects who are most risk averse 
under one elicitation procedure are most risk seeking under the other procedure, suggesting that 
differences in elicited risk attitudes depend on differences in the susceptibility towards the specific 
framing of the procedure. 
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2.4.2.3 Gender	and	Risk	Attitude	
There has been much interest in gender differences in risk attitude (Barsky et al., 
1997; Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009; Borghans et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Fehr-Duda et al., 2006; Schubert et al., 1999). We 
control for gender in our regressions and find, in line with the exiting literature, that 
females are more risk averse both under gains and under losses. There were no 
significant interactions between gender and time pressure or gender and expected 
value information. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Decisions under uncertainty that are made in auctions, managerial settings, or 
financial markets often involve serious decision time constraints. Similarly, neuro-
economic studies involving risky decisions let subjects make decisions under a strict 
timing schema. In contrast, most experimental measurements of risk attitudes 
provide subjects with ample decision time, and in fact urge subjects to consider their 
choices carefully.  
In this chapter, we study risky decisions under time pressure for gains, losses, and 
mixed prospects. Our results showed that time pressure affects choices under risk, 
but only in situation with loss prospects or mixed prospects. In such settings, 
behavior becomes more heuristic, and the findings support the view that aspiration 
levels become important. In the gain domain, the patterns of decision making seem 
very robust, even under severe time pressure. 
In particular, we found more risk aversion for losses, more loss aversion, and more 
gain seeking under time pressure. Our results show that typical non-expected utility 
patterns as modeled by prospect theory may not provide an appropriate description of 
choice behavior if time pressure becomes important. We have shown that recently 
developed models of expected utility with an aspiration level (Diecidue and van de 
Ven, 2008) may be a useful alternative in such situations. 
Our results provide reasserting evidence for the generalizability of risk attitude 
results from the laboratory to naturally occurring environments that exhibit time 
pressure in decision making, as long as the gain domain is concerned. If losses and 
mixed outcomes are involved, results with existing elicitation methods seem to be 
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only partially valid in such environments. Obviously, the same remark applies to 
results from neuro-economic studies. 
Our finding that expected value information reduces both loss averse and gain 
seeking behavior, irrespective of time pressure, suggests that subjects benefit from 
such decision aids. Surprisingly, no effect of expected value information was found 
for pure gain or pure loss gambles, supporting the view that elicited risk attitudes are 
robust to the availability of summary statistics. For mixed gables, our results suggest 
that subjects are aware of their sensitivity to framing and aspiration levels, and try to 
avoid such effects by falling back on presumably objective measures. Given that in 
many decision situations outside the lab a wide range of decision aid is available to 
the decision maker, actual behavior may thus be closer to the risk neutral benchmark 
than laboratory studies sometimes suggest. 
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2.6 Appendix 
 
A1. Experimental Instructions 
In this experiment you make choices between two risky options A and B, which pay some amount of 
money depending on the outcome of a 20-sided die. See Example 1. 
 
Example 1: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
A €11 €9 
B €20 €21 
Figure 2-3: Presentation of prospect choices (example 1) 
A 20-sided die will be thrown. Option A pays €11 if the die shows a 1, 2, 3,…, or 10, and pays €9 if 
the die shows an 11, 12, 13,…, or 20. Option B on the other hand pays €20 if the outcome of the die is 
1, 2, ..., or 5, and pays €21 if the outcome of the die is 6, 7, 8, …, or 20. If this choice was selected to 
be payoff relevant for you, the experimenter would come to your desk and you would throw a 20-
sided die. You would receive the payoff depending on the Option you have chosen before and the 
number shown by the die.   
 
Recognize that each number of the die represents a probability of 5%. The whole die adds up to 100% 
therefore. In Example 1 this means that Option A offers a chance to win €11 with probability 50% and 
to win €9 with probability 50%. Option B on the other hand offers a 25% chance to win €20 and 75% 
chance to win €21. 
Another example:  
Example 2: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
A €11 €9 
B €10 
Figure 2-4: Presentation of prospect choices (example 2) 
Here, Option A is the same as above: if you choose A, and the die shows any number between 1 and 
10 including, you receive €11. If the die shows any number between 11 and 20 including, you receive 
€9. If you choose Option B, on the other hand, you receive €10 for any number the die might show. 
Option B pays €10 with probability 100%. 
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A2. Example Screen Shot 
 
Figure 2-5: Screenshot - Decision screen 
 
A3. Tables 
        Treatmenta 
Variable 
NTP &NEV 
(I) 
TP&NEV 
(II) 
NTP&EV 
(III) 
TP&EV 
(IV) 
Mann-Whitney testsb 
RAG 0.56 (0.24) 0.56 (0.27) 0.65 (0.21) 0.63 (0.23) I<III, z=2.15, p=0.0318  
RAGHL 0.65 (0.20) 0.60 (0.29) 0.64 (0.16) 0.70 (0.26) - 
RAL 0.56 (0.27) 0.68 (0.25) 0.60 (0.24) 0.65 (0.25) I<II, z=2.060, p=0.0396 
RALMPS 0.44 (0.39) 0.65 (0.36) 0.56 (0.37) 0.64 (0.38) I<II, z=2.445, p=0.0145  
PLA 0.47 (0.38) 0.59 (0.33) 0.31 (0.35) 0.53 (0.39) III<IV, z=2.605, p=0.0092 
I<III, z=1.991, p=0.0464 
PGS 0.28 (0.28) 0.47 (0.30) 0.10 (0.18) 0.41 (0.32) I<II, z=2.723, p=0.0005 
III<IV, z=4.867, p=0.0000 
I<III, z=3.413, p=0.0006 
ENDOW 0.20 (0.27) 0.18 (0.22) 0.22 (0.29) 0.20 (0.26) - 
Standard deviations in parenthesis.  
a NTP: no time pressure; TP: time pressure; NEV: no expected value information; EV: expected value 
information.  
b Only significant test-results (p<0.05) are reported. 
Table 2-8: Means and standard deviations of variables by treatment 
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3 Chapter 3 
An Experimental Test of Precautionary Bidding 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Consider an auction with pure ex-post risk: The value of the auctioned good is risky, 
with the risk being independent of private or common value components and signals 
thereof. The risk is known ex-ante and is common knowledge among buyers. In the 
language of decision theory, the auctioned good is a risky lottery. Esö and White 
(2004) theoretically study auctions with ex-post risk in the affiliated value model by 
Milgrom and Weber (1982). They show for the standard first-price auction that 
bidders exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) unambiguously reduce 
their bids by more than the appropriate risk premium, an effect they call 
precautionary bidding.18 The intuition is that DARA bidders prefer higher income in 
the case they win the auction and have to bear the ex-post risk involved in the good, 
and therefore bid more conservatively. This effect is similar to the precautionary 
saving motive where agents transfer current wealth into future periods with more 
income uncertainty (Kimball, 1990). 
Examples for auctions with ex-post risk are numerous and financially significant. 
Television rights for Olympic Games are usually auctioned off before the host city is 
selected from a set of competitors. The winner bears the risk of a more or less 
attractive host, a risk arising from information unavailable to any bidder at the time 
the rights are allocated. In procurement auctions, unpredicted events that affect 
production costs add ex-post risk to the winning bidder’s profit. More generally, all 
goods whose resale value or quality is uncertain ex-ante to all buyers involve some 
ex-post risk. Precautionary bidding, if empirically relevant, has several important 
implications for auction design in general, and more specifically for information 
revelation by sellers and information acquisition by buyers. For instance, according 
to theory, sellers have an additional incentive to reduce the risk exhibited by the 
auctioned object as much as possible, and buyers have a strategic incentive to 
disregard some information. Because of its importance for the prediction of auction 
                                                            
18 In their article, they provide results for various auction formats. We focus on first-price auctions 
here. 
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outcomes and for economic design, it is essential to study the empirical validity of 
precautionary bidding. 
Despite the widespread occurrence of ex-post risk in auctions and its relevance, no 
empirical study on precautionary bidding has been conducted so far. A direct 
measurement of precautionary bidding with field data is not easily available, because 
it requires the independent observation of both the bidders’ risk tolerance and the 
riskiness of the good. In order to provide the first empirical assessment of 
precautionary bidding, we conduct experimental laboratory auctions where the 
controlled setting allows us to identify and quantify the precautionary premium 
directly. 
Our main experiment finds strong support for bidding behavior being consistent with 
precautionary bidding in first-price auctions. Bidders are significantly better off in 
first-price auctions when a risky object rather than an equally valued sure object is 
auctioned. Although our empirical hypotheses build on Esö and White’s (2004) 
theoretical framework, the experimental tests that we conduct for the data from the 
experiment are in fact model-free, relying only on observable certainty equivalents. 
In addition, we provide results for a parametric expected utility analysis. The latter 
shows that risk averse Nash equilibrium predicts bidding behavior in deterministic 
auctions reasonably well, but it fails to predict bidding behavior in auctions with ex-
post risk. This strongly corroborates the finding from our model-free analysis. In a 
control experiment, we address alternative explanations based on behavioral biases in 
decision-making that might have influenced our results in the main experiment. The 
data from this control experiment are in line with our conclusions from the main 
experiment and show the robustness of the precautionary bidding effect. 
The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows. In the next section we introduce 
the theoretical framework and the predictions of the precautionary bidding model. In 
section 3.3 we present our experimental design in detail. Section 3.4 reports the 
results from the main experiment, and section 3.5 provides evidence from the control 
experiment and from additional robustness checks. In section 3.6 we discuss the 
interpretation of our results in terms of precautionary bidding, and section 3.7 
concludes. 
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3.2 Theoretical Framework and Predictions 
Almost all analyses of bidding behavior in auctions today assume that objects are 
non-risky, although agents are often assumed to have noisy signals regarding the true 
value of the object. Risk aversion plays a role in first-price auctions, because it 
reduces bid shading and, therefore, increases the bid in comparison to the risk-neutral 
Nash equilibrium (e.g., Cox et al., 1982; 1985; Maskin and Riley, 1984; Kagel et al., 
1987). The only study so far that considers pure ex-post risk in common auctions 
formats is Esö and White’s (2004) theoretical analysis of the affiliated value model 
by Milgrom and Weber (1982). 
We follow their setup and assume that there are n potential bidders for a given 
object. Bidder i receives a private signal ],[ sssi  . The joint distribution of the signal 
follows the properties of affiliation described in Milgrom and Weber (1982). The 
risky ex-post monetary value of the object for bidder i is iiii zssvv   ),( , where v 
is strictly increasing in its first argument, is  denotes the highest signal of all bidders 
other than bidder i, and iz  is the realization of a random variable, iz~ , with zero 
mean. The realizations of the random variable come from a symmetric joint 
distribution and are independent of the signals, but they can be (perfectly) correlated 
across bidders. By definition, if iz~  is non-degenerate, the object is risky. The utility 
function u is strictly concave and thrice differentiable. For DARA bidders, 
)//()/( 22 xuxu   is strictly decreasing. 
Esö and White (2004, pp. 84-85) prove in this framework that, holding everything 
else constant, DARA bidders in the first-price auction have unambiguously higher 
indirect utilities in a symmetric equilibrium when iz  is non-degenerate, i.e., the 
object is risky.19 In the following, we give a brief intuition for the result. We then 
derive empirical predictions, building on Esö and White’s (2004) hypothesis, 
regarding the buyer’s equilibrium bids for a risky good and for her (risk free) 
certainty equivalent of this risky good. Our identification of precautionary bidding in 
the experiment will be based on the comparison of bids for risky lotteries and their 
certainty equivalents on the individual level. 
                                                            
19 The main result extends immediately to situations where another independent noise is added to 
make already noisy valuations even riskier (Kihlstrom et al., 1981). 
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In the first-price auction, for risk averse agents who maximize expected utility with a 
DARA utility function, the introduction of a mean-preserving ex-post risk has three 
effects. First, the value of the object for the agent is reduced by the risk premium. 
Agents replace the value of the risky object vi by its certainty equivalent CEi(vi) 
before making their bids. For risk averse bidders by definition ][)( iii vEvCE  , 
where [.]E  denotes the expected value. Second, the riskiness of the object introduces 
a background risk, making bidders become more risk averse regarding other risks 
(Eeckhoudt et al., 1996). Hence, in the presence of ex-post risk they will shade their 
bids less than predicted by the appropriate risk premium, because the possibility of 
reducing the chance to lose the object in the auction becomes more attractive than the 
risky gain of a higher payoff by decreasing the bid. 
There is a third effect, however, the precautionary effect. This effect causes bidders 
to bid less aggressively because each extra unit of income is more valuable to them 
in the case they win the auction for the risky object as opposed to its certainty 
equivalent, due to the background risk. In other words, increasing the probability of 
winning the auction through a higher bid becomes more costly in the presence of ex-
post risk. This effect is related to the prudence premium (Gollier, 2001; Eeckhoudt 
and Schlesinger, 2006). 
Taking all three effects together, Esö and White (2004) prove that for DARA bidders 
in equilibrium the total effect of ex-post risk on the reduction of one’s bid is 
unambiguously larger than just the risk premium.20 Our empirical strategy to identify 
precautionary bidding is based on the comparison of bids for risky objects and their 
certainty equivalents. By construction, both goods are equally valuable. If bids for 
risky objects were larger than bids for their certainty equivalents, the effect of 
background risk on bid shading would dominate, in contrast to the theory. If bids for 
risky objects were smaller than for their certainty equivalents, however, the 
precautionary effect must dominate, in accordance with the theory. Hence, we can 
formulate our main hypothesis.  
 
                                                            
20 For DARA bidders the prudence premium is larger than the risk premium. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1: In the affiliated private value first-price auction, buyers’ bids ib  for 
a risky object will be lower than their bids for a risk-free object whose value is equal 
to their individual certainty equivalent of the risky object, i.e.,  
( ) ( ( ))i i i i ib v b CE v . [1] 
The precautionary bidding effect is similar to the precautionary saving motive where 
agents transfer more wealth into the future when they face a higher future income 
risk (Kimball, 1990). Compared to precautionary saving, however, in first-price 
auctions individual risk attitudes and the level of riskiness of the object affect 
equilibrium bidding through multiple channels that point into different directions 
(see effects two and three above). In particular, increased risk aversion leads to less 
bid-shading (effect two). This makes EW’s result of an unambiguously negative 
effect of precautionary bidding on the bid the more remarkable. It also implies, 
ceteris paribus, that buyers are better off bidding for a risky object than for the 
equivalent risk-free object. 
As noted before, in most settings the (perceived) riskiness of the good and the degree 
of bidders’ risk aversion cannot easily be measured independently in the field. 
Moreover, direct comparisons between bids for risky and risk-free goods with an 
identical certainty equivalent typically cannot be constructed. Our experimental test 
of precautionary bidding directly compares bids for independently elicited certainty 
equivalents with bids for the appropriate risky objects on the individual level. 
Hypothesis 1 is derived from the precautionary bidding model under the premises of 
expected utility theory. Since our empirical test is only based on comparisons of bids 
for risky prospects and observable certainty equivalents, however, it is in fact model-
free, and Hypothesis 1 can be interpreted as a behavioral definition of the 
precautionary effect in first-price auctions. 
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3.3 Experimental Design 
3.3.1 The Auction 
In the experiment, we follow the affiliated private value implementation of Kagel et 
al. (1987), adjusted to the setup in which either sure prospects or risky prospects are 
sold. In particular, for sure prospects the subjects knew their private valuation, and 
for risky prospects they knew the prospect they could win in the auction. Their 
valuations were correlated because of a two-step procedure used to draw valuations 
and prospects from some interval of the whole payoff range (Kagel et al., 1987, p. 
1277). That is, a high private value observed by the agent makes it more likely that 
the other bidders also have high values. 
More specifically, our experimental subjects participated in a series of twelve 
anonymous first-price auctions. In each of them, they could bid for an object from an 
endowment of €10 in groups of three bidders. In order to produce matched bids for 
prospects and their individual certainty equivalents, each participant was bidding for 
two risky prospects and her two corresponding individual certainty equivalents that 
were elicited before in four out of the twelve auctions (see section 3.3.2 for details of 
the elicitation procedure). We call the specific bidder whose certainty equivalent is 
used the bidder of interest and the matched observations for the risky object and the 
appropriate individual certainty equivalent an auction pair. In the remaining eight 
auctions the private valuation of the bidder was drawn according to the procedure 
described in the following paragraph, with each of the other two bidders being the 
bidder of interest four times in turn. 
For risk-free prospects, the bidder of interest’s certainty equivalent for the matched 
prospect provided her private valuation vi. For the other two bidders in the group the 
valuations were determined as follows: vi was first reduced by a random number z(-), 
which was drawn from the interval [€0, €2], and then increased by a random number 
z(+) from the same interval. The number obtained, )()(0   zzvv iD , forms the 
midpoint of a €4-interval in which all three deterministic valuations (hence, 
superscript D) lie. Subjects did not learn the midpoint of the interval. Hence, the 
valuations of the other two bidders within a group were drawn from the interval 
]2€€ ,2€[€ 00  DD vv . By construction, the value vi lies in the interval and can 
An Experimental Test of Precautionary Bidding 
 
67 
assume any position in this interval, like the two other valuations. Figure 3-1 
illustrates the procedure for vi = €4.21, v0 = €5.11, and Bidder 1 as bidder of interest. 
For risky prospects, the procedure was similar. The bidder of interest had to bid for a 
risky prospect, presented in terms of its expected value plus or minus a fixed and 
announced amount }5,4,3,2{K  with equal probability.21 For each prospect, K 
follows uniquely from the rewriting of the gamble presentation in the preceding risk 
elicitation stage of the experiment (see section 3.3.2 for details). The risky prospects 
for the other two bidders were determined as described for sure objects, but taking as 
vi the expected value of the risky prospect for the bidder of interest. This gives 
expected values for the other two bidders in the range ]2€€ ,2€[€ 00  RR vv , to which 
the same ex-post risk of size K was added for all bidders. 
 
 
For example, assume that Bidder 1 indicated a certainty equivalent of €4.21 for the 
prospect [0.5: €6.36, 0.5: €2.36] in the risk elicitation task preceding the auction 
experiment. In the auction experiment, she would face one auction as illustrated in 
Figure 3-1 and another auction that would be described as offering an object with 
risky value of €4.36 that will, with a probability of 0.5 each, either be increased or 
decreased by an amount of K = €2. The two other bidders in the group would face a 
randomly drawn sure valuation out of the permissible range in the first auction and a 
randomly drawn risky valuation out of the permissible range (according to the 
procedure described above) in the second auction. 
                                                            
21 The presentation is identical to the theoretical formulation of ex-post risk as a noise added to a 
private valuation. Note that K took on the different values for different auctions but was always 
clearly announced before bidding. 
2 € 10 € 2 € 2 €
z(-)=0.8 
z(+)=1.7 
    5.11 € 
Bidder 1: 
4.21 €
Bidder 2: 
7.09 €
Bidder 3: 
6.07 €
Figure 3-1: Illustration of valuation assignment 
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Subjects were instructed about the general procedure of drawing values and the 
method of affiliation in great detail (see appendix A1 for the experimental 
instructions), but they were neither aware of the presence of a bidder of interest, nor 
of the fact that we took their certainty equivalents and prospects from the preceding 
risk elicitation stage, nor of the private valuations of the two other bidders. More 
precisely, they were simply told that the private valuations of the three bidders come 
from a €4-interval lying within a larger interval and were distributed randomly along 
this €4-interval (which was true by construction). Everything else was common 
knowledge among participants. Neither intermediate auction results nor bids were 
revealed before the end of the experiments, and groups stayed together for all twelve 
auctions.22 
After the twelve auctions, one auction was randomly selected for real payment of the 
full amount in euro. The auction winners paid their bids and received the payoff from 
the auction, possibly depending on the result of the ex-post risk, and they kept the 
rest of their €10-endowment that they had not used for bidding. Subjects who did not 
win the auction kept their endowment of €10. All randomizations concerning risky 
equal-chance events in the experiment were conducted by throwing dice at the 
subjects’ desks. 
Remember that the twelve auction rounds give us, per subject, two matched auction 
pairs (bids) for identical sure and risky valuations, and four more observations for 
bids for sure valuations. That is, in total we know individual valuations in eight out 
of the twelve auctions and can use this information for econometric analyses. We do 
not observe the valuation for subjects who were not the bidder of interest in the 
remaining four auctions for risky prospects. Only the bidder of interest submits a bid 
for a prospect for which we previously elicited her valuation in the risk preference 
elicitation stage that is described in the next sub-section. 
 
                                                            
22 Groups were formed randomly, but subjects who were close to each other in their risk attitude rank 
(within a session of 15 subjects) from the preceding risk elicitation had a higher chance to end up in 
the same group. This procedure approximates the assumption of identical risk attitudes for bidders in 
EW’s model and was explained in neutral terms to the participants (see the instructions in appendix 
A1). 
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3.3.2 Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
At the beginning of the experiment, we elicited subjects’ certainty equivalents for 
eleven risky prospects. All prospects were binary-outcome prospects with a 50% 
chance of each outcome (see Table 3-1, columns 1-3). Certainty equivalents were 
elicited using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1963) incentive mechanism 
(henceforth, BDM). Subjects were asked to state for each prospect their minimum 
selling price ps between the low and the high outcome of the prospect. They knew 
that a random buying price pb between these two outcomes would be drawn to 
determine if the prospect is sold to the experimenter if sb pp  , in which case the 
subject received the randomly drawn buying price, or is not sold otherwise, in which 
case the subject received the outcome of the prospect. 
The BDM mechanism has been used extensively in preference elicitation and is valid 
in our expected utility framework (e.g., Karni and Safra, 1987; Halevy, 2007). 
However, no BDM randomizations or risky prospects were resolved at this stage in 
order to prevent wealth differences between subjects in the auctions to come. 
Subjects were instructed that at the end of the experiment they would be paid on the 
basis of the outcome of one of the risky prospects or receive the random buying 
price, depending on the outcome of the BDM procedure. 
Prospect no. High payoff 
(prob. 50%) 
Low payoff 
(prob. 50%)
Expected 
value 
Average CE with 
BDMa 
Average CE with 
choice listb 
1 12.76 4.76 8.76 7.82 8.18 
2 8.30 2.30 5.30 5.00 5.18 
3 10.70 2.70 6.70 6.03 6.23 
4 6.52 2.52 4.52 4.10 4.41 
5 13.22 5.22 9.22 8.54 8.61 
6 8.06 2.06 5.06 4.70 5.04 
7 6.36 2.36 4.36 3.94 4.38 
8 13.20 3.20 8.20 7.83 7.67 
9 9.76 5.76 7.76 7.22 7.47 
10 12.76 6.76 9.76 8.93 9.21 
11 8.01 2.01 5.01 4.68 5.00 
Numbers in columns 2-6 show amounts in euro. a CE = Certainty equivalent; BDM = Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. b For an explanation of the right-most column, see section 3.5. 
Table 3-1: Risky prospects used in the experiment 
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3.3.3 Laboratory Protocol and Subjects 
Computer-based experiments were conducted at the experimental laboratory 
MELESSA of the University of Munich, using the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004). 75 
undergraduate students without experience in auction experiments participated in 5 
sessions with 15 subjects each. Sessions lasted up to 2 hours, and the average final 
payoff was €23.75, including a show-up fee of €4. Subjects received written 
instructions which were read aloud and had the opportunity to ask questions in 
private. Examples and/or test questions were given for each stage of the experiment, 
and a stage only began when all subjects correctly understood the procedures. 
The experiment started with the risk elicitation stage. Subjects received instructions 
for this stage, but knew that there would be further stages in the experiment. Upon 
completion, subjects received instructions for the second stage of the experiment. 
This stage was purely instructional, i.e., it was intended to make subjects acquainted 
with bidding in first-price auctions with and without ex-post risk. Subjects 
participated in twelve affiliated private value first-price sealed-bid auctions for six 
risky and six sure prospects. Auctions were held anonymously in groups of three 
people, with new groups formed in every auction. Again, subjects with a similar risk 
rank from the elicitation stage had a higher chance to end up in the same group in 
each auction. Subjects could bid from an endowment of €10 in each auction. All bids 
within a group, the winning bid and the winner were announced immediately after 
each auction to acquaint subjects with the affiliated value model and with bidding for 
uncertain prospects. Only at the end of the entire experiment, one auction from this 
training stage was randomly selected and subjects were paid according to the 
outcome. Furthermore, payments were scaled down by a factor of 1/10 (compared to 
the main auction experiment in stage 3). With the exception of the size of earnings 
and the specific procedure of taking prospects and certainty equivalents from the risk 
elicitation stage, this second stage of the experiment was identical to the main 
auction stage that was to follow. After stage 2 had ended, subjects received 
instructions for the main stage of the experiment, the twelve auctions as described in 
section 3.3.1. 
Remember that subjects were not informed about the matched structure and the 
bidder of interest in the main stage of the experiment. Note that, while prospects 
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were identical to the ones in the risk elicitation for the bidder of interest, the 
presentation of the prospects was quite different. They were framed in terms of ex-
post risk instead of binary gambles and were not easily recognized as the same 
prospects as in the first stage23, also because the training stage introduced a 
significant time lag. 
At the end of the experiment, all random aspects of the experiment were resolved, 
and subjects learned what they had earned in each of the three stages of the 
experiment. They were paid privately and in cash and then dismissed from the 
laboratory. 
 
3.4 Results of the Main Experiment 
Column 5 in Table 3-1 shows the average certainty equivalents for the lotteries 
elicited in the first stage of the experiment. On average, subjects exhibit risk 
aversion, with CEs being smaller than expected values for all prospects (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests; p < 0.01).  
Figure 3-2 provides clear evidence consistent with the hypothesized precautionary 
bidding effect ( ) ( ( ))i i i i ib v b CE v .  
A  B 
 
Notes: 
 Panel A: Number of pairs in which the bid for a risky prospect was (lower/identical/higher) than the 
bid for its certainty equivalent (within-person comparisons). 
 Panel B: Distribution of bids (in €) for risky prospects and for their deterministic certainty 
equivalents; % of subjects. 
  
Figure 3-2: Comparison of bids for risky prospects with bids for their certainty equivalents (BDM) 
                                                            
23 If so, it would make our results even stronger. Details are provided in the next section. 
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In Panel A, for the 150 matched auction pairs (2 auction pairs for each of the 75 
subjects), we show the number of pairs in which a buyer made a lower, identical, or 
higher bid for the risky prospect than for its CE. Clearly, risky prospects elicit lower 
bids than their certainty equivalents from the same individual (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test; p < 0.01). In 109 matched auction pairs, a lower bid was submitted for the risky 
prospect than for its certainty equivalent, in comparison to only 35 pairs with higher 
bids for the risky prospect. There were virtually no identical bids, suggesting that 
subjects did not simply remember prospects and their certainty equivalents from 
stage 1 and tried to be consistent.24 Panel B of Figure 3-2 shows that for risky 
prospects the whole distribution of bids shifts toward the left compared with bids for 
the matched certainty equivalents. Increased bid shading for risky prospects is also 
consistent within person, with 50 subjects always shading more for risky, 14 always 
shading less, and only 11 with mixed behaviour.   
Alternatively, one can perform a parametric utility analysis to assess precautionary 
bidding. The first benchmark measure for the evaluation of sure and risky prospects 
in our experiment are risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bids (Kagel et al., 1987), given 
in equation [2]: 
))]((
2
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)1(
212)( 
  sv
n
nnn
vvb iii . [2] 
In the case of our experiment, n = 3 (number of bidders), ε = 2 (radius of the smaller 
interval), and 0s  (lower bound of the larger interval). For each auction and each 
bidder we calculate the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bids from individual 
valuations. We find significant overbidding for the sure prospects, consistent with 
previous findings in the experimental literature for risk averse subjects (Cox et al., 
1988).25 The actual bids are significantly higher than the risk-neutral Nash bids 
                                                            
24 Note that even if some bidders of interest had recognized the prospects from the risk elicitation 
stage in the later auction stage and understood the construction of our matched auction pairs, they had 
no more relevant information on values and intervals than the other bidders in the group. In the data, 
there is no evidence whatsoever of bidders of interest bidding differently than the other bidders. 
25 Overbidding is a common empirical phenomenon in first-price auctions. Explanations fall roughly 
into three categories: risk aversion, inter-personal comparisons, and non-equilibrium behavior or 
learning. Surveys of the literature are, for instance, provided in Crawford and Iriberri (2007) and 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007). 
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(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01). For risky prospects we find significant 
underbidding with respect to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bids (Wicoxon 
signed-ranks test, p < 0.01). As a robustness check, one can aggregate relative 
overbidding and underbidding on the individual level. The basic result for the 75 
subjects does not change, and both tests are still significant (p < 0.01 for sure 
prospects, and p < 0.05 for risky prospects). 
 
In a next step, we estimate an individual utility function for each subject based on the 
data we have from the certainty equivalent elicitation stage (see Table 3-1). This 
allows us to calculate risk averse Nash equilibrium bids for each bidder and auction 
based on the individual risk aversion parameters and the (expected) value of the risky 
or deterministic prospects. These Nash bids are then again compared to the actual 
bids. 
More specifically, we use nonlinear least squares estimations to fit a constant relative 
risk aversion utility function (CRRA), )1/()( 1 rxxu r   , with risk aversion 
parameter r, for all 75 subjects individually.26 For each risky and for each risk-free 
auction, we can then calculate risk averse Nash equilibrium bids and compare them 
to the actual bids. Nash bids are calculated according to the equilibrium bidding 
formula in Kagel et al. (1987). 
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with  = r (risk parameter of the utility function). 
Equation [3] can only be applied if r < 1. Several subjects in our experiment are more 
risk averse than that. We therefore truncate their risk aversion parameter r at 0.99, 
which underestimates the actual level of their risk aversion. Nash bids are virtually 
identical to actual bids for sure prospects (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.83). 
However, we observe strong underbidding compared to the benchmark solution for 
risky prospects (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01). The robustness check of using 
                                                            
26 We selected a CRRA utility function because it has been widely applied in the literature on risk 
aversion and first-price auctions. It obviously has the DARA property. 
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relative bids, aggregated on the individual level, gives the same general picture (p = 
0.55 for sure prospects; p < 0.01 for risky prospects). 
In order to avoid arbitrary parametric utility assumptions and to fully exploit the 
model-free nature of our test of precautionary bidding, we estimate the quantitative 
effect of ex-post risk on bids by using regression analyses, controlling for the panel 
structure with eight observations per subject.27 Plotting valuations and bids suggested 
a linear specification.28 We include a dummy variable for bids made for risky 
prospects and a coefficient that captures the interaction of valuations with the 
presence of the ex-post risk. Model I in Table 3-2 shows that for sure prospects 
buyers shade their bids by 15 cents per euro valuation. In the presence of risk, bids 
are reduced by another 18 cents per euro valuation for the prospect. That is, the 
precautionary bidding effect is observed, because equally valuable risky and sure 
prospects elicit significantly different bids. Bidders shade their bid approximately 
twice as much when the good is affected by ex-post risk than when it is not. 
Dep. Var: bid I II III IV 
 (BDM) (BDM, excl. bids 
with low risk ranka) 
(BDM, excl. bidders 
with low risk rankb) 
(BDM) 
valuation 0.849** 
(0.024) 
0.874** 
(0.026) 
0.831** 
(0.026) 
0.854** 
(0.024) 
risk 0.030 
(0.281) 
0.322 
(0.301) 
-0.351 
(0.330) 
 
risk valuation -0.181** 
(0.045) 
-0.229** 
(0.051) 
-0.133** 
(0.051) 
 
risk size Kc    -0.116 
(0.092) 
risk size K  valuation    -0.029* 
(0.014) 
constant 0.073 
(0.155) 
0.007 
(0.163) 
0.127 
(0.178) 
0.032 
(0.154) 
# observations (bids) 600 461 480 600 
(# bidders) (75) (74) (60) (75) 
R2 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.66 
Fixed effects panel regressions: standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction;  ** represents 
significance at p=0.01 and * at p=0.05. BDM:  Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism; Risk rank: 
discrete variable ranging from 1 (least risk averse) to 15 (most risk averse).  
a Bids with lowest risk ranks excluded (ranks 1 to 3 out of 15).  
b Bidders with lowest risk rank in their session excluded (ranks 1 to 3 out of 15). 
c Risk size K: margin between lowest and highest outcome of the prospect (€2, €3, or €4). 
Table 3-2: Determinants of bidding behavior 
 
                                                            
27 Remember that for each subject, we know private valuations for two risky and six sure prospects. 
28 Models with non-linear specifications as a robustness check are provided in the appendix A2. 
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In models II and III in Table 3-2 we address the robustness of the effect with respect 
to the risk aversion rank of a specific certainty equivalent or of a specific bidder. The 
least risk averse certainty equivalent for a given prospect has rank 1 and the most risk 
averse certainty equivalent has rank 15 within an experimental session. Similarly, the 
subject in each session with the lowest average risk-aversion rank over all eleven 
prospects has rank 1 etc. From a psychological perspective, it could be argued that 
the effect found in the auction is driven by subjects who do not exhibit a stable risk 
attitude or who reveal too large certainty equivalents by mistake in the first stage of 
the experiment, and successively make very low bids in the auction (regression to the 
mean). Notice that buyers who provided relatively high certainty equivalents will 
have low risk ranks. We distinguish between individual certainty equivalents that are 
high for a certain prospect and may come from different bidders for different 
prospects (model II) and bidders who generally state high certainty equivalents 
(model III). In Table 3-2, we show the regression results when we exclude 
observations or bidders with the lowest three risk ranks. In the two alternative 
specifications the precautionary effect stays both economically and statistically 
significant. Standard errors increase due to the loss of more than 100 observations in 
each model, but the estimates are very robust. Note that while we have chosen to 
exclude the lowest three ranks, our results do not change when we exclude fewer or 
some more of the high certainty equivalents. Further, a standard regression-to-the-
mean explanation would equivalently imply that low-certainty-equivalent bidders 
should have higher actual valuations, and, therefore, increase their bids for the risky 
prospects compared to the matched certainty equivalents. This effect, were it present, 
would reduce the observed precautionary bidding effect. 
The right-most column in Table 3-2 considers the comparative static effect of 
increases in risk. Since the size of the ex-post risk varied among lotteries, we can test 
whether the bid-shading effect is correlated with the size of the risk. Indeed, we 
observe that the median increase in bid shading for risky prospects over the bid 
shading for the paired CEs equals €0.20, €1.21, and €1.30 for risk of size €2, €3, and 
€4, respectively.29 That is, an increase in bid shading is obtained for increases in ex-
post risk. Regression IV in Table 3-2 confirms the effect. For each euro increase in 
the risk-level K, bid shading increases by about 3 cents per euro valuation. 
                                                            
29 As we only employed prospects 1 to 6 in Table 3-1 to determine the valuations for the auctions, we 
were not able to observe bid shading for risk level K=5. 
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3.5 Control Experiment 
The results of the main experiment support the precautionary bidding hypothesis. 
However, several alternative, though ad-hoc, explanations of our data are 
conceivable. One could, for instance, claim that all subjects consistently reveal too 
high certainty equivalents in the elicitation stage. Although the BDM mechanism is 
widely used for preference elicitation (Halevy, 2007, p. 507), an upward bias for 
BDM selling prices has sometimes been reported (Isaac and James, 2000; Plott and 
Zeiler, 2005). If all subjects reported too large certainty equivalents, the negative 
effect of risk on bids could be explained by downward revision of the valuations of 
risky prospects in the auctions. 
Another possible, non-expected-utility explanation builds on the behavioral concept 
of loss aversion. If outcomes are described in terms of gains and losses from some 
reference point, subjects hold lower valuations of a prospect compared to a 
description in terms of gains only. In the risk elicitation stage of the experiment, 
prospects were described as binary gambles with two positive outcomes. Because of 
the affiliated value structure with sure and risky prospects, it was more natural to 
describe prospects in terms of a valuation plus ex-post risk in the auctions. The 
natural ex-post risk description, however, may have led subjects to frame the 
prospects in terms of an equal-chance gain or loss from the reference point of the 
sure valuation. This might have made the risky prospects less attractive than in the 
binary presentation in the risk elicitation, and, therefore, appear less valuable than the 
matched certainty equivalents. 
Although these behavioral biases provide more ad-hoc explanations than the 
precautionary bidding model, they have been shown to be descriptively relevant in 
other situations and may provide a psychologically convincing alternative 
explanation to the equilibrium model. We therefore conducted a control experiment 
that is able to assess potential effects of a selling price bias and loss aversion.  
 
3.5.1 Design and Hypotheses 
The control experiment (conducted with 75 new subjects in five sessions) was 
completely identical to the main experiment, except for the following two features. 
First, the subjects’ certainty equivalents were elicited by a choice list. For each 
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prospect, subjects made 21 choices between the risky prospect and a sure payoff, 
with all choices shown simultaneously on the screen (see screenshot in appendix 
A1). The lowest sure payoff was equal to the low outcome of the prospect, and the 
highest sure payoff was equal to the high payoff of the prospect, and these two 
choices were actually pre-determined for the subjects on the screen in order to 
enforce stochastic dominance. The 19 choices between the high and the low sure 
payoff were equally spaced in monetary units. These choices had to be filled in by 
the subjects, and the certainty equivalent was calculated as the midpoint between the 
highest sure amount for which the subject prefers the risky prospect, HSi, and the 
lowest sure amount for which she prefers the sure payoff LSi, i.e. CEi = (HSi + LSi)/2. 
Because we needed a unique switching point to calculate individual certainty 
equivalents for the subsequent auction stages of the experiment, we only allowed a 
single switching point for each individual in the choice list. As in the main 
experiment, at the end of the experiment one prospect was randomly selected for real 
pay. For this prospect, one of the 21 choices was randomly selected, and subjects 
were paid for this stage according to their decisions for the selected choices. 
The second design change regards the inclusion of another choice list at the end of 
the experiment that has been interpreted as a measure of loss aversion and has been 
widely used recently (Fehr and Götte, 2007, p. 316; Gächter et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 
2008). Subjects are offered a series of prospects, giving an equal chance of either a 
gain or a loss that they could choose to play or not to play (Table 3-3). They were 
free to accept or reject any prospect, that is, we did not require single switching from 
acceptance to rejection as the loss increases along the list.30 Payments for this choice 
list were according to decision in all six choices, depending on the outcome of the 
risky prospects. 
Prospect (50%–50%) Accept to play? 
Lose €2  or  win €6 Yes O     No O 
Lose €3  or  win €6 Yes O     No O 
Lose €4  or  win €6 Yes O     No O 
Lose €5  or  win €6 Yes O     No O 
Lose €6  or  win €6 Yes O     No O 
Lose €7  or  win €6 Yes O     No O 
Table 3-3: Choice list measure of loss aversion31 
 
                                                            
30 In fact, all our subjects had a single switching point. 
31 Adapted from Gächter et al. (2007). 
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For losses smaller than €6, rejecting to play the prospect implies a significant loss in 
expected value that may be explained more easily by a gain-loss framing and a 
kinked utility function of wealth changes than by a concave utility of wealth. It has 
also been shown that the predictions of reference-dependent utility models hold 
mainly for people who reject most of the prospects in this choice list (Fehr and Götte, 
2007). While we do not aim to add to the debate regarding utility curvature versus 
loss aversion, we call subjects who reject more prospects in this task more loss 
averse, in line with the alternative behavioral hypothesis we aim to test. Assuming 
the loss-aversion explanation for the choice list clearly implies that the precautionary 
effect should be driven by the most loss-averse subjects. Loss-averse subjects could 
value the prospects lower if presented in terms of ex-post risk in the auction rather 
than as a binary lottery in the initial risk elicitation stage, leading to a reduction of 
bids for risky prospects compared to their elicited certainty equivalents. This leads to 
the following two hypotheses originating from behavioral considerations. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (BDM Selling): Hypothesis 1 holds only for certainty equivalents 
elicited through BDM selling prices. 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (Loss Aversion): Hypothesis 1 holds only for loss averse bidders. 
 
3.5.2 Results of the Control Experiment 
Table 3-1 shows in the right-most column that under the choice list procedure the 
elicited certainty equivalents were not smaller than under the BDM selling price 
procedure. In fact, certainty equivalents for prospects 4, 7, 9, and 11 were even 
significantly larger for the choice list procedure (Mann-Whitney tests (two sided), p 
< 0.05); all other certainty equivalents were not significantly different for the two 
methods. These first results indicate already that there was no upward bias through 
the BDM elicitation of certainty equivalents. Further, Figure 3-3 shows an identical 
pattern as for the main experiment, with the precautionary effect being even stronger 
on average. Of the 150 matched pairs of auctions the risky prospect elicited lower 
bids than its certainty equivalent in the large majority of cases (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p < 0.01). Again, the whole distribution of bids shifts towards the left, 
compared with bids for the matched certainty equivalents.  We can therefore clearly 
reject behavioral Hypothesis 2. 
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Notes:  
Panel A: Number of pairs in which the bid for a risky prospect was (lower/identical/higher) than the 
bid for its certainty equivalent (within-person comparisons).  
Panel B: Distribution of bids (in €) for risky prospects and for their deterministic certainty 
equivalents; % of subjects.  
 
Figure 3-3: Comparison of bids for risky prospects with bids for their certain equivalents (CL) 
 
As before, conducting a parametric utility analysis for risk-free prospects, we 
observe significant overbidding in comparison to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium 
bids (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01), and for risky prospects we observe risk-
neutral Nash bids that are much larger than actual bids (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p 
< 0.01). Overbidding now does not vanish when one compares actual bids to the risk 
averse equilibrium Nash bids based on CRRA utility functions (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p < 0.01) for sure prospects. However, underbidding is nevertheless highly 
significant for risky prospects (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01). Not 
surprisingly, given the similarity of the descriptive results from the main experiment 
and the control experiment, all our conclusions regarding precautionary bidding from 
the utility analysis for the main experiment remain valid for the choice list procedure. 
This is also true for taking average bids, aggregated on the individual level, as the 
basis for the statistical comparison. 
As in the main experiment we estimate the quantitative effect of ex-post risk on bids 
using fixed effects panel regressions, shown in Table 3-4. Model I in the table shows 
our basic regression, now for the choice list (CL) experiment. The results are very 
similar to the main experiment, with bid shading of about 15 cents per euro valuation 
and a significant precautionary effect of another 28 cents per euro reduction under 
ex-post risk. In models II to IV we test for differences between the precautionary 
effect jointly for BDM- and CL-elicitation stages, using the complete data from both 
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experiments. Model II uses all observations and includes an interaction dummy 
taking up the difference between the BDM and the CL experiment. The 
precautionary effect remains significant and its magnitude (a 20 cent reduction in the 
bids per euro valuation) is considerable. 
Figure 3-4 shows the distribution of the number of prospects rejected in the loss 
aversion measurement task. Note that all subjects switched at most once, and all 
switched from accepting the first prospects (see Table 3-3, small losses) to rejecting 
the later prospects (larger losses). 
Dep. Var.: bid I II III IV 
 (CL) (CL & BDM) (CL, LA dummy) (CL, LA continuous) 
valuation 0.853** 
(0.020) 
0.851** 
(0.016) 
0.857** 
(0.020) 
0.856** 
(0.020) 
risk 0.371 
(0.256) 
0.190 
(0.190) 
-0.430 
(0.254) 
0.447 
(0.257) 
riskvaluation -0.276** 
(0.039) 
-0.205** 
(0.032) 
-0.238** 
(0.040) 
-0.212** 
(0.046) 
riskvaluationCL - -0.044* 
(0.017) 
- - 
riskvaluationLAd - - -0.084** 
(0.022) 
- 
riskvaluationLAc - - - -0.022** 
(0.008) 
constant -0.159 
(0.137) 
-0.042 
(0.103) 
0.187 
(0.136) 
-0.181 
(0.137) 
# observations (bids) 600 1200 600 600 
(# bidders) (75) (150) (75) (75) 
R2 0.74 0.71 0.75 0.74 
Fixed Effects Panel Regressions: standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction;  ** represents 
significance at p=0.01 and * at p=0.05. BDM:  Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism; CL: 
choice list mechanism; LAd: loss aversion dummy;Lac: loss aversion continuous.  
Table 3-4: Determinants of bidding behavior 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Distribution of loss aversion 
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The median number of rejected prospects is 4, replicating the findings in Fehr et al. 
(2008) and Gächter et al. (2007). In regression model III we include the loss aversion 
measure as a dummy for those bidders who reject four or more prospects (median 
split), and in regression model IV we include the raw number of rejected prospects. 
Both regressions show that loss aversion does increase the precautionary bidding 
effect. The loss aversion measures increase the model fit and add significantly to the 
precautionary effect. However, the coefficients for the precautionary bidding effect 
stay at around 20 cents per euro valuation and remain highly significant. Thus, our 
results clearly reject hypothesis 3. The precautionary bidding effect is robust and 
cannot be explained solely by the two behavioral effects. Finally, the comparative 
static effect of increases in risk (the level of K) on the level of bid shading for risky 
prospects emerges strong also in the choice list based experiment as it did in the main 
experiment.32 
 
3.6 Discussion 
Esö and White (2004) showed theoretically that ex-post risk in affiliated value 
auctions has an unambiguous effect for bidders with decreasing absolute risk 
aversion: bids for risky prospects in the first-price auction are discounted by more 
than the appropriate risk premium. This is a strong result given the several 
simultaneous effects of risk aversion on bid shading in the first-price auction. If 
precautionary bidding is descriptively relevant, the theoretical result has implications 
for optimal information collection and revelation by sellers, strategic information 
acquisition by buyers and, more generally, auction design. An empirical assessment 
of precautionary motives in auction bidding cannot be obtained easily, however, 
because it requires independent knowledge of risk and risk attitudes, both difficult to 
measure precisely in the field. 
We designed an experimental auction for risky and sure prospects that aims to 
provide a first empirical assessment of precautionary bidding. Our study directly 
compared bids for risky prospects with bids for their relevant certainty equivalents 
on the individual level. It thus allows for a model-free measurement and gives a 
                                                            
32 Median increases in bid shading equal €1.00, €1.48, and €1.57 for risk size of €2, €3, and €4. A 
regression analogously to model IV in Table 3-2 reveals an additional shading of about 6 cents per 
euro valuation for each euro increase in risk (p<0.001).  
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behavioral definition of the precautionary premium. We find robust evidence that is 
consistent with the predicted effect. Bids are significantly lower for risky prospects 
than for the appropriate certainty equivalent for a large majority of our experimental 
subjects. That is, bidders are significantly better off bidding for a risky object than 
for an equally valued risk-free object. Consistent with the experimental auction 
literature, we find on average overbidding with respect to the risk-neutral Nash 
equilibrium for sure objects and that the risk averse Nash equilibrium under expected 
utility describes bidding behavior for sure objects reasonably well. Corroborating the 
precautionary bidding effect, in the presence of ex-post risk, there is significant 
underbidding with respect to the risk-neutral and the risk averse Nash equilibrium 
bids.  
Although the empirically observed effect in our experiments is consistent with the 
idea of a precautionary premium, alternative interpretations are possible. Two 
behavioral interpretations, based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents and on 
loss aversion, were rejected in the control experiment. Another potential 
interpretation involves subjects’ beliefs about their competitors’ bidding behavior 
(Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Heinemann et al., 2009). Subjects may simply 
believe that other subjects shade the bids for risky prospects more strongly than for 
sure prospects. It is not clear, however, why they would expect a discount that is 
larger than the expected risk premium. Thus, a belief-based explanation would rather 
depend on subjects systematically overestimating the risk premia of other subjects. 
The existing literature provides little support for such an effect (Ball et al., 2010; 
Faro and Rottenstreich, 2006). We therefore think that systematically biased believes 
alone cannot provide a convincing explanation for the observed behavior in the 
auctions.  Another concern about the interpretation of our result as a precautionary 
effect relates to the unobserved degree of prudence. As Kimball (1990, p. 54) argued, 
the precautionary effect relates to the propensity of people to “prepare and forearm 
oneself on the face of uncertainty.” In terms of the current analysis, if a buyer wins 
the auction and has to carry the risk, she wants to be prepared by holding more 
wealth and will bid less aggressively for the risky good. Although the precautionary 
effect is quite intuitive in risky auction settings, it may come as a surprise to observe 
it in a laboratory experiment. The finding is less surprising, however, given that a 
considerable level of risk aversion in auction experiments are a standard finding, and, 
in particular, that also behavior consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion 
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(DARA) has been observed on experimental markets in the laboratory. For instance, 
Levy (1994) conducted a dynamic portfolio choice experiment where subjects made 
investment decisions under changing wealth levels. Payoffs were given in terms of a 
few thousand experimental euros, but they translated into typical laboratory payoffs, 
since the market earnings were divided by a factor of 1000. Levy found clear 
evidence for decreasing absolute risk aversion in terms of experimental wealth. No 
effect of real wealth on risk taking in the experiment has been observed, however. 
Levy suggested that subjects make their decision within the frame of payoffs relevant 
in the experiment and therefore show sensitivity to otherwise rather small changes in 
payoffs.  
Similar findings are provided in Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Noussair et al. 
(2011), who measure prudence directly using methods in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 
(2006). Both papers show clear evidence of strong prudence for typical experimental 
stakes, like the ones used in this chapter. Nousair et al. (2011) explicitly test for 
CARA and reject it in favor of DARA. These findings lend support to the 
interpretation of our results in terms of precautionary bidding. For bidders with 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, absolute prudence is larger than absolute risk 
aversion, leading to the additional precautionary premium. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated increased bid shading in experimental first-price auctions 
for risky prospects, over and above the size of the risk premium. Thinking of, e.g., 
auctions for consumer products at online platforms, auctions for art items, and 
auctions for licenses or procurement contracts, stakes and risks are much larger in the 
real world than in our experiment. We therefore expect precautionary bidding to be 
an important factor, affecting bids and prices on non-laboratory markets as well.  
In some settings, however, precautionary bidding effects may be mitigated by other 
influences that lead to an upward bias in bidding. Goeree and Offerman (2003) test 
explanations of the winner’s curse using auctions with noisy signals of an uncertain 
private value. In the context of the current study, this would be similar to resolving 
the risky prospects ex-ante and providing subjects with a noisy signal of the 
outcome. Goeree and Offerman observe too optimistic bidding for these private 
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value auctions, similar to the winner’s curse for common values, an effect they call 
the news curse. In situations where buyers receive noisy signals of the value of a 
risky good, the precautionary effect may therefore be counterbalanced by the news 
curse.  
Related settings where ex-post risk may not necessarily lead to precautionary effects 
involve auctions with resale opportunities (Haile, 2003), and license auctions with 
aftermarkets (Janssen and Karamychev, 2009). With potentially countervailing 
effects on bids, it seems a fruitful direction for future research to study the 
comparative influence of ex-post risk deriving from different market structure on 
auction outcomes in controlled experimental settings. In a similar vein, within the 
precautionary bidding framework, a direct empirical test of the predicted market 
structure effects, including the buyers’ selection into auctions for risky or risk-free 
goods and the incentives for sellers to invest in the reduction of ex-post risk,  would 
be desirable. 
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3.8 Appendix 
 
A1. Experimental instructions (translated from German) 
 
Welcome to the experiment and many thanks for your participation! 
From now on please do not speak with other participants 
 
General Procedure 
This experiment serves the investigation of economic decision making You can earn money which 
will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. 
During the experiment you and the other participants are requested to make decisions. Your decisions, 
as well as the decisions of the other participants, will determine your monetary payoff according to the 
rules explained below. The whole experiment will take about two hours. If you have any questions 
during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to answer your 
questions at your desk.  
In the interest of clarity, we use male terms only in our instructions. 
Anonymity 
In some parts of the experiment you will be grouped with other participants. Neither during the 
experiment nor afterwards you or the other participants will learn about the identity of other group 
members. Neither during the experiment nor afterwards the other participants will learn about your 
experimental earnings. We will never connect names with experimental results. At the end of the 
experiment you will have to sign a receipt about your personal earnings which only serves for 
accounting purposes. The sponsor of this experiment does not receive any experimental data. 
Auxiliaries 
You are provided with a pen on your desk. For calculations you will find a link to the Windows 
calculator on the screen. 
The Experiment 
The experiment consists of three parts. You will receive detailed instructions for each part after 
finishing the previous. In each part you can earn money. The sum of earnings will determine your 
final income. 
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Part 133 
Part 1 consists of a sequence of lotteries. Such a lottery could be structured as follows. 
 
Figure 3-5: Screenshot – Bidding decision 
 
In the above example you would earn €10 with 50% probability and €5 with 50% probability.  
For each lottery you have two possibilities: 
1. you can gamble or 
2. you can sell the lottery. 
Proceedings are as follows: You are asked to state a minimal selling price for the presented lottery. 
Minimal selling price denotes the price for which you are willing to sell the lottery. This price has to 
be within a predetermined range. For the above example the range would be from €5 to €10. 
After stating a minimal selling price (an amount within the given range with two digits behind the 
comma) the computer randomly generates a buying offer. The offer is drawn from the same 
interval which predetermines the range of your choice – in the above example, between €5 and €10. 
Each two-digit number within this interval can be drawn with same chance. The computer’s buying 
offer is purely random and totally independent from your chosen minimal selling price. 
Afterwards the computer’s buying offer and your chosen minimal selling price will be matched. If the 
computer’s buying offer is higher or equal to your minimal selling price, you sell the lottery to the 
computer and receive an amount equal to the computer’s buying offer. If the computer’s buying 
offer is smaller than your minimal selling price, no sale takes place. You gamble and receive the 
lottery outcome. The procedure of the “gamble” will be explained in detail below. 
Example 1: Let’s assume for the lottery shown above you choose a minimal selling price of €7. Let’s 
further assume the computer randomly generates a buying offer of €9.50. In this case the computer’s 
buying offer is at least as high as your minimal selling price. You sell the lottery to the computer and 
receive an amount equal to the computer’s buying offer, namely €9.50. 
                                                            
33 For the main experiment, i.e., the Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism. 
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Example 2: Let’s once more assume you choose a minimal selling price of €7 for the lottery shown 
above. This time the computer randomly generates a buying offer of €6.50. Then the computer’s 
buying offer is lower than your minimal selling price. You do not sell the lottery to the computer. You 
keep the lottery and gamble. Hence, you either receive €5 with 50% probability or €10 with 50% 
probability.  
Please note: 
The randomly generated computer offer is independent of your decision about your minimal selling 
price. Since in case of a purchase your earnings are not determined by your minimal selling price but 
by the computer’s buying offer you should truly state the minimal price for which you are just 
willing to sell the lottery. 
 
Altogether you will state minimal selling prices for 11 lotteries. At the end of the experiment the 
computer randomly picks one lottery. Since you don’t know which one, it is in your own interest to 
consider all your decisions for all the lotteries carefully. Then, the computer randomly generates a 
buying offer.  
If the buying offer is higher or equal to your minimal selling price, you sell the lottery to the computer 
and receive an amount equal to the buying offer. If the buying offer is smaller than your minimal 
selling price, no sale takes place. In this case you gamble and receive the outcome of the lottery. More 
precisely, the experimenter comes to your desk and you roll a six-sided die. For the example above 
you would receive €5 if you roll the numbers 1, 2 or 3 or €10 if you roll the numbers 4, 5 or 6.  
At the top right corner you will find a timer which gives you some temporal orientation for your 
decision. You can exceed this time limit (especially for the initial decisions, this might most likely be 
the case). 
 
Part 234 
In part 2 in each round (in each auction) all participants will be matched in groups of three. The 
group composition may chance from auction to auction. However, you will always be matched with 
participants who have a similar risk attitude. (As a measure of risk attitude we use your decisions 
of part 1. From now on, none of your decisions will influence subsequent parts of the experiment). 
You and both other group members will take part in an auction for fictitious goods. For such a good 
you receive a private valuation (V). This private valuation may deviate from valuations that the two 
other members of your group receive. Private valuations are determined as follows: In a first step 
the computer will draw a random number out of a larger interval. Let’s assume that the computer 
randomly chooses €9.00. This amount subsequently serves as the midpoint of a smaller interval. 
Later the private valuations will be drawn from this smaller interval. The smaller interval always has a 
width of four, meaning that in our example your private valuation as well as the private valuations of 
both other group members will be drawn from an interval between €7.00 and €11.00. Let’s assume the 
computer randomly allocates you a private valuation of €8.50. You will learn about your private 
valuation before the auction starts. In this case you know that this number is drawn from a smaller 
interval with width 4, and you also know that the midpoint of the smaller interval is drawn from a 
larger interval. But you do not know the midpoint of the smaller interval.  
After all group members learned about their private valuations, each group member bids for the good 
[bid=(B)]. Each group member receives an endowment (E) of €10. Bids above the endowment are 
allowed. Please note that this may possibly cause losses which will be subtracted from gains from 
                                                            
34 Handed out after completion of Part 1. 
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other parts of the experiment. A group’s highest bidder acquires the good and pays her bid. Outbid 
group members do not have to pay their bids. In case of a tie, a coin toss decides. Earnings are 
determined as follows: 
Earnings: 
- Highest bidder: E – B + V 
- Outbid group members: E 
Some auctioned goods, however, exhibit risk. The risk structure is always the same. With 50% 
probability your private valuation increases by a certain amount (R) and with 50% probability 
your private valuation decreases by the same amount. Let’s assume an amount (R) of €3. In this case 
the earnings of the highest bidder will be either reduced or increased by €3 both with a probability of 
50%. The amount (R) is identical for all group members (of course, only the winner has to bear the 
risk). Prior to each auction you will always learn if the auctioned good exhibits risk and if so by which 
amount (R) the winner’s earnings will be increased or reduced.  
Altogether, you will participate in 12 auctions. Subsequent to each auction you will learn whether or 
not you have purchased the good. In addition, you learn about the other group members’ bids. In case 
the auctioned good exhibit some risk, the resolution of the risk will take place at the end of the 
experiment.  
For each of the 12 auctions you have an endowment of €10. At the end of the experiment, one auction 
will be randomly selected and the results of this auction will be paid out in cash. Since you don’t 
know which one, it is in your own interest to consider all your decisions for all 12 auctions carefully. 
Each group member receives her earnings from this auction. Since this part is supposed to make you 
familiar with bidding in an auction and to give you a better understanding of the auction mechanism 
all earnings will be divided by a factor of 10. 
Thus, an outbid player in the selected auction receives €10 * 0.1 = €1. A player who submitted the 
highest bid in the selected auction will receive her endowment minus her bid plus her valuation (if the 
good exhibits some risk: plus/minus (R)) divided by 10. 
If in the selected auction you have purchased a good exhibiting a risk, the resolution of the risk takes 
place at the end of the experiment. More precisely, the experimenter will come to your desk and you 
roll a six-sided die. For the numbers 1, 2 or 3 your earnings will be reduced by the amount (R), and 
for the numbers 4, 5 or 6 your earnings will be increased by the same amount. 
 
Part 335 
This part is very similar to part 2. Again, all participants will be matched in groups of three to 
participate in a number of auctions. As you already know from part 2, you will always be matched 
with participants exhibiting a similar risk attitude (as a measure of risk attitude we use again your 
decisions in part 1). Prior to each auction you will learn about your private valuation which will be 
determined similarly to part 2. Unlike in part 2, in this part your earnings will NOT be divided by 
the factor 10. 
As in part 2, you bid either for goods with a certain value or for goods with a risky value depending 
on the auction. For each auction you receive an endowment of €10. Bids above the endowment of 
€10 are allowed, but in case you make a loss, it will be subtracted from gains stemming from other 
parts of the experiment. Earnings are determined as described in the instructions for part 2. 
                                                            
35 Handed out after completion of Part 2 
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Altogether, you will participate in 12 auctions. Unlike in part 2, subsequently to each auction you will 
neither learn whether you have purchased the good, nor what others have bid. Instead, after submitting 
your bid next auction starts. 
If the auctioned good exhibit some risk, the resolution of this risk takes place at the end of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment one auction will be randomly selected and the results of 
this auction will be paid out in cash. Since you do not know which one will be chosen, it is in your 
own interest to consider all your decisions for all 12 auctions carefully. Each group member receives 
her earnings from this auction. 
 
 
Examples: 
Example 1 (non-risky good): 
Players A, B and C have been grouped together. For a non-risky good they receive the following 
valuations: A: €4.50; B: €8.10; C: €6.50 
 
a) Let’s assume knowing their valuations players submit the following bids: 
A: €4.00; B: €6.00; C: €5.00 
Player B submitted the highest bid and thus purchased the good. He has to pay a price equal to his bid, 
namely €6.00. This results in the following earnings in this period: 
A: €10.00 (E); B: €10.00 (E) – €6.00 (B) + €8.10 (V) = €12.10; C: €10.00 (E) 
In case this auction is selected to determine payoffs, players A and C receive €10.00, and player B 
receives €12.10. 
 
b) Let’s assume knowing their valuations players submit the following bids: 
A: €4.00; B: €8.10; C: €5.00 
Player B submitted the highest bid and thus bought the good. He has to pay a price equal to his bid, 
namely €8.10. This results in the following earnings in this period: 
A: €10.00 (E); B: €10.00 (E) - €8.10 (B) + €8.10 (V) = €10.00; C: €10.00 
In case this auction is selected to determine payoffs, all players receive €10.00. 
 
c) Let’s assume knowing their valuations players submit the following bids: 
A: €3.00; B: €6.00; C: €9.00 
Player C submitted the highest bid and thus bought the good. He has to pay a price equal to his bid, 
namely €9.00. This results in the following earnings in this period: 
A: €10.00 (E); B: €10.00 (E); C: €10.00 (E) - €9.00 (B) + €6.50 (V) = €7.50 
In case this auction is selected to determine payoffs, players A and B receive €10.00, and player C 
receives €7.50. 
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d) Let’s assume knowing their valuations players submit the following bids: 
A: €15.00; B: €8.00; C: €4.00 
Player A submitted the highest bid and thus bought the good. He has to pay a price equal to his bid, 
namely €15.00. This results in the following earnings in this period: 
A: €10.00 (E) - €15.00 (B) + €4.50 (V) = - €0.50; B: €10.00 (E); C: €10.00 (E) 
In case this auction is selected to determine payoffs, players B and C receive €10.00 and player A 
makes a loss of €0.50. This loss will be deducted from gains he made in other parts of the experiment. 
 
Example 2 (risky good): 
Players A, B and C have been grouped together. For a risky good they receive the following 
valuations: A: €11.70; B: €9.10; C: €8.30 
The good exhibits a risk. Its value will either increase by €3 (R) with 50% chance or decrease by €3 
with 50% chance. 
 
a) Let’s assume knowing their valuations players submit the following bids: 
A: €11.00; B: €5.00; C: €4.00 
Player A submitted the highest bid and thus bought the good. He has to pay a price equal to his bid, 
namely €11.00. Due to the risk he has to gamble at the end of the experiment (in case this auction is 
selected to be payoff-relevant). Let’s assume he is rolling a two with the die. Hence, his valuation for 
the purchased good is reduced by €3. This results in the following earnings in this period: 
A: €10.00 (E) - €11.00 (B) + €11.70 (V) - €3.00 (R) = €7.70; B: €10.00 (E); C: €10.00 (E) 
In case this auction is selected to determine payoffs, players B and C receive €10.00, and player A 
receives €7.70. 
 
b) Let’s assume players submit the same bids as in a) but this time player A rolls a four at the 
end of the experiment. Hence, his valuation for the purchased good is increased by €3. This 
results in the following earnings in this period: 
A: €10.00 (E) - €11.00 (B) + €11.70 (V) + €3.00 (R) = €13.70; B: €10.00 (E); C: €10.00 (E) 
In case this auction is drawn to determine payoffs, players B and C receive €10.00, and player A 
receives €13.70. 
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1) Questions: 
 
Please choose “True” or “False”: 
 A player, who did not purchase a good, has zero earnings:  
  True          False 
 A player bidding exactly his valuation for a non-risky good will earn €10 at most. 
  True          False 
 A player who bids more than his valuation for a non-risky good and wins the auction will 
earn less than he would have earned in case of not bidding at all. 
  True          False 
 Altogether, you can’t make losses in this part. 
  True          False 
 If I submit a bid below my own valuation, I will earn €10 in case of not winning and the 
difference between my valuation and my bid in case of winning. 
  True          False 
 The lower my bid, the lower my chance of winning the auction. 
  True          False 
 The higher my bid, the higher my earnings in case of winning. 
  True          False 
 
2) Exercises 
 
Players A, B and C have been grouped together. For a non-risky good they receive the following 
valuations: A: €5.50; B: €2.70; C: €5.60 
Knowing their valuations the players submit the following bids: 
A: €3.00; B: €2.00; C: €1.00 
 Which player purchases the good? 
Your answer: _______________ 
 What are the earnings of player A? 
Your answer: _______________ 
 What are the earnings of player B? 
Your answer: _______________ 
 What are the earnings of player C? 
Your answer: _______________ 
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Part 136 
In this part you have to go through a number of lists. You can always choose between two alternatives 
in these lists: with option X you receive a lottery, and with option Y you receive a sure payment. 
On a given list, option X always represents the same lottery. Sure payments of option Y vary from 
decision to decision. Such a choice list could look as follows: 
 
Figure 3-6: Screenshot – Choice list 
In the example above option X always represents a lottery which results in earnings of either €5 with 
50% chance or €10 with 50% chance. Option Y starts with a sure payment of €5 and ends with a sure 
payment of €10.  
For each row you have to choose between option X and option Y. The first decision in a list is always 
preselected: Instead of getting a sure payment of €5 with certainty it is always better to receive a 
lottery with an outcome of either €5 or €10. Thus, Option X is always preselected for the first 
decision. The last decision in a list is also preselected. Instead of getting a lottery with an outcome of 
either €5 or €10 it is always better to receive a sure payment of €10. Thus, Option Y is always 
preselected for the last decision.  
Between these two extremes you have to make choices for 19 option pairs. Since sure payments of 
option Y are continuously increasing downwards the list, it is consistent to switch from option X to 
option Y only once. 
Altogether, you will have to fill in 11 choice lists. The lotteries of option X and the range of the sure 
amounts will differ between lists. At the end of the experiment, one choice list is randomly selected by 
the computer. From this list the computer randomly selects one decision to determine your payoffs 
in this part. If you chose option X, you will gamble and receive the outcome of the chosen lottery. 
More precisely, the experimenter comes to your desk at the end of the experiment and you roll a six-
sided die. For the example above you would receive €5 if you roll the numbers 1, 2 or 3 or €10 if you 
                                                            
36 For the control experiment, i.e, the choice list. 
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roll the numbers 4, 5 or 6. If for this option pair you chose option Y, you receive the sure amount of 
option Y. 
Since you don’t know which choice will be payoff relevant, it is in your own interest to consider all 
your decisions carefully. 
Example 1: Let’s assume the computer randomly selects the choice list shown above. From this list 
choice 2 is randomly selected to determine payoffs. Let’s further assume in this decision task you 
picked option X. In this case you have to gamble. More precisely, you have to roll the dice. With 
numbers 1, 2 or 3 you receive €5, and with numbers 4, 5 and 6 you receive €10. 
Example 2: Let’s again assume the computer randomly selects the choice list above. From this list 
choice 20 is randomly selected to determine payoffs. Let’s assume for this decision task you picked 
option Y. In this case you receive the sure amount of option Y in decision 20, namely €9.75. 
At the top right corner you will find a timer which gives you some temporal orientation for your 
decision. You can exceed this time limit (especially for the initial decisions, this might most likely be 
the case). 
 
 
A2. Non-linear specifications 
Dep. Var.: bid I  II  III  
 (BDM)  (CL)  (CL, LA dummy)  
valuation 1.059** 
(0.123) F(2,520) 
=635.23** 
1.076** 
(0.110) F(2,520) 
=904.35** 
1.089** 
(0.108) F(2,518) 
=939.96** (valuation)² -0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.016* 
(0.008) 
-0.016* 
(0.007) 
risk 1.51 
(0.792)  
0.087 
(0.743)  
0.30 
(0.732)  
riskvaluation -
0.181** 
(0.045) F(2,520) =10.44** 
-0.182 
(0.222) F(2,520) 
=26.49** 
-0.202 
(0.220) F(2,518)= 
5.17** risk(valuation)² 0.039 
(0.020) 
-0.007) 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.016) 
riskvaluationLAd -  -  0.079 (0.076) F(2,518)= 
10.13** risk(valuation)²LAd -  -  -0.022* (0.010) 
constant -0.558 
(0.396)  
-0.885 
(0.377)  
-0.938* 
(0.371)  
# observations (bids) 600  600  600  
(# bidders) (75)  (75)  (75)  
R2 0.68  0.74  0.75  
Fixed Effect Panel Regressions: standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction;  ** represents significance at 
p=0.01 and * at p=0.05. BDM: Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism; CL: choice list mechanism; LAd: 
loss aversion dummy. 
Table 3-5: Non-linear specifications 
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4 Chapter 4 
Outcome Risk and Prevention Framing in Social Dilemmas 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Social dilemmas are characterized by individual incentives to free-ride, whereas from 
a social perspective it would be optimal to cooperate. However, the zero-contribution 
thesis deducted from a purely selfish Nash equilibrium contradicts observations from 
everyday life where cooperative behavior can be observed frequently (Ostrom, 
2000). One of the key challenges of economics is to provide well-funded knowledge 
on how this cooperative behavior can be fostered and which characteristics of public 
goods dilemmas help to achieve cooperation. Experimental economic research has 
contributed greatly to better understand human behavior in social dilemmas 
identifying numerous institutions to foster or hamper cooperative behavior (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Falk et al., 2005; Nikiforakis, 2008; Rege and 
Telle, 2004; Güth et al., 2007; Potters et al., 2005; Sutter et al., 2010).37  
In this experimental study we systematically vary a public goods game in two 
dimensions and examine how this variations influence individuals’ willingness to 
cooperate.  
In the first dimension, we explore whether cooperation is more likely if the goal of 
cooperation is to create a common value or if it is to prevent the loss of a common 
value. Henceforth, we will call social dilemmas of the former type creation frame 
social dilemmas and those of the latter type prevention frame social dilemmas.  
In the second dimension, we analyze whether contributions are higher when 
deterministically increasing the value of the public good as modeled in the standard 
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) or when increasing the probability of a 
successful provision. Henceforth, we will denote social dilemmas of the former type 
as no outcome risk social dilemmas and those of the latter type as outcome risk social 
dilemmas.  
Distinguishing within these two dimensions allows capturing crucial characteristics 
of various real world social dilemmas. The provision problem of public TV and 
                                                            
37 For overviews see Ledyard (1995), Zelmer (2003), or Chaudhuri (2011). 
Outcome Risk and Prevention Framing in Social Dilemmas 
 
95 
radio, for instance, can most likely be classified as a creation frame social dilemma 
exhibiting no outcome risk. Providing these public good creates a value and the 
provision has an infinite number of possible provision levels, with each invested 
monetary unit deterministically increasing the quality of provision. The provision of 
public safety, in contrast, can better be described as a prevention frame social 
dilemma exhibiting no outcome risk. As in the public TV and radio example an 
infinite number of provision levels exists, but the goal of provision has rather a 
preventive than a creative character. The funding of research and development 
projects can be characterized as a creation frame social dilemma exhibiting outcome 
risk. Here, the provision goal is to create a value but usually only two provision 
levels exist: the scientific breakthrough is either achieved, or it is not. A contribution 
to such a project does not deterministically increase the provision quality but rather 
increases the probability of success. Another social dilemma exhibiting these 
characteristics would be the funding of lobbying efforts. Like the former two 
examples the construction of a dyke exhibits outcome risk as its probability not to 
burst with the next flood increases with the efforts spent in its construction but has 
undeniably a preventive character.   
How variations in these two dimensions affect cooperativeness has not been analyzed 
in depth.38 Furthermore, these two dimensions have to our best knowledge never 
been explored systematically together. Running such an analysis with field data 
appears hardly feasible due to the impossibility of finding examples of respective 
dilemma types with a comparable marginal impact of cooperation. By contrast, a lab 
experiment allows us to keep the expected value of a marginal contribution constant 
in all four treatments resulting from the above mentioned variations. In four different 
treatments we let subjects contribute over ten rounds in a stranger matching design 
and, additionally, elicit subjects’ expectations about others’ contributions in each 
round. In a one-shot interaction we also elicit subjects’ conditional contribution 
                                                            
38 Keser and Montmarquette (2008) investigate cooperation in a prevention frame social dilemma with 
outcome risk varying initial wealth, initial loss-probabilities, and the degree of information but do 
neither provide a comparison to the no-risk domain nor to the creation frame domain. Brown and 
Stewart (1999) vary initial endowments in public bad games to examine how implicit cooperation-
thresholds necessary to avoid perceived losses affect cooperativeness. Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) 
investigate the impact of prevention- and creation-framing on cooperativeness in a step-level public 
goods game.  An in-depth literature overview will be provided in section 4.3.  
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functions, i.e. the amount an individual is willing to contribute conditionally on what 
other individuals contribute. We find both prevention framing and outcome risk to 
increase contributions as well as expectations about the cooperativeness of others. 
Consequently, we find highest contributions when combining both outcome risk and 
prevention framing. Here, a constant contribution level can be established while 
cooperation collapses over time in all other treatments.  
Finding treatment differences when framing a game either as creation- or as 
prevention-task cannot be explained by expected utility theory (EUT) as same 
actions result in same outcomes, and thus EUT would predict no treatment 
differences. Even when assuming participants to adopt reference points in the way 
intended by the framing, i.e. to adopt initial endowments as reference points and 
view further changes as either gains or losses, the hypotheses are not clear-cut. 
Assuming loss aversion, cooperation is more desirable in the prevention frame as 
preventing a loss is more preferable than enabling a gain of the same size. However, 
from a selfish perspective contributing is still a dominated strategy as it reduces the 
own payoff. Given loss aversion, contributing is even more harmful in the prevention 
frame as it increases the lost amount a contributor suffers with certainty. We find the 
higher desirability of cooperation in the prevention frame to outweigh the higher 
individual incentives to free ride. This result is mostly driven by the fact that 
participants are conditional cooperators on average. We find subjects to expect others 
to be more cooperative under a prevention frame and consequently reciprocate with 
higher contributions, establishing higher cooperation in the prevention frame 
treatments.  
Finding higher contributions under outcome risk is more puzzling. Risk aversion in 
the sense of a concave shaped utility function cannot explain our findings but would 
rather predict lower contributions in the outcome risk social dilemma. One feasible 
explanation for our findings would be that probability weighting makes subjects to 
overweight their marginal impact which mitigates the perceived social dilemma 
property of the game. This explanation approach is supported by the finding of a 
significant lower share of free-riders in treatments exhibiting outcome risk. Another 
explanation would base on the assumption that individuals tend to think themselves 
as pivotal – a behavioral pattern which has been reported in the psychological 
literature on voting behavior. 
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Our findings contribute to a better understanding of why some real world social 
dilemmas are more easily overcome than others. They help to determine which 
global social dilemmas need supranational institutions to ensure a successful 
internalization and which dilemmas may be overcome by non-institutionalized 
international cooperation. Furthermore, our results suggest interest groups, concerned 
with the provision of a specific public good containing a preventive character and/or 
outcome risk, to emphasize these characteristics as much as possible. 
The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows. In the next section we present 
our experimental design and our hypotheses. In section 4.3 we link our research to 
the related literature. Section 4.4 presents our experimental results. In section 4.5 we 
discuss alternative explanations for our findings and finally conclude in section 4.6.  
 
4.2 Experimental Design 
 
4.2.1 Treatments 
In order to systematically study the effect of outcome risk and prevention framing on 
cooperativeness in social dilemmas, we vary two factors: no outcome risk vs. 
outcome risk and creation framing vs. prevention framing, resulting in a 2x2-design 
depicted in Table 4-1. 
 No Outcome Risk Outcome Risk 
Creation Framing Creation frame no Risk (CnR) Creation frame Risk (CR) 
Prevention Framing Prevention frame no Risk (PnR) 
Prevention frame Risk 
(PR) 
Table 4-1: Treatments 
 
The mechanism used in all treatments is a voluntary contribution mechanism as 
introduced by Isaac et al. (1985). Let I={1, 2, …, n} denote a group of n subjects 
interacting in a public goods game. Individual Ii receives an endowment of w with 
0w  which can be allocated either to a private account and/or to a public account. 
The voluntary contribution of individual i to the public account is denoted by ic and 
must satisfy wci 0 . Let C denote the sum of all group members’ contributions to 
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the public account (i.e. 


n
j
jcC
1
). Subject i’s return for each group contribution is 
denoted by with   n10 .  Depending on the treatment, the mechanism is 
either modified keeping expected payoffs equivalent (in the risk dimension) or just 
presented differently (in the framing dimension).   
 
In the Creation frame no Risk treatment (CnR), the mechanism is presented in the 
way which is usually found in the literature starting with Isaac et al. (1985): By 
contributing to the public account, subjects deterministically increase the amount 
each group member receives additionally to her private account. Individual i’s 
expected payoff is thus given by 
CcwE iii  )(   [1]. 
In the Prevention frame no Risk treatment (PnR), the mechanism is mathematically 
identical but presented differently to subjects: They receive an endowment of fw 
with wnf   . However, each player is about to lose f .  By contributing to the 
public account, this loss is deterministically reduced for each group member by the 
factor . The payoff function as presented to the subjects can be written as 
)()( CfcfwE iii      [2].39 
In the Creation frame Risk treatment (CR), contributions to the public account do not 
result in payments for all group members in a deterministic way. Instead, each 
contribution increases the group’s probability of gaining a fixed prize f by 
f
  
percent. The payoff function as presented to the subjects can be written as 
fC
f
cwE ii  )()(   [3]. 
The mechanism in the Prevention frame Risk treatment (PR) is mathematically 
identical to the one described for the CR-treatment but presented differently: 
Subjects receive an endowment of fw  but face the threat of suffering a loss of f . 
                                                            
39 It is easy to see that [1] and [2] are equivalent. 
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Contributing to the public good reduces the groups’ probability of suffering this loss. 
The payoff function as presented to the subjects can be written as 
fC
f
cfwE ii  )1()(     [4]40. 
The parameters in our experimental session were set up as follows: group size n=4, 
endowment 5€w and parameter 5.0 . All treatments were presented to 
participants in a neutral and context-free fashion. We avoided terms like 
“cooperation”, “social dilemma”, or “public good”. We do deliberately use the terms 
“gain” in our creation frame treatments and “loss” in our prevention frame treatments 
in order to induce the framing. 
 
4.2.2 Equilibria and Predictions 
As mechanisms in the CnR- and PnR-treatments are purely deterministic, subject i’s 
actual payoff i in these treatments is equivalent to the expected payoff )( iE  . The 
actual marginal per capita return, further denoted as MPCR, i.e. a player’s return 
resulting from a one unit contribution, is equivalent to the expected MPCR denoted 
by E(MPCR). More precisely: 
 )/()()( ,, iiiPnRCnRPnRCnR cCEMPCRMPCRE .  [5] 
Given that   satisfies   n10 , each unit invested into the private account 
provides a subject with a higher payoff than an investment into the public account, 
thus, making free-riding in both the CnR- and the PnR-treatment the unique 
dominant strategy, while the social optimum would be to fully contribute.  
In contrast, mechanisms in the CR- and PR-treatments are stochastic. Hence, the 
MPCR in these treatments is a mean preserving spread of the MPCR present in the 
CnR- and PnR-treatments. More precisely:  
)()/()()( , EcCEMPCRE iiiPRCR  .  [6] 
                                                            
40 It is easy to see that [3] and [4] are equivalent. 
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Assuming risk neutrality for all players, free-riding is a unique dominant strategy as 
it maximizes a subject’s expected payoff while full contribution would be the social 
optimum. Given the assumption of individuals being risk averse in the sense of 
exhibiting a concave utility function, free-riding is not necessarily the unique Nash-
equilibrium. A contribution´s marginal impact on a risk averse individual’s utility 
rather depends on the contributions made by other group members, with others’ 
contributions increasing the marginal utility of one’s own contribution.  
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 illustrate the motivation behind this insight. 
 
Figure 4-1: Utility of a contribution if C is low 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Utility of a contribution if C is high 
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Making no contributions to the public account in the CR- and PR-treatments results 
in an outcome of either w  or fw , with probabilities of either outcome depending 
on the contributions of others. By contributing  ic , the player receives a prospect 
with an outcome of either icw   or icfw  . Compared to the no-contribution-
case the probability of the higher outcome increased by icf  . If others’ 
contributions are low as in Figure 4-1, a contribution results in a lower utility for the 
contributing player. In contrast, if others’ contributions are very high as in Figure 4-2 
and the player’s concave utility function is sufficiently curved, a contribution results 
in a higher utility, even for a selfish decision maker. 
Hence, given a sufficiently concave utility function, it is feasible to receive Nash-
equilibria of non-zero contributions for selfish but risk averse individuals. However, 
assuming individuals to exhibit a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function of the form )1/()( 1 rxxU r   with x denoting a subject’s payoff and r  her 
degree of risk aversion, our simulation results in appendix A3 show that with the 
values used in our setup the slope of the contribution function is not sufficiently bent 
to turn the marginal utility of a contribution positive, even when assuming an r  
substantially higher than elicited for our participants. In our setup, zero-contribution 
remains a unique Nash-equilibrium for selfish decision makers independently of their 
degree of risk aversion. This leads us to our first hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Assuming purely selfish decision makers, zero contributions will 
be observed in all four treatments no matter whether decision makers are either risk 
neural or risk averse.41 
Experimental evidence on social dilemmas, however, reports decision makers not to 
act purely selfish but finds average contributions to lie significantly above the zero-
contribution Nash-equilibrium (see Ledyard (1995) for an overview). Positive 
contributions are driven by social preferences such as altruism, warm-glow 
(Andreoni, 1989), reciprocal preferences (Sugden, 1984; Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006), interaction of heterogeneous players (Ambrus and Pathak, 2011) or inequality 
                                                            
41 We did not derive hypotheses for risk loving individuals as risk aversion is a commonly found 
behavioral pattern in laboratory experiments. The results of our risk test (see section 4.2.4)  show that 
risk loving preferences do indeed not matter for our sample. 
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aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 
2002).  
When formulating further hypothesis, we assume the distribution of social 
preferences to be constant over treatments. We further assume subjects to form no 
reference points but to decide according to expected utility theory.42 When assuming 
subjects not to adapt reference points but to evaluate absolute outcomes only, the 
presentation of a decision problem either as creation- or as prevention-task should 
not affect decisions as same actions result in same final payoffs regardless of social 
preferences. This leads us to our second hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Assuming other regarding decision makers and no reference 
dependency, contributions do not differ between prevention- and creation frame both 
under outcome risk and no outcome risk. 
Varying the game in the risk dimension means to determine whether contributions 
either deterministically determine the provision level or just the probability of 
provision. However, treatments are designed in a way that same actions always result 
in same expected payoffs. Thus, assuming subjects to be risk neutral, contributions 
should not differ between outcome risk treatments and no outcome risk treatments.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Assuming other regarding and risk neutral decision makers, 
contributions do not differ between outcome risk and no outcome risk both under 
prevention- and creation-framing.  
As shown above, for a risk averse decision maker the marginal utility of a 
contribution increases in the outcome risk treatments with the sum of contributions 
collected in the public account but remains negative even when assuming other 
group members to fully contribute. Thus, for selfish individuals it does not matter in 
our setup whether marginal utility of a contribution differs between outcome risk and 
no outcome risk treatments, as it is negative in both cases and thus free-riding is 
always the unique dominant strategy. In contrast, if we assume subjects to be other 
regarding and thus, contributions to result in an additional utility gain, e.g. warm 
glow, altruism etc., differences in marginal utility stemming from the evaluation of 
own payoffs according to the convex utility function can become crucial as the 
                                                            
42 How predictions change when assuming reference dependence will be discussed in section 4.5. 
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marginal utility gain resulting from other regarding preferences adds to the former 
one and thus, might turn a contribution into a utility-maximizing strategy. In 
appendix A4 we compute the marginal utility of a contribution (without the 
additional gain resulting from social preferences) for both outcome risk and no 
outcome risk treatments for a slightly risk averse as well as for an extremely risk 
averse individual (with respect to the convexity of the utility function). We can show 
both for slightly risk averse and for extremely risk averse decision makers that 
marginal utility of contributions are lower in the risk treatments than in the no risk 
treatments for all but one case: Only when assuming all other group members to fully 
contribute, marginal utility of a contribution is higher in the outcome risk treatments. 
This leads us to our last hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Assuming other regarding and risk averse decision makers, 
contributions in the outcome risk treatments will not exceed contributions in the no 
outcome risk treatments, except for the case that all group members fully contribute. 
 
4.2.3 Laboratory Protocol 
Computerized experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory 
MELESSA at the University of Munich, using the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
Subjects received written instructions which were read aloud. After reading the 
instructions subjects had to solve a couple of control questions to ensure that 
everybody understood the task. Control questions were designed ensuring that results 
were equivalent in all four treatments.43 Once every subject had solved her control 
questions successfully, the experiment started. 
192 undergraduate students without experience in public goods experiments 
participated in eight sessions with 24 subjects each. 66 % subjects were female, and 
average age was 24.52 years. In all four treatments sessions lasted about 1.5 hours 
with average earnings of €21.85. 
 
                                                            
43 A complete presentation of control questions can be found in the appendix A2. 
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4.2.4 Procedure 
An experimental session consisted of three parts: In part 1, participants had to state 
one shot unconditional as well as conditional contribution decisions filling out a 
contribution table equivalent to the one used by Fischbacher et al. (2001). In part 2, 
unconditional contributions as well as individual expectations about others’ 
contributions were elicited in ten consecutive rounds with feedback in between. In 
part 3, subjects’ risk preferences were elicited using a choice list mechanism 
equivalent to the one introduced by Holt and Laury (2002). 
 
Part 1: Subjects were arranged in groups of four and were faced with one of the 
social dilemmas presented in section 4.2.1, depending on the treatment. They were 
asked to decide about two types of contributions to a public account: an 
unconditional contribution and a contribution table. While in the former type only 
one single contribution decision was requested, in the latter a participant had to 
indicate for each average contribution level of her group members (rounded to 
integers) how much she was willing to contribute to the public account. While for 
one randomly assigned group member the actual contributions were determined by 
her conditional contribution decisions, all other group members contributed 
according to their unconditional contribution decisions. Part 1 consisted of only one 
round. The result of this random draw was revealed only at the end of the 
experiment. Subjects knew that at the end of the experiment they would further learn 
about average contributions of their group members and their final payoff in this 
part. Subsequently to this part (before starting part 2), no information was revealed. 
 
Part 2: Subjects were faced with the same social dilemma situation as in part 1 and 
had to make two types of decision in ten consecutive rounds: a contribution decision 
where they had to state their unconditional contribution, ic , and an estimation 
decision. In the latter, subjects had to estimate average contributions of their group 
members providing a vector of probabilistic forecasts. Thus, for each possible 
average contribution level k  ( 50  k ) of their group members (rounded to 
integers) subjects had to state an estimated probability kp  (with 


5
0
1
k
kp ). Subjects 
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were rewarded for the correctness of their stated estimations, applying a quadratic 
scoring rule as suggested by Murphy and Winkler (1970).44 Player i’s reward (in 
euro) in round   was given by 



5
0
2)(5.25)(
k
kki pIpE
 ,  [5] 
where kI  was an indicator function that took the value 1 if the realized event was k
and 0 otherwise. The procedure ensured earnings between €0 and €5 depending on 
the correctness of player i’s estimation. After each round, subjects were informed 
about average contributions of their group members, their earnings from the 
contribution task ( ti ), as well as their earnings from the estimation task ( iE ). At 
the end of the experiment, only one ti and one iE  were randomly selected and 
paid out for real. t  and   were separately selected by two independent die throws in 
order to disallow for hedging opportunities. By using a stranger-matching approach 
to allocate subjects into groups, we elicited pure preferences without strategic 
considerations. Each round three groups of four were randomly composed from a 
pool of twelve. Thus, for each session we received two statistically independent 
observations and, hence, four independent observations per treatment.  
 
Part 3: Subjects faced a set of ten choices between two binary lotteries, one with a 
higher and one with a lower payoff-variance. Probabilities varied systematically over 
all ten choices in such a way that a subject should switch from the lower variance 
lottery to the higher variance lottery only once and a more risk averse subject should 
switch later than a more risk loving one. The payoffs replicate the low payoff 
condition of Holt and Laury (2002) and are presented in appendix A5.  
The experiment ended after a short socioeconomic questionnaire. 
   
                                                            
44 See also Palfrey and Wang (2009), Croson (2007), and Gächter and Renner (2010). 
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4.3 Related Literature 
 
4.3.1 Prevention vs. Creation Framing 
In order to compare cooperativeness when the goal of cooperation is either to create 
a value or to prevent the loss of a value, we endow participants either with a high 
amount of money and present them with a loss scenario or with a low amount 
presenting them with a win scenario. Parameters are chosen in a way ensuring equal 
decisions in both treatments to result in equal outcomes. Thus, treatments are payoff-
equivalent but framed differently.  
“A framing effect is said to be present when different ways of describing the same 
choice problem change the choices people make, even though the underlying 
information and choice options remain essentially the same” (Cookson, 2000, p. 55).  
The impact of framing on economic decision making has been intensely studied. 
Kühberger (1998) and Levin et al. (1998) provide overviews on the relevant framing 
literature. Research on social dilemmas identified several determinants where 
framing matters, e.g. ingroup-outgroup framing, restart effects, decomposed game-
presentation, provision of rank information, or context framing (Andreoni, 1988; 
Cookson, 2000; Brandts and Schwieren, 2009; Dufwenberg et al., 2011).    
Building on psychological studies by Brewer and Kramer (1986), Komorita (1987), 
and McCusker and Carnevale (1995) among others, Andreoni (1995) analyzed the 
effect of give- vs. take-framing in social dilemmas. He discovers whether 
cooperativeness differs between public goods problems and public bad problems 
(commons dilemmas). In the former type of social dilemma games, cooperative 
behavior is determined by the act of giving, since giving causes positive external 
effects on others (give-frame). In the latter type, cooperative behavior is determined 
by the act of not taking, since taking causes negative external effects on others (take-
frame). Andreoni (1995) finds contributions to be significantly higher in the give-
frame. He concludes that “people are significantly more willing to cooperate in a 
public goods experiment when the problem is posed as a positive externality rather 
than a negative externality” (Andreoni, 1995, p. 13). His explanation: the perceived 
warm-glow of the act of giving must be stronger than the cold-prickle of taking. 
Subsequent studies find largely similar results (Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger 
and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cookson, 2000; Park, 2000; Cubitt et al., 2011).  
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Brown and Stewart (1999) examine in an environmental dilemma, i.e. a public bad 
game, whether the fact that collective egoistic behavior results in a loss outcome 
motivates group members to deviate from the selfish Nash-strategy and to behave 
more cooperatively instead. In their experiment, a decision maker has to divide a 
certain number of tokens between an individual account resulting in private costs 
only and a public account resulting in lower personal costs than in the individual 
account but generating negative external effects by reducing the initial endowment of 
other group members by the same amount. By varying initial endowments between 
treatments, a certain degree of cooperation becomes crucial for the treatment group 
in order to avoid negative outcomes for the group members. The authors examine 
whether loss avoidance motivates these group members to increase their 
internalization rates although they risk incurring even greater losses if others do not 
follow. They find subjects of the treatment group facing the threat of a loss to be 
more cooperative on average than subjects in a base treatment where no loss is 
possible. However, they find the same subjects to be more cooperative even when 
facing identical decision problems as the control group, raising questions concerning 
the comparability of treatments.  
In a step level public goods game, further denoted as provision point mechanism 
(PPM), Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) investigate both theoretically and empirically 
whether cooperation is higher if the task is framed as an opportunity to provide a 
public good or as an opportunity to prevent the deterioration of a public good. They 
find higher contributions in the prevention frame if the threshold necessary to 
provide the public good is high, but higher contributions in the creation frame if the 
threshold is low. 
In contrast to Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011), we investigate cooperativeness not in a 
PPM but in a VCM. Both games differ crucially with respect to their strategic 
characteristics, as the former has multiple and even pareto efficient equilibria and is 
thus a coordination game while the latter has only one equilibrium which deviates 
from the social optimum, thus describing a social dilemma. Like Brown and Stewart 
(1999), we do not vary our treatments in the give- vs. take-framing dimension 
examined by Andreoni (1995). But while Brown and Stewart examine cooperation in 
a public bad game (taking task) where the goal of cooperation does not vary across 
treatments but an implicit minimum contribution threshold necessary to avoid losses 
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is introduced by reducing initial endowments, we explore cooperation in a public 
goods game (giving task) and vary cooperation as either exhibiting a creative- or a 
preventive character. 
 
4.3.2 Outcome Risk vs. No Outcome Risk 
While in our no outcome risk treatments the provision of the public good is 
deterministic, it is uncertain under outcome risk. Messick et al. (1988) refer to 
uncertainties arising from uncertain external factors which might influence the 
quality of a provided public good or its provision itself as environmental uncertainty 
and oppose it to strategic uncertainty resulting from the fact that contributions of 
other group members are unknown. 
Wit and Wilke (1998) introduce environmental risk in a PPM by drawing the 
required provision threshold from a uniform distribution. They find lower 
contributions under high environmental uncertainty. Au (2004) and Gustafsson et al. 
(2000) find similar results. Van Dijk et al. (1999) compare contributions in an 
ordinary PPM with those of a step-level game where the prize is not fixed but can 
take any value of a certain interval with uniformly distributed probabilities. Keeping 
the prize’s expected value identical in both treatments, they do not find a significant 
effect and therefore conclude that uncertainty about the value of a public good has no 
influence of contribution behavior in PPMs. McCarter et al. (2010) reproduce this 
experiment but let the lower bound of the interval fall below the provision threshold. 
They find significantly lower cooperativeness under outcome risk. They argue that 
the possibility of a perceived loss discourages participants to contribute.  
Dickinson (1998) introduces environmental risk into the VCM.  He compares the 
findings of a deterministic VCM where contributions to a public account 
deterministically increase payoffs of all group members with two treatments 
exhibiting environmental risk. In the so called uncertainty treatment the return each 
group member receives from the provision of the public good linearly increases with 
each contribution but the provision takes place only with a 75% chance. In another 
treatment referred to as incentive treatment contributions not only linearly increase 
the return of a public goods provision but the provision-probability as well. 
Dickinson finds the introduction of environmental risk to weakly reduce 
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contributions. However, increasing the return and the probability of a public goods 
provision at the same time, as done in the incentive treatment, results in a non-
constant marginal per capita return making a proper comparison with the base 
treatment impossible.  
Building on the study of Dickinson (1998), Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) 
systematically varied the provision probability of either the pubic or the private good 
and additionally introduced a treatment where the provision probability is unknown 
to subjects. The authors refer to treatments with known probability as risk treatments 
and to those with unknown probability as uncertainty treatments. They find subjects 
to significantly decrease public goods contributions when the provision of the public 
good is either risky or uncertain but to increase contributions to the public good 
when either risk or uncertainty is involved in the provision of the private good.  
Keser and Montmarquette (2008) explore cooperativeness when voluntary 
contributions reduce the probability of a fixed public loss. By varying initial loss-
probabilities, initial wealth, and the degree of information, they find an increase in 
loss probability as well as an introduction of ambiguity to reduce the level of 
voluntary contributions. By revealing the outcome of the loss-lottery after each of 
their 100 rounds, they show that the recent occurrence of a loss decreases aggregate 
contribution levels in the subsequent periods.  However, the authors exclusively 
investigate cooperative behavior in the prevention frame risk domain but do neither 
provide a comparison in the gain- nor in the risk-dimension.45 
By varying a VCM both in the risk and in the framing dimension keeping marginal 
incentives of a contribution equal we are to our best knowledge the first to provide an 
experimental setting that allows us to systematically identify the impact of the above 
mentioned variations. 
   
                                                            
45 Altogether, they find efficiency levels between 22% and 32% and argue that this is lower than 
efficiency levels between 40% and 60% usually found in the standard VCM (creation frame no risk). 
Due to the specific design (100 repetitions in a partner matching), such a comparison has, however, 
limited validity.  
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4.4 Results 
We start with presenting our main results found in part 2 of our experiment. 
Subsequently, our findings resulting from the conditional cooperation task carried 
out in part 1 are exposed. 
 
4.4.1 Unconditional Cooperation (Part 2) 
Figure 4-3 shows our main finding in Part 2.  
 
Figure 4-3: Contributions and expected contributions (creation vs. prevention) 
 
Both under outcome risk and under no outcome risk average contributions (depicted 
by solid lines) are higher in the prevention frame than in the creation frame in every 
round. Moreover, both under creation- and prevention-framing average contributions 
are higher in treatments with outcome risk than in treatments without outcome risk in 
every round.46 Figures 4-11 and 4-12 in appendix A6 show average contributions 
                                                            
46 See also Figure 4-10 in appendix A6. 
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separately for each of our 16 independent observation. Expectations about 
contributions made by group members (depicted by dashed lines) are found to be 
higher under prevention framing as well as under outcome risk already in the first 
round. In order to validate the significance of these observations, we run several non-
parametric tests. P-values reported below show test-statistics of two sided Mann-
Whitney tests.  
PR vs. CR: When comparing average amounts contributed in all ten rounds (further 
denoted as average contributions) for each independent observation (matching pool 
of 12 subjects), contributions are significantly higher in the PR-treatment compared 
to the CR-treatment (p=0.043, n=447). This holds also true when comparing 
contributions collected in the first round (p=0.021, n=48). Likewise, expectations 
about average contributions of group members48, which subjects revealed in the first 
round, are significantly higher in the PR- than in the CR-treatment (p=0.022, n=48).  
PnR vs. CnR: Neither average contributions (p=0.149, n=4) nor first round 
contributions (p=0.119, n=48) are significantly higher in the PnR- than in the CnR-
treatment. However, the difference in first round expectations about others´ 
contributions is found to be highly significant (p=0.004, n=48). 
PR vs. PnR: Average contributions are significantly higher in the PR- than in the 
PnR-treatment (p=0.021, n=4) as are first round contributions (p=0.070, n=48). In 
contrast, the difference in first round expectations is not found to be significant 
(p=0.194, n=48). 
CR vs. CnR: The contributions observed in the CR-treatment are higher than in the 
CnR-treatment, a difference which is weakly significant both for average 
contributions (p=0.100, n=4) and for first round contributions only (p=0.083, n=48). 
In the same line, first round expectations are significantly higher in the CR-treatment 
(p=0.025, n=48).  
Figure 4-4 summarizes our non-parametrical test-results. 
                                                            
47 n denotes the number of independent observations per treatment. 
48 We used the stated vector of probabilistic forecasts to calculate for each participant the average 
amount of money she expects her group members to contribute.   
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Figure 4-4: Treatment differences with Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
 
Table 4-2 presents different specifications of a tobit model regressing average 
contributions on a variety of explanatory variables.  
Dep. Var.: Average 
contr. 
I II III 
 
prevention 
 
0.609† 
(0.328) 
 
 
0.609† 
(0.334) 
 
0.610† 
(0.333) 
risk 1.013* 
(0.414) 
 
1.023* 
(0.416) 
0.759* 
(0.354) 
prevention  risk 0.598 
(0.502) 
 
0.589 
(0.508) 
0.588 
(0.507) 
risk aversiona  0.002 
(0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
 
risk aversion  risk   0.041 
(0.055) 
 
constant 1.041*** 
(0.256) 
 
1.018*** 
(0.297) 
1.152*** 
(0.225) 
# observations 192 17949 179 
(# groups) (16) (16) (16) 
Pseudo R2 0.49 0.48 0.48 
Log Pseudolikelihood -135.58 -127.62 -127.33 
Tobit regressions with errors clustered for independent observations (groups); 
standard errors in parenthesis; : interaction;  *** represents significance at p=0.001, 
** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
a Discrete variable ranging from 0 (extremely risk seeking) to 10 (extremely risk 
averse). 
Table 4-2: Sum of contributions over ten rounds 
 
                                                            
49 Thirteen players were excluded as no risk aversion parameter could be determined due to multiple 
switching in the choice list task. 
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Errors are clustered for our 16 independent observations (matching pools of 12 
subjects each). Regressions confirm the previous finding that both prevention 
framing and outcome risk have a significant impact on total contributions (outcome 
risk at a 5% level, prevention framing at a 10% level). The interaction effect of both, 
however, is not found to be significant. The level of risk aversion elicited in part 350 
is found to have a non-significant impact on contributions – neither in the outcome 
risk treatments nor in the treatments without outcome risk. 51 
This appears surprising as we have shown in section 4.2.2 that risk aversion resulting 
from utility curvature should have an impact on contributions in the treatments 
exhibiting outcome risk. It is, however, important to note that Holt and Laury’s 
(2002) mechanism cannot distinguish between risk aversion arising from concavity 
of the utility function and risk aversion resulting from probability weighting. In fact, 
for the payoffs involved in laboratory experiments subjects are often assumed not to 
exhibit a concave but a linear utility function, implying observed risk aversion to 
stem from probability weighting (Abdellaoui, 2011; Wakker 2010).  
As shown in Figure 4-3, average contributions lie consistently below average 
expectations about others´ contributions in the CnR-, PnR-, and CR-treatment. Only 
in the PR-treatment average contributions match or even exceed average 
expectations. This finding is confirmed by a random effects tobit model regressing 
contributions to the public account on expectations, which is presented in Table 4-3. 
Each matching pool (containing 12 subjects) is treated as an independent 
observation, resulting in 16 independent observations in total. In all treatments 
participants’ contributions are significantly affected by their expectations on others’ 
contributions indicating that subjects are on average conditional co-operators. 
However, in the CnR-treatment, participants contribute only €0.87 on average for 
                                                            
50 Risk aversion is determined by the decision number where a decision maker switches from the 
lower variance lottery to the higher variance lottery in part 3 – resulting in a categorized risk measure 
ranging from 0 (extremely risk seeking) to 10 (extremely risk averse).  
51 Risk aversion elicited in part 3 did not differ significantly between treatments. Figure 4-13 in 
appendix A6 shows distributions of save choices per subject separately for each treatment. On 
average, subjects chose in 6.42 out of 10 cases the low variance lottery (safe choice) in the CnR-
treament compared to 6.44 in the PnR-, 6.42 in the CR-, and 6.39 in the PR-treatment.  
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each euro they expect others to contribute.52 This relation is not significantly 
different for the CR- and PnR-treatments. Solely in the PR-treatment participants are 
on average willing to contribute an amount at least as high as the average they expect 
others to contribute.53 
Dep. Var.: contribution  
expectation 0.865*** 
(0.059) 
 
expectation  CR 0.065 
(0.065) 
 
expectation  PR 0.181** 
(0.064) 
 
expectation  PnR -0.112 
(0.090) 
 
constant no
# observations 1920
(# groups) (16)
# rounds 10
Wald chi2 1993.31
Log Likelihood -3276.69
Random effects tobit regressions: standard errors in 
parenthesis; : interaction; *** represents significance 
at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Table 4-3: Contributions as a function of expectations 
 
Looking at single observations, in the PR-treatment subjects chose a contribution 
lower than their average expectation (on others’ contributions) only in 34.6 % of all 
contribution decisions, compared to 52.0 % in the CR-treatment, 66.9 % in the CnR-
treatment, and   59.0 % in the PnR-treatment. This self-serving bias ( Fischbacher et 
al., 2001) is confirmed when looking at conditional contribution patterns further 
below. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) argue that the self-serving bias in conditional 
contributions itself leads to a decay in contributions even if an entire group of 
participants consists solely of conditional cooperators. Indeed, while contributions 
decrease over time in all other treatments they remain fairly constant in the PR-
treatment – the treatment with no self-serving bias on average. 
                                                            
52 Applying a chi2-test we can reject the null hypothesis that this coefficient is not different from one 
(p=0.0291). 
53 A chi2-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that βexpectation + βexpectation*PR is not different from one 
(p=0.1230). 
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4.4.2 Conditional Cooperation (Part 1) 
Figure 4-5 shows average conditional contribution functions elicited in our four 
treatments. 
 
Figure 4-5: Conditional Cooperation (creation vs. prevention) 
 
In all four treatments conditional contribution is an increasing function of the 
contributions made by others. Thus, in all four treatments subjects display 
conditional cooperation on average, confirming the findings presented in Table 4-3.54 
Noticeably, the slope of the conditional contribution line is steeper in the PR- and 
CR- than the PnR- and CnR-treatments, meaning that subjects exhibit a stronger 
tendency to conditionally cooperate when facing outcome risk than when facing no 
                                                            
54 While in treatments CnR, CR, and PnR the average conditional contribution line is below the 45°-
line, thus indicating the above mentioned self-serving bias in conditional cooperation behavior, the 
conditional contribution line for the PR-treatment lies in large parts even above the 45°-line, 
confirming our finding in section 4.4.1. 
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outcome risk on average.55 Using a two sided Mann-Whitney test we find this 
difference to be highly significant both for the creation frame and for the prevention 
frame comparing the sum of contributions over all six levels (creation frame: 
z=3.784, p=0.0002; prevention frame: z=3.751, p=0.0002). Comparing conditional 
contribution behavior under either creation- or prevention-framing in treatments 
without outcome risk, no significant difference can be found. Conditional 
contributions in the PnR-treatment start on a slightly higher level than in the CnR-
treatment. However, contribution levels converge with higher average contributions 
of other group members. Taking average contributions aggregated over all six levels, 
conditional contribution behavior is not significantly different between the CnR- and 
the PnR-treatment (Mann-Whitney (two sided): z=0.605, p=0.545). Facing outcome 
risk subjects’ average conditional contributions are higher in the PR-treatment than 
in the CR-treatment in 5 of 6 cases. Nevertheless, comparing average aggregate 
contributions over all six levels, a two sided Mann-Whitney test does not yield a 
significant difference (z=0.1237, p=0.216).56 
We thus find average conditional contribution decisions to differ significantly 
between outcome risk and no outcome risk while no difference is found in the 
framing dimension. In order to better understand the differences found in the risk 
dimension we compare distributions of cooperation types using the classification 
introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001) 57. 
 Free-rider Cond. Cooperator Hump-shaped others 
CnR 38% (18) 
50% 
(24) 
10% 
(5) 
2% 
(1) 
PnR 27% (13) 
35% 
(17) 
19% 
(9) 
19% 
(9) 
CR 2% (1) 
73% 
(35) 
19% 
(9) 
6% 
(3) 
PR 2% (1) 
52% 
(25) 
29% 
(14) 
17% 
(8) 
(Absolute numbers in brackets.) 
Table 4-4: Cooperation types per treatment 
                                                            
55 Figure 4-14 in appendix A6 provides a better graphical comparison of conditional cooperation 
under outcome risk and under no outcome risk. 
56 Table 4-8 in appendix A5 reports all test statistics separately for each contribution level. 
57 We apply the same classifications used in Fischbacher et al. (2001). Thus, subjects are classified as 
conditional cooperators not only if their responses are monotonic in a strict sense but also if their 
contributions positively and significantly (at the 1% level) correlate with others’ contributions 
according to a Spearman rank correlation coefficient.  
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As shown in Table 4-4, we find a strikingly lower number of free riders in the 
outcome risk treatments compared to treatments with no outcome risk involved. In 
the CR- as well as in the PR-treatment only 1 out of 48 participants can be classified 
as free riders compared to 18 in the CnR- and 13 in the PnR-treatment. Differences 
are highly significant using a Fisher’s exact test (p<0.001). Additionally, we find 
contributors classified as others to be more frequent in the prevention treatments 
compared to treatments framed as creation-task.58 Conditional cooperation patterns 
of the four classified types do not differ considerably across treatments as shown in 
Figures 4-13 to 4-16 in appendix A6.59 Thus, the steeper slope of conditional 
contribution lines under outcome risk appears to be mostly driven by the differing 
distribution of types, specifically the lower share of free-riders. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
We find that both prevention framing as well as outcome risk tend to increase 
cooperativeness in social dilemmas. 
Finding higher cooperation in treatments framed as preventive tasks than in 
treatments framed as creative tasks cannot be explained by expected utility theory as 
framing does not affect final payoffs. Alternatively, participants can be assumed to 
adopt reference points in the way intended by the framing, i.e. to adopt initial 
endowments as reference points and view further changes as either gains or losses, 
and to exhibit loss aversion as described by Kahnemann and Tversky’s Prospect 
Theory (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979). But even under these assumptions, 
predictions are still not clear-cut. On the one hand, if losses loom larger than gains, 
preventing the loss of some amount of money generates a higher utility than creating 
the same amount. Hence, cooperation would be perceived as more desirable under a 
prevention frame. On the other hand, from a selfish perspective contributing remains 
a dominated strategy as it reduces the subject´s own payoffs (either deterministically 
                                                            
58 Following Fischbacher et al. (2001), the class of ‘others’ consists of individuals who cannot be 
classified into any of the remaining classes. In our sample these are mostly subjects who indicated to 
contribute the same non-zero amount independently of what others do. 
59 See also Table 4-9 in appendix A5. 
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or in expectations). Given loss aversion, contributing is even more harmful in the 
prevention frame as it increases the lost amount a contributor suffers with certainty. 
Our findings suggest that higher contributions in the prevention frame are mostly 
driven by higher expectations about others’ contributions. We find first round 
expectations about others’ contributions to be significantly higher in the prevention 
frame than in the creation frame both under outcome risk and under no outcome risk. 
Thus, subjects expect others to be more cooperative when the goal of cooperation has 
a preventive character. As subjects are conditionally cooperative on average they 
consequently respond with higher contributions resulting in higher average 
contributions in the prevention frame treatments. Cachon and Camerer (1996) find 
loss avoidance to help individuals establishing more desirable equilibria in 
coordination games. Brown and Stewart (1999) find participants in a public bad 
game to raise their internalization rates if a minimum cooperation level is necessary 
to avoid losses for the group. Despite the absence of implicit cooperation thresholds, 
higher expectations about the cooperativeness of others help conditional cooperative 
subjects to coordinate on higher contribution levels in our prevention frame 
treatments (although a self-serving bias in the CnR-treatment still leads to a decay in 
contributions over time).  
The finding of higher contributions in the outcome risk treatments compared to the 
treatments without outcome risk is more puzzling. As shown in section 4.2.2 higher 
contributions under outcome risk cannot be explained by the curvature of the utility 
function - at least not with the curvature we elicit on average for our participants. 
Eliciting risk preferences with a choice list mechanism (Holt and Laury, 2002) we 
find subjects to be risk averse on average exhibiting a level of risk aversion that 
would rather predict lower contributions under risk. Instead, our elicited risk measure 
does not explain variances in contribution decisions at all, indicating that the risk 
aversion measured with this elicitation method might not stem from utility curvature 
but rather from probability weighting. 
One possible explanation for our findings could base on the assumption of betrayal 
aversion. In a modified trust game Bohnet et al. (2008) find subjects to be more 
averse to a risk deriving from being betrayed by one's partner than to an equivalent 
risk deriving from a chance device. In a public goods game exhibiting no outcome 
risk by contributing a decision maker puts her fate completely in the hand of others 
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as she can only hope that others will do the same. In an outcome risk social dilemma 
the profitability of a contribution does not necessarily depend on the contributions 
made by others. A contribution can be beneficial even if group members do not 
reciprocate appropriately as each contributed euro can provide the pivotal percentage 
points to enable the desired event and hence, provide an outcome larger than without 
contribution. However, betrayal aversion cannot explain our finding of differing 
conditional cooperation behavior as the strategy method eliminates any risk of 
betrayal, thus discrediting this explanation. 
An alternative explanation for higher contributions under outcome risk could be that 
it is less obvious for decision makers under outcome risk than under no outcome risk 
that contributing is a dominated strategy. Individuals are usually found to have 
difficulties with the evaluation of probabilities. They tend to overweight small 
probabilities while underweighting medium and large probabilities (Kahnemann and 
Tversky, 1979). In our case, the overweighting of small probabilities might induce 
subjects to overweight the marginal impact of a contribution. Assuming a probability 
weighting function of the functional form 

1))1((
)(
pp
ppw   
introduced by 
Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) with p denoting the actual probability, )( pw the 
perceived probability, and ]1,0(  the intensity of the bias (with 1  implying no 
probability weighting) a 735.0 would be sufficient to evaluate a contribution as 
beneficial (as 1.0)05.0( pw ).60 Empirical studies proof a weighting bias of this 
size to be a quite realistic assumption. Employing maximum-likelihood estimation 
techniques, Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) find a 61.0 , Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996) 71.0 , and Camerer and Ho (1994) 56.0 . Thus, probability weighting 
might cause subjects to perceive contributions as more beneficial in the risk 
treatments than in the no risk treatments as it makes them overweighting the 
marginal impact of a contribution and thus mitigates the social dilemma structure of 
                                                            
60 With w(p)=0.1, one euro contribution to the public account increases the pubic good’s expected 
value by the same amount. Hence, a risk-neutral decision maker (with respect to utility curvature) is 
indifferent between contributing and not contributing. Solving the inequation  

1))05.01(05.0(
05.01.0 
for   yields the weighting parameter necessary for a risk neutral agent to perceive a contribution as 
beneficial (blanking out any potential contributions of other participants). 
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the game. This hypothesis is supported by the finding of a significantly lower share 
of free-riders in the treatments exhibiting outcome risk compared to the ones without 
outcome risk. However, if subjects are assumed to aggregate probabilities, 
probability weighting would predict them to contribute particularly when they expect 
others to contribute either a lot or very little since the perceived marginal impact of 
an additional percentage point (slope of the weighting function) is largest at these 
points. We do not find such pattern. Yet, it is a frequently observed behavioral 
pattern of boundedly rational individuals to evaluate new gambles to some extent in 
isolation instead of merging them with other existing risks. Kahneman and Lovallo 
(1993) introduce the term narrow framing to describe this phenomenon. It is hence 
conceivable that participants do not use their expectations on other’s contributions to 
aggregate probabilities. They might rather consider each euro contribution as an 
independent small probability prospect and thus, overweight the impact of each 
contribution, no matter what others do.  
A further explanatory approach for our finding of higher contributions under 
outcome risk builds on the assumption that subjects contribute more in these 
treatments in order not to feel responsible for the desired event not to occur. Not 
contributing in a treatment without outcome risk means to refuse other group 
members an amount of €0.50 for each euro not contributed to the public account, 
thus €2.50 per group member at most. In contrast, if non-contributors in the outcome 
risk treatments feel responsible for the occurrence of the undesired event the feeling 
of guilt should be much stronger ex-post as their behavior refused all group members 
(including the non-contributor herself) earnings of €10 each. In fact, evidence for 
individuals to feel ex-post responsible for an event not to occur despite their very low 
marginal impact can be found in the literature on voting behavior. Kanazawa (1998; 
2000) finds individuals who preferred the losing presidential candidate but abstained 
in the election to become more likely to vote in subsequent elections as they feel 
responsible for the defeat. His results can hardly be explained by an overweighting of 
small probabilities but rather by a tendency of individuals to feel as pivotal. This 
tendency could likewise explain our finding of higher contributions under outcome 
risk when assuming participants to anticipate the guilt they would feel ex-post in case 
of not contributing.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we systematically varied a public goods game in two dimensions 
exploring on the one hand whether cooperation is more likely if the goal of 
cooperation is either to create a common value (creation frame) or to prevent the loss 
of a common value (prevention frame) and on the other hand whether contributions 
are higher when deterministically increasing the value of the public good (no 
outcome risk) or when increasing the probability of successful provision (outcome 
risk). Combining both dimensions, we obtained four different treatments which were 
designed in a way that kept the expected value of a marginal contribution constant 
over treatments. Matching subjects over ten rounds in groups of four in a stranger 
design we elicited subjects’ contributions as well as their expectations about others’ 
contributions in each round, incentivizing the estimation decision with a quadratic 
scoring rule. Additionally, we elicited subject’s conditional cooperation functions 
employing a strategy method introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001).  
We found both prevention framing and outcome risk to increase cooperation. 
Consequently, highest contribution levels could be found when combining both 
features. Here, the self-serving bias usually found in conditional cooperation 
(Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010) disappeared, allowing the establishment of a 
constant contribution level in this treatment while cooperation collapsed over time in 
all other treatments.  
Although we found a higher share of individuals contributing a constant non-zero 
amount independently of what others do if the game was framed as a preventive task, 
average conditional cooperation behavior did not differ significantly between 
preventive and creative tasks. Instead, higher contribution levels in the prevention 
frame were mostly driven by higher expectations about the contributions made by 
others. Our participants who we found to be conditionally cooperative on average 
expected group members to be more cooperative under a prevention frame and 
consequently responded with higher contributions.  
Higher contributions under outcome risk were also partly driven by higher 
expectations about others’ contributions but mostly by a significantly lower share of 
free-riders in treatments exhibiting outcome risk.  
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Finding no self-serving bias on average in our treatment exhibiting both outcome risk 
and prevention framing was driven by a combination of the near disappearance of 
free-riders under outcome risk and an increase in the share of constant contributors, 
i.e. participants constantly contributing a non-zero amount independently of what 
others did, which we generally found under prevention framing. The combination of 
both occurrences made the self-serving bias to disappear on average. However, the 
latter finding should not be generalized as it might depend on the specific 
configuration of our task. 
Expected utility theory cannot explain our finding of higher cooperation under 
prevention framing as the framing does not affect final outcomes. But even the 
assumption of subjects to adopt reference points in the way intended by the framing, 
i.e. to adopt initial endowments as reference points and view further changes as 
either gains or losses while exhibiting loss-aversion, does not provide a clear-cut 
hypothesis. On the one hand, as losses loom larger than gains, cooperation in order to 
prevent a loss would be more desirable than cooperation with a creative character. 
On the other hand, contributing remains a dominated strategy under prevention 
framing and might even be more harmful here, as it increases the lost amount a 
contributor suffers with certainty. We argue that the higher desirability of 
cooperation in preventive tasks may drive the higher expectations found under 
prevention framing and, hereby, helps conditional contributors to establish higher 
contribution levels. Our finding of higher contributions under outcome risk is more 
puzzling as it cannot be explained by a concave shaped utility function which would 
rather predict lower contributions under risk. We argue that probability weighting 
may lead subjects to overweight their marginal impact which mitigates the perceived 
social dilemma property of the game, an assumption which is supported by the 
significantly lower share of free-riders in treatments exhibiting outcome risk. 
Another explanation we discussed is that subjects contributed in the outcome risk 
treatment in order to avoid the burden of feeling responsible for an occurrence of the 
undesired event ex-post. Further research is necessary to better understand the 
mechanisms behind these findings. 
Our results contribute to better understand why some real world social dilemmas are 
more easily overcome than others. It may help to explain the record-setting election 
turnout in France’s presidential election 2002 where voters contributed to a public 
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good by going to the polls in order to prevent the election of radical right-wing 
candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen, who made it surprisingly into the runoff election due 
to a fragmentation of the left. It may help to explain the unprecedented success of the 
global community in abandoning chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) which was ratified in the 
Montreal Protocol 1989 in order to prevent a further depletion of the ozone layer. 
And it may explain why global aid agencies have such a hard time to attract money 
for their day to day business in developing regions, including mostly creative tasks 
exhibiting no outcome risk such as the funding of education and the construction of 
infrastructure, while donations abound in case of disasters when money is needed to 
prevent further damage. 
Furthermore, our results suggest interest groups concerned with the provision of a 
specific public good containing a preventive character and/or outcome risk to 
emphasize these characteristics as much as possible. In fact, there may often exist 
some leeway in how to present a social dilemma. The construction of an airport, for 
instance, can be portrayed as an opportunity to create access to new markets and 
more convenient travelling but it can also be presented as a necessary investment in 
order to prevent a region from falling behind in global competition. Such leeway 
may also exists when justifying a military intervention either as a measure to create 
free access to markets and commodities or as a measure to prevent the expansion of 
international terrorism. It would be interesting to know to what extent interest groups 
are aware of these effects and whether they understand to use it the right way. 
Further research is, however, necessary to better understand the mechanisms behind 
our findings.  Moreover, various extensions are conceivable. Instead of modeling 
probability of success as a strictly linear function of contributions - a simplification 
which we made to enable a clean comparison between outcome risk and no outcome 
risk conditions - it would be interesting to disclose how non-linear functions may 
affect our findings. This is particularly true for an S-shaped relationship with 
contributions having an increasing marginal impact on probability of success up to a 
certain level and a decreasing marginal impact afterwards thus, never reaching 
certainty. Additionally, a systematic investigation on the effects of ambiguity 
concerning the probability of success could be a valuable extension. We leave these 
issues for future research. 
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4.7 Appendix 
 
A1. Instructions (translated from German)61 
Welcome to the experiment and many thanks for your participation! 
Please stop talking to other participants of the experiment from now on 
 
General rules concerning the procedure 
This experiment serves the investigation of economic decision making. You can earn money which 
will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. During the experiment you and all other participants 
will be asked to make decisions. Your decisions, as well as the decisions of the other participants, will 
determine your monetary payoff according to the rules explained below. Additionally, you receive a 
show-up fee of €4. The whole experiment will take about one and a half hours and consists of three 
parts. In all parts you will make your decisions at the computer. You will receive detailed instructions 
for each part after finishing the previous. Parts are completely unrelated. Decisions in one part don’t 
have any consequences for other parts. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise 
your hand. One of the experimenters will come to answer your questions in private. In the interest of 
clarity, we use male terms only in the instructions. 
 
Anonymity 
In some parts of the experiment you will be grouped with other participants. Neither during the 
experiment nor afterwards you or the other participants will learn about the identity of other group 
members. Neither during the experiment nor afterwards will other participants learn about your 
experimental earnings. We will analyse the data only in aggregate form and never connect names with 
experimental results.  
 
Support 
You are provided with a pen on your desk. For calculations you will find a link to the Windows 
calculator on the screen. 
 
Part 1 
Procedure 
In this part you will be matched in a group of four. All group members receive an endowment of 
[CnR, CR: €5] [PnR, PR: €15]. You have to split this endowment between a public and a private 
account. You can allocate each integer between €0 and €5 to the public account. The amount allocated 
to the public account affects all group members in the same way as you will see below. Each amount 
which you don’t allocate to the public account will automatically be allocated to your private account. 
For instance, if you put €3 to the public account, [CnR, CR: €2] [PnR, PR: €12] will be allocated to 
your private account. The amount allocated to your private account affects exclusively your own 
payoff.  
You have to make two types of decisions which will be explained in detail more below. In the next 
section you will learn the consequences of your decisions: 
Consequences of your decision 
 Dependent on your decisions as well as the decisions of the other group members… 
 
------------------------------------------------------- CnR, PnR ------------------------------------------------------ 
… your payoff will be determined as follows: 
                                                            
61 Parts exclusively used in a certain treatment are enclosed in square brackets. Larger treatment-
specific text passages are marked with horizontal lines. CnR denote creation frame no risk, PnR 
prevention frame no risk, CR creation frame risk, and PR prevention frame risk.  
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- If no one allocates money to the public account [CnR: each group member will receive the 
amount allocated to his private account] [PnR: €10 will be deducted from each group 
members’ private account. This money will be lost]. 
- For each euro allocated to the public account [CnR: you as well as all other group members 
will earn €0.50] [PnR: the loss which you and your group members suffer will be reduced 
by €0.50]. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- CR, PR -------------------------------------------------------- 
…there are two possible outcomes: 
Outcome 1: [CR: Each player receives the amount of €10 additionally to the amount located on his 
private account.] [PR: Each player receives the full amount allocated to his private account.] 
Outcome 2: [CR: Each player receives the amount located on his private account.] [PR: €10 are 
deducted from each player’s private account. This money is lost. Each player receives the money 
remaining on his private account.] 
Please note: 
- One of the two possible outcomes will definitely occur. This outcome occurs for all four 
group members. It is not possible that different outcomes occur for different group 
members. 
The probability for outcome 1 to occur is further denoted with W1. As one of the two outcomes will 
definitely occur the probability for the occurrence of outcome 2 (denoted as W2) is always the 
converse probability of W1 (100-W1). For instance, if W1=70  W2=30; if W1=30  W2=70. 
Influencing Outcome probabilities 
By contributing to the public account, probabilities W1 and W2 can be altered: 
- If no group member contributes to the public account, outcome one will certainly not 
occur (W1=0%) for the group and therefore, outcome two will occur with certainty 
(W2=100%). 
- For each euro allocated to the public account by any group member, probability W1 rises by 
5% and thus W2 drops by 5%. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- all ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Example 1: All four group members allocate nothing to the public account (i.e. [CnR, CR: €5] [PnR, 
PR: €15] to their private accounts). In total €0 are allocated to the public account.  
[CnR: Thus, each group member solely receives €5 (the amount allocated to his private account).] 
[PnR: Thus, each group member suffers a loss of €10 (deducted from his private account).] 
[CR: Thus, W1=0% (W1=0·5=0) and W2=100% (W2=100-W1). Outcome 2 occurs with certainty. Each 
group member receives the amount allocated to his private account.]  
[PR: Thus, W1=0% (W1=0·5=0) and W2=100% (W2=100-W1). Outcome 2 occurs with certainty. Each 
group member suffers a loss of €10 (deducted from his private account).]  
Consequently, each group member receives €5. 
[CnR:     
incometotal
accountgroupincome
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsum
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
55,0005 
    
 ] 
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[PnR:      
incometotal
loss
onscontributigrouptoduereductionloss
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsumloss
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
55,0010015
.max












  
    
] 
[CR:    
incometotaloutcomebonusno
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
5005
)2(

  
] 
[PR:    
incometotaloutcomeloss
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
510015
)2(

  
] 
Example 2: All four group members allocate €5 each to the public account (i.e. [CnR, CR: €0] [PnR, 
PR: €10] to their private accounts). In total, €20 are allocated to the public account (4·5=20).  
[CnR: Thus, each group member receives €10 from the public account additionally to the amount of 
€0 from his private account.] 
[PnR: Thus, €0 will be deducted from each group member’s private account.] 
[CR: Thus, W1=100% (W1=20·5=100) and W2=0% (W2=100-W1). Outcome 1 occurs with certainty. 
Additionally to the amount allocated on the private account, each group member receives €10 from 
the public account.] 
[PR: Thus, W1=100% (W1=20·5=100) and W2=0% (W2=100-W1). Outcome 1 occurs with certainty. 
Each group member receives the full amount located on his private account.] 
Consequently, each group member receives €10. 
[CnR:     
incometotal
accountgroupincome
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsum
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
105,02055 
    
] 
[PnR: 
     
incometotal
loss
onscontributigrouptoduereductionloss
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsumloss
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
105,02010515
.max












  
    
] 
[CR:    
incometotaloutcomebonus
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
101055
)1(

  
] 
[PR:    
incometotaloutcomelossno
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
100515
)1(

  
] 
Example 3: All four group members allocate €3 each to the public account (i.e. [CnR, CR: €2] [PnR, 
PR: €12] to their private accounts). In total €12 are allocated to the public account (4·3=12).  
[CnR: Thus, each group member receives €6 from the public account additionally to the amount of €2 
from his private account. Consequently, each group member receives €8.] 
[PnR: Thus, €4 will be deducted from each group member’s private account. Consequently, each 
group member receives €8.] 
[CR, PR: W1=60% (W1=12·5=60) and W2=40% (W2=100-W1).] 
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[CnR:     
incometotal
accountgroupincome
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsum
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
85,01235 
    
] 
[PnR: 
     
incometotal
loss
onscontributigrouptoduereductionloss
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsumloss
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
85,01210315
.max












  
    
] 
[CR: 
 With 60% probability each group member receives €12  
 (    
incometotaloutcomebonus
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
121035
)1(

  
) 
and with 40% probability each group member receives €2  
(    
incometotaloutcomebonusno
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
2035
)2(

  
).] 
[PR: 
With 60% probability each group member receives €12 
(    
incometotaloutcomelossno
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
120315
)1(

  
) 
and with 40% probability each group member receives €2 
(    
incometotaloutcomeloss
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
210315
)2(

  
).] 
------------------------------------------------------- CR, PR --------------------------------------------------------- 
The following table provides a detailed overview of the amounts jointly allocated to the public 
account by all four group members and the resulting outcome probabilities W1 and W2. 
Sum of group 
contributions W1 W2 
Sum of group 
contributions W1 W2 
0 0% 100% 11 55% 45% 
1 5% 95% 12 60% 40% 
2 10% 90% 13 65% 35% 
3 15% 85% 14 70% 30% 
4 20% 80% 15 75% 25% 
5 25% 75% 16 80% 20% 
6 30% 70% 17 85% 15% 
7 35% 65% 18 90% 10% 
8 40% 60% 19 95% 5% 
9 45% 55% 20 100% 0% 
10 50% 50%  
Table 4-5: Instructions - Probabilities 
Please note: At the end of the experiment, you will only receive the amount located on your private 
account. Your contributions to the public account will not be paid out. Their only purpose is to [CR: 
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raise the probability for outcome 1 for you and your group] [PR: reduce the probability for outcome 2 
for you and your group]. 
Determining payoffs for part 1 
The actual probabilities for outcome 1 and 2 depend on your as well as your group members’ 
decisions. In order to determine your payoff the definite occurrence of outcome 1 or 2 will be played 
out as follows: 
Visible for all, a randomly selected participant throws a ten-sided-die (with digits 0 to 9) twice for 
each group at the end of the experiment (subsequently to part 3). By this two die throws, a random 
number for part 1 will be found for each group with the first throw determining the first digit and the 
second throw the second digit of this random number.  
Example 1: First throw: 7; second throw: 2  random number: 72. 
Example 2: First throw: 0; second throw: 5  random number: 5. 
 Please note: This procedure guarantees the occurrence of all integers between 0 and 99 with equal 
chances. 
This way, a random number is determined which will be typed in the computer by the participant, 
supervised by the experimenter. Four each group, the computer compares their random number with 
the probability for outcome 1 (W1) determined by group members’ contributions to the public 
account. If the random number is smaller than W1, outcome 1 will occur for the group. If the 
random number is larger or equal than W1, outcome 2 will occur. 
Example 1: Group members have allocated €10 to the public account. Thus,W1=10·5=50. Outcome 1 
will occur for random numbers smaller than 50, i.e. 0, 1, 2, ..., 49. These are 50 out of 100 possible 
numbers. Therefore, the probability for outcome 1 to occur is exactly 50%. 
Example 2: Group members have allocated €0 to the public account. Thus,W1=0·5=0. Outcome 1 will 
occur for random numbers smaller than 0. This will never be the case as the random number is limited 
to values between 0 and 99. Therefore, the probability for outcome 1 to occur is exactly 0%. 
Example 3: Group members have allocated €20 to the public account. Thus,W1=20·5=100. Outcome 1 
will occur for random numbers smaller than 100. This will always be the case as the random number 
is limited to values between 0 and 99. Therefore, the probability for outcome 1 to occur is exactly 
100%. 
---------------------------------------------------------- all ---------------------------------------------------------- 
Before continuing with the different types of decisions, you are requested to solve a couple of 
exercises on the computer screen. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The experimenter 
will come to answer your questions in private. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CONTROL QUESTIONS62 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Decisions 
As mentioned before you will have to make two types of decisions, which we will call “unconditional 
contribution” and “contribution table” from now on. 
- On the first screen you have to select your unconditional contribution to the public account 
by typing in the amount you want to allocate to the public account. Only integers are 
possible. After choosing your amount, click “OK”. 
- On the second screen you have to fill in a contribution table. For each possible rounded 
contribution-average of the other group members you have to choose your contribution to the 
public account. The contribution table looks as follows: 
                                                            
62 See appendix A2. 
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Figure 4-6: Screenshot – Conditional cooperation 
 
Numbers is the left column represent the possible rounded average contributions of other group 
members to the public account, i.e. the average contribution of each other group member.  
In the right column you indicate how much you are willing to contribute to the public account, given 
the average contribution of your group members.  
For instance, you have to choose your contribution to the public account given that others contribute 
on average €0, €1, €2, €3 etc. In each box you can type in any integer between 0 and 5. You have to 
make an entry in each box. After filling in all boxes, please click “OK”. 
When all entries for the unconditional contribution and the contribution table are made, the computer 
will randomly select one group member for whom only his contribution table will determine his 
contribution. For all other group members the unconditional contribution decisions determine 
their contributions. Since you don’t know if you will be randomly selected or not, you should 
consider both types of contributions thoroughly.  
 
Example 1: Suppose you are randomly selected by the computer. Thus, the entries in the contribution 
table determine your contribution to the public good. The unconditional contributions of the other 
group members are €0, €2 and €5. Thus, the rounded average is €2 ((0+2+5)/3=2.33). Let’s assume 
you declared in your contribution table to contribute €1 to the public account if the other group 
members contribute €2 on average. In total 0+2+5+1=€8 are allocated to the public account.  
[CnR: Your income would therefore be as follows: 
    
incometotal
accountgroupincome
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsum
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
85,0815 
    
] 
[PnR: Your income would therefore be as follows: 
     
incometotal
loss
onscontributigrouptoduereductionloss
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsumloss
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
85,0810115
.max












  
    
] 
[CR, PR: Probability for outcome 1 will therefore be W1=40% (W1=8·5=40) and probability for 
outcome 2 W2=60% (W2=100-W1).] 
Example 2: Suppose you are not randomly selected by the computer. Thus, your entry in the 
unconditional contribution screen determines your contribution to the public good. Assume you chose 
an unconditional contribution of €5. Two other group members who aren’t selected either chose 
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unconditional contributions of €4 and €5 respectively. Thus, the rounded average is €5 
((5+4+5)/3=4.66)). Let’s assume the randomly selected group member indicated in his contribution 
table to contribute €4 if the other group members contribute €5 on average. In total 5+4+5=€18 are 
allocated to the public account.  
[CnR: Your income would therefore be as follows: 
    
incometotal
accountgroupincome
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsum
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
95,01855 
    
] 
[PnR: Your income would therefore be as follows: 
     
incometotal
loss
onscontributigrouptoduereductionloss
multiplieraccountpublictoonscontributiofsumloss
accountprivateincome
accountpublictooncontributiownendowment
95,01810515
.max












  
    
] 
[CR, PR: Probability for outcome 1 will therefore be W1=90% (W1=18·5=90) and probability for 
outcome 2 W2=10% (W2=100-W1).] 
The results of this part will be revealed at the end of the experiment. Then, you will learn the 
average contribution of others… [CnR, PnR: …as well as your income of this part.] [CR,PR: ... ,the 
resulting probabilities W1 and W2 for your group and (after determining the random number by die 
throw) your income.]  
 
Part 263 
Procedure 
In 10 identical rounds you are matched in groups of four. Groups are randomly re-matched by the 
computer for each round. Thus, in each round you are matched with other group members. Each 
round you have to make a “contribution decision” as well as an “estimation decision”. The 
contribution decision is equivalent to your selection of unconditional contributions in part I. In your 
estimation decision you have to estimate the contributions of other group members to the public 
account. Both types of decisions determine your income in this part in the following manner: At the 
end of the experiment one round is randomly selected to be payoff relevant for your contribution 
decision and one round in randomly selected to be payoff relevant for your estimation decision. Thus, 
you should consider all your decisions carefully.  
  
Decisions 
Contribution decision 
This decision problem is identical to the one you already know from part 1. Endowed with an 
amount of [CnR, CR: €5] [PnR, PR: €15] you have to decide how much to allocate to a public account 
(minimum €0, maximum €5) and how much to a private account. Your decisions have identical 
consequences as in part 1. However, you only have to make an unconditional contribution decision. 
You do not have to fill in a contribution table. After making ten decisions in ten rounds, one 
decision is randomly selected by die throw to be payoff relevant.  
 
Estimation decision 
After choosing your unconditional contribution, you are asked to estimate the average contribution 
of your three group members on the next screen. You state how likely you think it is that the three 
other group members allocate €0, €1, €2, €3, €4 or €5 to the public account on average. The six 
probabilities must sum up to 100%. Depending on the correctness of your estimation, you can earn 
                                                            
63 Handed out after completion of part 1. 
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an additional amount between €0 and €5 - provided this round is randomly selected to be payoff 
relevant. 
The next table shows four examples of estimation decisions. The examples will help you to 
understand the mechanism. Generally, you should consider the following: 
- More probable events should receive higher numbers. 
- Less probable events should receive lower numbers. 
 
Average 
contribution of 
group members 
Example 1: 
Estimation 
Example 2: 
Estimation 
Example 3: 
Estimation 
Example 4: 
Estimation 
€0 0 % 15 % 0% 70% 
€1 0 % 20 % 0% 0% 
€2 100 % 30 % 0% 0% 
€3 0 % 20 % 50% 5% 
€4 0 % 15 % 50% 5% 
€5 0 % 0 % 0% 20% 
Table 4-6: Instructions – Examples for estimation decisions 
In example 1 the decision maker is absolutely sure that other group members will allocate exactly an 
average of €2 to the public account. In example 2 the decision maker does not believe in an average 
contribution of more than €4, but beliefs average contributions between €0 and €4 to be possible with 
different probabilities (most probably a contribution of €2). Examples 3 and 4 are further examples for 
estimation decisions.  
Please note: All examples are randomly selected. Your decisions may look completely differently.  
 
The correctness of your estimation determines your income. We use a so called “quadratic 
deviation rule” to calculate your income. This method ensures that you can earn between €0 and €5, 
depending on the correctness of your estimation. Let’s assume your estimation decision is similar to 
the one shown in example 1. If average contributions of your group members have been €2, you 
would earn €5. However, if average contributions have been higher or lower than €2, you would earn 
€0. With an estimation as shown in example 2, you would earn less than in example 1 in case of 
average contributions of €2 (more precisely €3.46). However, you would earn a positive amount also 
in case of average contributions of €0, €1, €3 or €4. And even in case of average contributions of €5 
you would still earn a non-zero amount (more precisely €1.96). 
This means in general: 
- If you are certain about the occurring event(s), you should allocate higher probabilities to 
this (these) event(s). 
- If you are uncertain about the occurring events, it is advisable to split probabilities evenly 
between different events.  
 
In any case you should always allocate the probabilities according to your belief. The quadratic 
deviation rule ensures that there is no other way to maximize your earnings. 
 
Information between rounds 
After each round your contribution to the public account and the average contributions of your 
group members are displayed on your computer screen. [CnR, PnR: Additionally, the resulting 
amount that will be paid out at the end of the experiment, provided this round will be randomly 
selected as payoff relevant, is displayed.] [CR, PR: Additionally, the resulting probabilities for 
outcome 1 (W1) and outcome 2 (W2) are displayed. Whether outcome 1 or outcome 2 finally occur 
will only be determined at the end of the experiment for the round selected as payoff relevant by die 
throw.] 
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Determination of income in part 2 
At the end of the experiment payoff relevant rounds will be determined for all participants. To 
determine the round that is payoff relevant for estimation decisions, a randomly selected participant 
throws a ten-sided-die (with digits 0 to 9) once and types in the resulting number supervised by the 
experimenter. This number determines the payoff relevant round for your estimation decision (0 
represents round 10). For instance, a digit of one means that you will receive the amount that you 
earned with the correctness of your decision in round one.  
Subsequently, the round relevant for your contribution decision will be determined. The same 
randomly selected participant throws the ten-sided-die again to determine the relevant round for 
your contribution decision. Your and your group members’ (of this round) decisions determine 
[CnR, PnR: your income from your contribution decision.] [CR, PR: the probabilities for outcome 1 
or outcome 2. Whether outcome 1 or outcome 2 definitely occur will be determined afterwards. This 
is done exactly as described in part 1. Visible for all, a randomly selected participant throws a ten-
sided-die (with digits 0 to 9) twice for each group existent in the payoff relevant round. By this two 
die throws a random number for part 2 will be found for each group.  As in part 1, this random 
number will be compared to the outcome probabilities of the payoff relevant round. This determines 
whether outcome 1 or outcome 2 occur for your group in the payoff relevant round.] 
This amount will be paid out additionally to your earnings from parts 1 and 3. 
 
Part 364 
Task 
You face 10 decision problems. In each decision problem you have to choose one out of two 
lotteries. Once you have made all your decisions, please click the “OK”-button. You should consider 
all your decisions carefully since each decision can potentially determine your income in this part.  
Here is an example for such a decision problem: 
 Lottery X Lottery Y Your Choice 
You receive  
€2.00 with probability 8/10 
or 
€1.60 with probability 2/10 
You receive 
€3.85 with probability 8/10 
or 
€0.10 with probability 2/10 
Lottery X 
Lottery Y 
 
Your income in this part will be determined as follows: The computer chooses randomly and with 
equal probability one decision problem to be payoff relevant. The lottery chosen by you in this 
decision problem will be played and paid out in cash.  
Example: Suppose the computer randomly selects the decision problem given in the example above 
and suppose you preferred lottery X. The computer will then simulate lottery X and you will either 
receive €2 (with probability 8/10 = 80%) or €1.60 (with probability 2/10 = 20%).  
                                                            
64 Handed out after completion of part 2. 
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A2. Control Questions (translated from German)65 
Problem 1 
From their individual endowment of [CnR, CR: €5] [PnR, PR: €15], the four members of a group 
decide to allocate the following amounts to the public account: Player 1   €0, Player 2  €2, Player 
3  €1, Player 4  €0. 
------------------------------------------------------ CnR, PnR ------------------------------------------------------- 
 
a) Which amount do the respective players allocate to their private account? 
b) [CnR: Which amounts are added through the contributions made to the public account?] 
[PnR: By how much will the amount on their private account be reduced because of the 
contributions to the public account? 
c) What payoffs do the players receive? 
 
------------------------------------------------------- CR, PR ------------------------------------------------------- 
a) What are the final payoffs in case one or two respectively? 
b) With which probabilities do case one (W1) and case two (W2) occur? 
c) Let´s assume 58 results from the dice throw to determine the random number at the end of 
the experiment. Which case will occur for the group? 
 
Problem 2 
From their individual endowment of [CnR, CR: €5] [PnR, PR: €15], the four members of a group 
decide to allocate the following amounts to the public account: Player 1   €3, Player 2  €4, Player 
3  €5, Player 4  €4. 
------------------------------------------------------ CnR, PnR ------------------------------------------------------- 
 
a) Which amount do the respective players allocate to their private account? 
b) [CnR: Which amounts are added through the contributions made to the public account?] 
[PnR: By how much will the amount on their private account be reduced because of the 
contributions to the public account? 
c) What payoffs do the players receive? 
 
------------------------------------------------------- CR, PR ------------------------------------------------------- 
a) What are the final payoffs in case one or two respectively? 
b) With which probabilities do case one (W1) and case two (W2) occur? 
c) Let´s assume 58 results from the dice throw to determine the random number at the end of 
the experiment. Which case will occur for the group? 
                                                            
65 Parts exclusively used in a certain treatment are enclosed in square brackets. Larger treatment-
specific text passages are marked with horizontal lines. CnR denote creation frame no risk, PnR 
prevention frame no risk, CR creation frame risk, and PR prevention frame risk.  
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A3. Simulation: Marginal contribution-utility for different degrees of risk 
aversion 
 
 
Figure 4-7: Marginal contribution-utility depending on others‘ contributions 
 
Figure 4-7 shows subject i’s marginal utility-gain of a contribution in the CR- and 
PR-treatments depending on the sum of contributions made by her as well as other 
group members. Results are computed using the same parameters we apply in our 
experiment, i.e. 4n , 5w  and 5.0 . Thus, the maximum sum of contributions 
collected is €20. Utility is determined by a CRRA utility function of the form 
)1/()( 1 rxxU r   , varying the risk aversion parameter r . The values applied for r  
are the margins of risk aversion intervals which can be individually determined by a 
choice list elicitation mechanism introduced by Holt and Laury (2002).66  Holt and 
Laury classify subjects obtaining a risk aversion parameter r  within the interval 
between 0.15 and 0.41 as slightly risk averse and subjects with 37.197.0  r  as 
highly risk averse. While the vast majority of our participants exhibits an r  between 
0.41 and 0.97 (see section 4.4), Figure 4-7 shows that even for an extremely high risk 
aversion parameter of 37.1r  marginal utility of a contribution is always negative, 
although increasing in the sum of contributions. Thus, given the parameters used in 
our experiment and a realistically sloped utility function, free-riding remains a 
dominant strategy for selfish individuals.    
                                                            
66 The mechanism is elaborately described in section 4.2.4.  
-.500
-.400
-.300
-.200
-.100
.000
0 5 10 15
U
co
nt
r
-U
no
t c
on
tr
C (Sum of contributions)
Marginal utility of a contribution 
depending on others' contributions
r = 1.37
r = 0.97
r = 0.68
r = 0.41
r = 0.15
Appendix - Outcome Risk and Prevention Framing in Social Dilemmas 
 
135 
A4. Simulation: Marginal contribution-utility under risk and no risk condition 
 
Figure 4-8: Marginal contribution-utility depending on others’ contributions (low risk aversion) 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Marginal contribution-utility depending on others’ contributions (high risk aversion) 
 
Figures 4-8 and 4-9 show the marginal utility of a contribution dependent on the sum 
of group contributions both under outcome risk and under no outcome risk. It is 
important to note that marginal utility of a contribution is not only increasing with 
the sum of contributions under outcome risk but also with no outcome risk in place. 
The intuition behind this finding is as follows: Given a concave utility function, the 
marginal utility of money decreases. Given generous contributions of other group 
members, a decision maker’s earnings are already high and thus, the marginal costs 
of a contribution are lower. Figure 4-8 shows utility curves intercepting at 14C  for 
slightly risk averse individuals ( 15.0r ) applying an identically sloped CRRA-
utility function as in appendix A3. For highly risk averse individuals ( 37.1r ) 
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marginal contribution-utility is higher under the outcome risk condition only if the 
sum of contributions amount to at least 17 (Figure 4-9).  
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A5. Tables 
Option X Option Y Expected payoff 
difference 
1/10 of €2.00, 9/10 of €1.60 1/10 of €3.85, 9/10 of €0.10 €1.17 
2/10 of €2.00, 8/10 of €1.60 2/10 of €3.85, 8/10 of €0.10 €0.83 
3/10 of €2.00, 7/10 of €1.60 3/10 of €3.85, 7/10 of €0.10 €0.50 
4/10 of €2.00, 6/10 of €1.60 4/10 of €3.85, 6/10 of €0.10 €0.16 
5/10 of €2.00, 5/10 of €1.60 5/10 of €3.85, 5/10 of €0.10 -€0.18 
6/10 of €2.00, 4/10 of €1.60 6/10 of €3.85, 4/10 of €0.10 -€0.51 
7/10 of €2.00, 3/10 of €1.60 7/10 of €3.85, 3/10 of €0.10 -€0.85 
8/10 of €2.00, 2/10 of €1.60 8/10 of €3.85, 2/10 of €0.10 -€1.18 
9/10 of €2.00, 1/10 of €1.60 9/10 of €3.85, 1/10 of €0.10 -€1.52 
10/10 of €2.00, 0/10 of €1.60 10/10 of €3.85, 0/10 of €0.10 -€1.85 
Table 4-7: Choice list (Holt and Laury 2002) 
 
  Framing dimension Risk dimension 
  CR vs. PR CnR vs. PnR CnR vs. CR PnR vs. PR 
ot
he
rs
' co
nt
rib
ut
io
n  0 z= 1.439 z= 3.272* z= -2.194* z= -0.125 
1 z= 1.563 z= 1.942 z= -1.411 z= -1.001 
2 z= 2.662** z= 1.032 z= -1.516 z= -3.149** 
3 z= 1.978* z= 0.157 z= -4.207*** z= -4.999*** 
4 z= 0.396 z= -0.262 z= -3.514*** z= -3.712*** 
5 z= -0.114 z= -0.114 z= -2.674** z= -2.547* 
suma z= 1.237 z= 0.605 z= -3.784 *** z= -3.751*** 
 
Mann-Whitney tests comparing contributions conditional on 
what others contribute between treatments; *** represents 
significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05. 
a sum of contributions over all six levels. 
Table 4-8: Conditional contribution (by treatment) - Mann-Whitney tests 
 
CnR vs. CR PnR vs. PR 
Cond. 
Contr.67 Humpshaped others Cond. Contr. Humpshaped others 
ot
he
rs
' c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 0 z=-1.459 z=0.745 z= -0.447 z= -0.672 z= 1.247 z= -1.514 
1 z= 1.053 z= -1.091 z= -1.000 z= -0.472 z= 1.185 z= -1.805 
2 z= 0.914 z= -0.416 z= 0.000 z= -1.406 z= -1.298 z= -1.998* 
3 z= -1.037 z= 1.561 z= -1.414 z= -0.772 z= -3.684*** z= -2.307* 
4 z= -0.616 z= 0.750 z= 0.000 z= -0.331 z= -2.344* z= -1.585 
5 z= 0.484 z= -1.644 z= -0.471 z= 0.075 z= -1.965* z= -0.717 
suma z= -0.249 z= -1.269 z= -0.447 z= -0.862 z= -2.978** z= -1.560 
 
Mann-Whitney tests comparing contributions conditional on what others contribute between 
treatments separately for each contribution type; *** represents significance at p=0.001, ** at 
p=0.01, * at p=0.05. 
a sum of contributions over all six levels. 
Table 4-9: Conditional contribution (by contribution type) – Mann-Whitney test 
                                                            
67 We apply the same classifications used in Fischbacher et al. (2001). Thus, subjects are classified as 
conditional cooperators not only if their responses are monotonic in a strict sense but also if their 
contributions positively and significantly (at the 1% level) correlate with others’ contributions 
according to a Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
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A6. Figures 
 
Figure 4-10: Contributions and expected contributions (risk vs. no risk) 
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Figure 4-11: Contributions by independent observation (creation vs. prevention) 
 
 
Figure 4-12: Contributions by independent observation (risk vs. no risk) 
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Figure 4-13: Distribution of risk aversion elicited by a choice list mechanism (Holt & Laury 2002) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-14: Conditional Cooperation (risk vs. no risk) 
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Figure 4-15: Conditional Cooperation by type (creation vs. prevention under risk) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-16: Conditional Cooperation by type (creation vs. prevention under no risk) 
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Figure 4-17: Conditional Cooperation by type (risk vs. no risk under creation) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-18: Conditional Cooperation by type (risk vs. no risk under prevention) 
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